United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996). · Go Syfert
Search
United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
G Cite
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, last quoted 2000 · …ten-year sentence but with deferred adjudication probation ✓
26 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Carmello Anthony Rolon (ca6, 2026-01-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1997 2011 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Carmello Anthony Rolon
6th Cir. · 2026 · confidence medium
It treats a Texas “deferred adjudication” as a “prior conviction” when calculating a defendant’s criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 57 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (quotation omitted), and under the statute we considered in Adams, see United States v. Cisneros, 112 F.3d 1272, 1282 (5th Cir. 1997) (addressing 18 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Taylor Mills
5th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
Appx, 424, 425-26 (5th Cir. 2012) (per cu-riam) (same under § 4A1.2(f) and comment n.10), 3 .See, e.g., Stauder, 73 F.3d at 56-57 (noting that § 2K2.1 incorporates the definition of “conviction” used in § 4A1.1, which directs that criminal history computations should count a "diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt”); United States v. Joshua, 305 F,3d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that § 4b 1.1 incorporates the definition of "prior felony conviction” used in § 4B1.2, which, in turn, includes commentary *215 stating: “ ‘Prior felony conviction…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beedy v. State
Tex. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
The State also cites federal authority to demonstrate that courts have liberally construed the a similar definition “conviction.” See Garnica-Vasquez v. Reno, 210 F.3d 558, 559 (5th Cir.2000) (stating that deferred adjudication is considered conviction for purposes of federal deportation statute); U.S. v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 57 (5th Cir.1996) (stating that deferred adjudication is considered conviction in calculating base offense level for later conviction under federal sentencing guidelines).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hurley v. State of Texas (2×)
Tex. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Garnica-Vasquez v. Reno, 210 F.3d 558, 560 (5th Cir.2000) (deferred adjudication considered conviction for purposes of federal deportation laws); United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 57 (5th Cir.1996) (deferred adjudication considered conviction in calculating base offense level for later conviction under federal sentencing guidelines).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Dell
10th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
See United States v. Fernandez, 234 F.3d 1345, 1346 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 57 (5th Cir.1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Altieri
D. Me. · 2003 · confidence medium
The Government cites to United States v. Joshua, 305 F.3d 352, 353 (5th Cir.2002), United States v. Valdez-Valdez, 143 F.3d 196, 203 (5th Cir.1998), United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 57 (5th Cir.1996) Gamica-Vasquez v. Reno, 210 F.3d 558, 560 (5th Cir.2000), and Bui v. Ashcroft, No. Civ.A 3:02-CV-1140, 2003 WL 251929 , at *3 (N.D.Tex.2003) in support of its position.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Joshua
5th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 56-57 (5th Cir.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Cothran
5th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
United States v. Gooden, 116 F.3d 721, 724 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 57 (5th Cir.1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Guerrero
5th Cir. · 2000 · confidence medium
United States v. Stauder, 73 F.3d 56, 57 (5th Cir. 1996).
discussed Cited "see" Yeboah-Sefah v. Ficco
1st Cir. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Teti, 507 *73 F.3d at 56-57. "[W]here state law is explicitly more favorable to defendants than the federal standard, we will presume the federal law adjudication to be subsumed within the state law adjudication.” Id. at 56 (quotation marks omitted).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Armando Lazaro Fernandez
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 56-57 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Armando Lazaro Fernandez
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 56-57 .
cited Cited "see" United States v. Armando Lazaro Fernandez
11th Cir. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 56-57 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Thomas Joseph STAUDER, II, Defendant-Appellant
95-10112.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Jan 9, 1996.
73 F.3d 56
1996 WL 5663
Christy Lee Drake, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Amarillo, TX, for plaintiff-appellee., Sam L. Ogan, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Amarillo, TX, for defendant-appellant.
Reavley, Higginbotham, Barksdale.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

At issue is whether, for sentencing for a felon in possession of a firearm conviction, a Texas criminal deferred adjudication can be used for calculating the base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. We AFFIRM.

I.

Thomas Joseph Stauder, II, pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. For calculating Stauder’s base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), and over Stauder’s objection, the district court included as a prior felony conviction Stau-der’s 1991 guilty plea to aggravated assault in Texas state court, for which he received a ten-year sentence, but with deferred adjudication probation.

II.

Stauder maintains that his Texas deferred adjudication is not a “conviction” under Texas law, and contends, therefore, that it should not have been counted in calculating his base offense level. Needless to say, we review, de novo, the district court’s application of the Guidelines. E.g., United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381, 389 (5th Cir.1995).

The base offense level for a defendant convicted of a firearm offense is based on the number of certain types of prior felony convictions. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1. Section 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) provides for a base offense level of 20 if the defendant “had one prior felony conviction of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense”; Stauder concedes that aggravated assault (his Texas offense) is a crime of violence.

The commentary to § 2K2.1 refers to application note 3 to § 4B 1.2 for the definition[*57] of “prior felony conviction(s)”. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment, (n.5). That note defines a “prior felony conviction” as “a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence imposed”. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment. (n.3).

The commentary to § 2K2.1 provides also that, “[f]or purposes of determining the number of ... convictions under [§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) ], count any such prior conviction that receives any points under § 4A1.1 (Criminal History Category)”. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), comment, (n.5) (emphasis added). The definitions and instructions for computing criminal history state that “[a] diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or admission of guilt ... is counted as a sentence under § 4Al.l(c) even if a conviction is not formally entered....” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(f) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, as Stauder acknowledges, the Guidelines provide that deferred adjudications resulting from a finding or admission of guilt are to be considered in computing the criminal history category. And, § 2K2.1 provides that any prior “conviction” that receives points for purposes of determining the criminal history category is to be considered in determining the number of prior felony convictions for calculating the base offense level under § 2K2.1. Although § 2K2.1 uses the term “conviction”, it refers specifically to the criminal history provisions, which, as stated, include deferred adjudications such as Stauder’s in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score. *

III.

Based on the foregoing, we hold that the district court did not misapply the Guidelines by considering Stauder’s deferred adjudication in calculating his base offense level. Stauder’s sentence is, therefore,

AFFIRMED.

*

Stauder’s reliance on United States v. Hamilton, 48 F.3d 149, 153 (5th Cir.1995) ("when adjudication of guilt is deferred, there is no ‘conviction’ " within meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 609, which permits a witness to be questioned about prior convictions); Martinez-Montoya v. I.N.S., 904 F.2d 1018, 1025-26 (5th Cir.1990) (Texas deferred adjudication procedure does not result in final conviction within meaning of immigration laws); and United States v. Dotson, 555 F.2d 134, 135 (5th Cir.1977) (upholding dismissal of charge that defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm because there was no adjudication of guilt and sentence was suspended), is misplaced. In short, those cases did not involve the interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1.