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Issue: confrontation clauseMS ↗
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Quoted verbatim 13×
97.2 score
G Cite
cited 6× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 ·
…booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding
at p. 654
⚠ not in text
cited 6× by 6 distinct cases, last quoted 2008 ·
…calculate the guideline range as they would have done prior to booker , but then sentence defendants by taking into account all of the relevant factors of 18 u.s.c. 3553 , as well as the guidelines range.
at p. 655
⚠ not in text
Topic ↗
cited 4× by 4 distinct cases, 2008–2018 ·
…booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding.
at p. 654
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 2006 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Wendell Adrian Brown v. United States
(2×)
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding. instead, the remedial majority gave district courts the option, after calculating the guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside the resulting guideline range.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Jake Messer
based on the supreme court's ruling in booker, the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory; they are advisory.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Martin v. State
crawford was concerned only with testimonial evidence introduced at trial ....
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Jackson
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding. instead, the remedial majority gave district courts the option, after calculating the guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside the resulting guideline range.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Paull
because crawford was concerned only with testimonial evidence introduced at trial, crawford does not change our . . . rule that the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Martedis McPhearson
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Wittingen
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Sexton
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Franklin
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Franklin
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Cook, Larone
(2×)
also: Cited as authority (rule)
booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding. instead, district courts have "the option, after calculating the guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside the resulting guideline range.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Terry Pitchford v. State of Mississippi
because crawford was concerned only with testimonial evidence introduced at trial, crawford does not change our long-settled rule that the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings
examined
Cited as authority (quoted)
United States v. Mendez
booker did not eliminate judicial fact- finding. instead, the remedial majority gave district courts the option, after calculating the guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside the resulting guideline range.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Com. v. McClain, M.
In Pennsylvania, due process does not include the ability to cross-examine adverse witnesses post- trial because the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution “does not apply in sentencing hearings.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 337 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005))).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Anthony Ellsworth Turner
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265-67 (2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Com. v. Malloy, S.
In Pennsylvania, due process does not include the ability to cross- examine adverse witnesses post-trial because the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution "does not apply in sentencing hearings." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 337 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quoting United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mary Jane Johns
As we have said, “Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d. 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Com. v. Thompson, W.
Commonwealth. v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 337 (Pa. Super. 2014), quoting United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. David Gonzalez
We have held that “testimonial hearsay does not affect a defendant’s right to confrontation at sentencing.” United States v. Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 576 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005) (referring to “our long-settled rule that the confrontation clause does not apply in sentencing proceedings”).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Petric v. State
See, e.g., United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 243 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Brown, 430 F.3d 942, 944 (8th Cir.2005); and United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir.2006).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Romero Minor
See United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 527-28 (6th Cir.2009); Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d at 575-76 ; United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Powell
See United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103, 109 (D.C.Cir.2007); United States v. Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir.2007); United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102, 108 (5th Cir.2006); United States v. Bustamante, 454 F.3d 1200, 1202-03 (10th Cir.2006); United States v. Littlesun, 444 F.3d 1196 , 1199— 1200 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Brown, 430 F.3d 942, 943-44 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Robert Pizzino
In sentencing a defendant, district courts must “tak[e] into account all of the relevant factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 , as well as the Guidelines range.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir.2005).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Tennessee v. Arealie Boyd
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jerome Sawyers
“Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 821 , 127 S.Ct. 129 , 166 L.Ed.2d 35 (2006).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
State of Tennessee v. William Edwin Harris
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Harper v. Commonwealth
See also United States v. Luciano, 414 F.3d 174, 178-80 (1st Cir.2005) (“Nothing in Crawford requires us to alter our previous conclusion that there is no Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right at sentencing.”); United States v. Martinez, 413 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir.2005) (“Both the Supreme Court and this Court, however, have consistently held that the right of confrontation does not apply to the sentencing context and does not prohibit the consideration of hearsay testimony in sentencing proceedings.”); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005) (“Because Crawford wa…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rashid
See United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005). 4 Under this framework, the upward adjustment of Ab-rar’s advisory Guidelines sentence range based on judicial findings about Abrar’s leadership role in the crimes, the amount of loss attributable to his crimes, abuse of a specialized skill (accounting), and obstruction of justice (based on perjury) was not procedural error.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. White
See United States v. Brika, 487 F.3d 450 , 459 n. 3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 128 S.Ct. 341 , 169 L.Ed.2d 239 (2007); United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Crockett
(2×)
In United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir.2005), the Sixth Circuit suggested that an expert witness may not rely on testimonial hearsay in a criminal case, although the Court found that the expert actually relied only on evidence that was properly admitted.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Osborne
Instead, the remedial majority gave district courts the option, after calculating the Guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside the resulting Guideline range.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Osborne
Instead, the remedial majority gave district courts the option, after calculating the Guideline range, to sentence a defendant outside the resulting Guideline range.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Jackson
Defendant’s next contention that the district court impermissibly relied upon judicially found facts regarding the alleged losses in enhancing his sentences is meritless in light of our recurring conclusion that “district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range using the same preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that governed prior to Booker.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gray
Defendant’s next contention that the district court impermissibly relied upon judicially found facts regarding the alleged losses in enhancing his sentences is merit-less in light of our recurring conclusion that “district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range using the same preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that governed prior to Booker.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir.2006) (citing United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Wittingen
(2×)
See, e.g., Thompson, 515 F.3d at 568 (“The Supreme Court has sanctioned judicial factfinding, even factfinding that enhances rather than reduces a defendant’s sentence, so long as the factfinding does not result in a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 461 (6th Cir.2006) (“[A] district court may make its own factual findings regarding relevant sentencing factors, and consider those factors in determining a defendant’s sentence.”); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005) (“Booker did not elim…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Pomales
(2×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
“Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Philips
Rather, district courts must "calculate the Guideline range as they would have done prior to Booker , but then sentence defendants by taking into account all of the relevant factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 , as well as the Guidelines range." United *486 States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir.2006).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Phillips
(2×)
Rather, district courts must “calculate the Guideline range as they would have done prior to Booker, but then sentence defendants by taking into account all of the relevant factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 , as well as the Guidelines range.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2006).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Thompson
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying a presumption of reasonableness to a within- Guidelines sentence where the Guidelines calculation was enhanced based on judge-found facts and the resulting sentence would have been outside a non-enhanced Guidelines range); United States v. Cook, 453 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “Booker . . . has no bearing on advisory guideline calculations”); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court’s fact-finding with respect to an obstruction of justi…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Thompson
(2×)
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 529 (6th Cir.2007) (applying a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence where the Guidelines calculation was enhanced based on judge-found facts and the resulting sentence would have been outside a non-enhanced Guidelines range); United States v. Cook, 453 F.3d 775, 777 (6th Cir.2006) (explaining that " Booker . . . has no bearing on advisory guideline calculations"); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that the district court's fact-finding with respect to an obstruction of justice enhanc…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sexton
(2×)
As we stated in United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir.2006) (collecting cases), "[b]y now, it is well established that the preponderance standard does not violate Booker , so long as the trial court appreciates that the guidelines are advisory, not binding." See also United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005) (" Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding").
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Daulton
(2×)
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654 (6th Cir. 2005).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Maken
Although United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 , 125 S.Ct. 738 , 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, “Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005). 8 “[TJhis court and others have repeatedly held since Booker that district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range using the same preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that governed prior to Booker.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir.2006); see also Rita v. Unit…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Maken
Although United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, “Booker did8not eliminate judicial fact-finding.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2005). “[T]his court and others have repeatedly held since Booker that district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range using the same preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that governed prior to Booker.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456 , 2465-6…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gonzalez
Rather, district courts must “calculate the Guideline range as they would have done prior to Booker , but then sentence defendants by taking into account all of the relevant factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 , as well as the Guidelines range.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir.2006).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Vasilakos
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 129 (2006).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Vasilakos
United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir.2005), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 127 S.Ct. 129 , 166 L.Ed.2d 35 (2006).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Four Pillars Enterprise Co.
Rather, district courts must “calculate the Guideline range as they would have done prior to Booker , but then sentence defendants by taking into account all of the relevant factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 , as well as the Guidelines range.” United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir.2005); see also United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir.2006).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lacefield
As we have previously noted, “this court and others have repeatedly held since Booker that district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range using the same preponderance of the evidence standard that governed prior to Booker.” United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 654-55 (6th Cir.2005), cert. denied, — U.S.—, 127 S.Ct. 129 , 166 L.Ed.2d 35 (2006)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. White
Cf., United States v. Flores, 477 F.3d 431, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mickens, 453 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v. Stone, 432 F.3d 651, 655 (6th Cir. 2005).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
MOUNTAIN TOP BEVERAGE GROUP, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILDLIFE BREWING N.B., INC.; James Sorenson, Defendants--Appellees
v.
WILDLIFE BREWING N.B., INC.; James Sorenson, Defendants--Appellees
04-4075.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Dec 22, 2005.
ARGUED: David L. Petitjean, Chappano Wood, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. Whelley II, Rachael L. Rodman, Chernesky, Heyman & Kress, Dayton, Ohio, for Appellant. David L. Petitjean, Chappano Wood, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.
Moore, Rogers, McKeague.
Published
Citer courts: Sixth Circuit (1)
OPINION
ROGERS, Circuit Judge.Plaintiff Mountain Top Beverage Group appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Wildlife Brewing and James Sorenson on Mountain Top’s trademark infringement claims under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a), and related state law claims, and the district court’s cancellation of Mountain Top’s ‘Wildcat” trademarks. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, this court affirms the district court’s decision for the reasons stated in Judge Dlott’s order below. See Mountain Top Beverage Group, Inc. v. Wildlife Brewing N.B., Inc. et al, 338 F.Supp.2d 827 (SD.Ohio 2003). [1] The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Wildlife and Sorenson and cancelled Mountain Top’s trademark. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
1
. We do not reach the issues resolved in part III.C of the district court’s order, Mountain Top, 338 F.Supp.2d at 836-37, as there was no cross-appeal raising those issues.