Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299 (1803). · Go Syfert
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Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299 (1803). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 2× by 2 distinct cases, last quoted 1987 · …contemporary interpretation of the constitution of the most forcible nature ⚠ not in text
cited 2× by 1 distinct case · …it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under a statute for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irrefutable answer, and has indeed fixed the construction ✓
cited 2× by 1 distinct case, last quoted 1985 · …to this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice, and acquiescence under it, for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistable answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. ✓
244 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 63 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Baldwin v. United States (scotus, 2020-02-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1900 1963 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers. How cited ↗
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Baldwin v. United States (2×)
SCOTUS · 2020 · signal: see · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under a statute for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irrefutable answer, and has indeed fixed the construction
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Glenn Bowles v. Gretchen Whitmer
6th Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
But the Court later upheld the constitutionality of circuit riding, reasoning that the practice’s continuation for a decade had “fixed” the Constitution’s “construction.” Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 309 (1803).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
SCOTUS · 2024 · confidence medium
Page Proof Pending Publication Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (1827); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309 (1803).4 But traditionally, that did not mean a court had to “defer” to any “reasonable” con- struction of an “ambiguous” law that an executive agency might offer.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
SCOTUS · 2024 · confidence medium
Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby, 12 Wheat. 206, 210 (1827); see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 401 (1819); Stu- art v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309 (1803).4 But traditionally, that did not mean a court had to “defer” to any “reasonable” —————— 4 Accord, National Lead Co. v. United States, 252 U. S. 140 , 145–146 (1920) (affording “great weight” to a “contemporaneous construction” by the executive that had “been long continued”); Jacobs v. Prichard, 223 U. S. 200, 214 (1912) (“find[ing] no ambiguity in the act” but also finding “strength” for the Cour…
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Doe Corporation
7th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Enterprises, Inc., 498 No. 22-1845 5 U.S. at 299.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ali Hamza Ahmad al Bahlul v. United States
D.C. Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
When analyzing separation-of-powers challenges, the Supreme Court has explained, “the practical construction of the [C]onstitution, as given by so many acts of [C]ongress, and embracing almost the entire period of our national existence, should not be overruled, unless upon a conviction that such legislation was clearly incompatible with the supreme law of the land.” Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 691 (1892); see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) NLRB v. Noel Canning
SCOTUS · 2014 · confidence medium
A. Plain Meaning A sensible interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause should start by recognizing that the Clause uses the term “Recess” in contradistinction to the term “Ses­ sion.” As Alexander Hamilton wrote: “The time within which the power is to operate ‘during the recess of the —————— gress elected under the present constitution,” “recognized by many successive legislatures, and . . . acted upon by the judicial department,” in support of the conclusion that the Necessary and Proper Clause allowed Congress to incorporate a bank); Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Earle A. Partington v. Joseph M. Gedan Howard T. Chang (2×)
9th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309 (1803).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Application of the Neutrality Act to Official Government Activities
OLC · 1984 · confidence medium
See also U nited States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322-29 (1936); The P ocket Veto Cases, 279 U.S. 655, 688-90 (1929); M yers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926); M artin v. H unter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 351-52 (1816); Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).17 Moreover, given the Act’s purpose to enhance the President’s ability to implement the foreign policy goals that have been developed by him, with appropriate participation by Congress, it would indeed be anomalous to inter­ pret the Act to prohibit Government officials, acting proper…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States (2×)
Cust. Ct. · 1958 · confidence medium
Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299, 309 , 5 U.S. 299, 309 [ 2 L.Ed. 115, 118 ]; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 351 , 14 U.S. 304, 351 [ 4 L.Ed. 97, 109 ]; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 315 , 53 U.S. 299, 315 [ 13 L.Ed. 996, 1003 ]; Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 , 4 S.Ct. 279 [ 28 L.Ed. 349, 350 ]; The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 416 , 5 S.Ct. 881 [ 29 L.Ed. 147, 148 ].
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Young
La. · 1915 · confidence medium
That presumption is not reasoning in a circle, but the basis of a wise and quieting rule-that in determining the meaning of a statute- or the existence of a power weight shall be given to the usage itself, even when the validity of the practice is the subject of investigation^ “This principle, recognized in every jurisdiction, was first applied by this court in the-often-cited case of Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299, 309 [ 2 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Board of Water Commissioners v. Curtis
Conn. · 1913 · confidence medium
Stuart v. Laird, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309; Lavery v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 560, 563; Harrison v. State, 22 Md. 468, 491 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McEntee v. . Kingston Water Co.
NY · 1900 · confidence medium
Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N. Y. 85 ; Kortright v. Buffalo Commercial Bank, 20 Wend. 93 , 94; The King v. Bank of England, 1 Doug. 523 .) The law supposes that the corporation promises or undertakes to do its duty, and subjects it to answer in a proper action for its defaults whether of nonfeasance or misfeasance, (3 Dane, 109; 5 id. 160 ; Bank of Columbia v. Patterson, 1 Cranch, 299, 305, 306, opinion by Mr. Justice Story.) The principles controlling this case have frequently been decided in the lower courts, and the substance of these decisions is that if the company supplying water, gas, telegraph…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. Hickman's Heirs
Tenn. · 1813 · confidence medium
Contemporaneous construction is always most to be relied on in doubtful cases. 1 Cra. 299, 304, 309 .
discussed Cited "see" Wilkinson v. Legal Services Corp. (2×)
D.D.C. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299 , 2 L.Ed. 115 (1803) (noting that early historical practice can put a constitutional issue "at rest"); see also Thomas A. Curtis, Note, Recess Appoint-merits to Article III Courts: The Use of Historical Practice in Constitutional Interpretation, 84 Co-lum.L.Rev. 1758 (1984). 10 . 12 Stat. 646 (1863), currently codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" In Re George I. Benny and Alexandra Benny, Debtors. Alexandra Benny v. John M. England, Trustee, Chicago Title Insurance Company, Creditor, Etc., United States of America, Intervenor-Appellant v. John M. England, Trustee, Chicago Title Insurance Company, Creditor, Etc. (2×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 , 2 L.Ed. 115 (1803) (long practice of Supreme Court Justices sitting as Circuit Justices is a "contemporary interpretation [of the Constitution] of the most forcible nature"); see also United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1010-11 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc) (relying on historical practice to uphold recess appointments against Article III concerns), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1269 , 89 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986).
discussed Cited "see" Benny v. England (2×)
9th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 308 , 2 L.Ed. 115 (1803) (long practice of Supreme Court Justices sitting as Circuit Justices is a “contemporary interpretation [of the Constitution] of the most forcible nature”); see also United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1010-11 (9th Cir.1985) (en banc) (relying on historical practice to uphold recess appointments against Article III concerns), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1269 , 89 L.Ed.2d 577 (1986).
cited Cited "see" State v. Kelsey
unknown court · 1882 · signal: see · confidence high
See Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299 ; Wilberforce on Stat. L. 146; R. v. Hogg, 1 T.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Brewer v. Burns (4×)
Ariz. · 2009 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 , 2 L.Ed. 115 (1803) (propriety of requiring justices to sit as circuit judges established by "practice and acquiescence . . . commencing with the organization of the judicial system").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Senator Barry Goldwater v. James Earl Carter, President of the United States
D.C. Cir. · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 299, 309, 2 L.Ed. 115 (1803); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S.) 304, 351, 4 L.Ed. 97 (1816); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264, 420, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. (41 U.S.) 539, 620, 10 L.Ed. 1060 (1842); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299, 315, 13 L.Ed. 996 (1851); Burrow-Giles Lithographing Company v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 , 4 S.Ct. 279 , 28 L.Ed. 349 (1883); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 , 463-469, 4 S.Ct. 437 , 28 L.Ed. 482 (1883); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 , 5 S.Ct. 881 , 29 L.Ed. 147 (18…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." International Chemical Workers Union v. Planters Manufacturing Co. (2×)
N.D. Miss. · 1966 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 299 , 2 L.Ed. 115 (1803); United States v. Vowell, 5 Cranch 368 , 3 L.Ed. 128 (1809); Bank of United States v. Halstead, 10 Wheat. 51 , 6 L.Ed. 264 (1825); Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 , 35 L.Ed. 363 (1891). 5 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In re Will of Warfield
Cal. · 1863 · signal: see also · confidence low
(Panaud v. Jones, 1 Cal. 448 , and cases cited at 499; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 477 ; see also Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299 .) Our conclusion is, that the evidence shows that the will in question was duly probated before the institution of the present proceedings.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Stuart
v.
Laird
Supreme Court of the United States.
Mar 18, 1803.
1 Cranch 299
1803 U.S. LEXIS 362
C. Lee, for plaintiff in error. , Gantt, contra., Lee, in reply.
Paterson.
Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 82%
Citer courts: Supreme Court (2)

The chief justice, having tried the cause in the court below, declined giving an opinion.

Paterson, justice,

(judge Cushing being absent on account of ill health,) delivered the opinion of the court.

On an action instituted by John Laird against Hugh Stuart, a judgment was entered in a court for the fourth circuit in the eastern district of Virginia, in December term 1801. On this judgment, an execution was issued, returnable to April term 1802, in the same court. In the term of December 1802, John Laird obtained judgment at a court for the fifth circuit in the Virginia district, against Hugh Stuart and Charles L. Carter, upon their bond for the forthcoming and delivery of certain property therein mentioned, which had been levied upon by virtue of the above execution against the said Hugh Stuart.

Two reasons have been assigned by counsel for reversing the judgment on the forthcoming bond. 1. That as the bond was given for the delivery of property levied on by virtue of an execution issuing out of, and returnable to a court for the fourth circuit, no other court could legally[*309] proceed upon the said bond. This is true, if there be no statutable provision to direct and authorize such proceeding. Congress have constitutional authority to establish from time to time such inferior tribunals as they may think proper; and to transfer a cause from one such tribunal to another. In this last particular, there are no words in the constitution to prohibit or restrain the exercise of legislative power.

The present is a case of this kind. It is nothing more than the removal of the suit brought by Stuart against Laird from the court of the fourth circuit to the court of the fifth circuit, which is authorized to proceed upon and carry it into full effect. This is apparent from the ninth section of the act entitled, “ an act to amend the judicial “ system of the United States,” passed the 29th of April, 1802. The forthcoming bond is an appendage to the cause, or rather a component part of the proceedings.

2d. Another reason for reversal is, that the judges of the supreme court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct commissions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistable answer, and has indeed fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and ought not now to be disturbed.

Judgment affirmed.