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13 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1844–2007 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alexander v. State by and Through Allaingreen2 sentences2005There, the principle was noted in the following cases: "` Alexander et al. v. State , 441 So.2d 1329 , 1341 (Miss. 1983) ("Once taxes have been levied and appropriation made, the legislative prerogative ends and executive responsibility begins. . . ."); State ex rel. 2005There, the principle was noted in the following cases: "` Alexander et al. v. State, 441 So.2d 1329, 1341 (Miss.1983) ("Once taxes have been levied and appropriation made, the legislative prerogative ends and executive responsibility begins. . . ."); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Personnel Bd. of State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2004In Personnel Board of Alabama v. King , 456 So.2d 80 , 82 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984), this court acknowledged this principle by stating: "[T]he provision for a hearing officer in the context of Personnel Board appeals is a result of the Personnel Board's own rules and regulations formulated pursuant to section 36-26-9 , Ala. Code (1975). 2004In Personnel Board of Alabama v. King, 456 So.2d 80, 82 (Ala.Civ.App.1984), this court acknowledged this principle by stating: "[T]he provision for a hearing officer in the context of Personnel Board appeals is a result of the Personnel Board's own rules and regulations formulated pursuant to section 36-26-9, Ala.Code (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. East Lake Land Co.green1 sentence1915“In Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 Ala. 545 , it was said: ‘Whenever a statute is leveled against an abuse, or in furtherance of an acknowledged principle of right and justice, every reason exists for its most reansonable application;; and, in such cases, it may fairly be presumed that it was the intention of the Legislature that the boon of the statute should be extended .to every case which its words could properly. include.’ ” —Binning- ham Trust & Saings Co. v. East Lake Land Co., 101 Ala. 304, 307, 308 , 13 South. 72 . | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Bristol & Powellgreen1 sentence1844It has been often stated, as .an acknowledged principle, if a factor sells goods in his own name, the purchaser, without a knowledge of any other person being a party to the contract, in the absence of collusion, is entitled to regard the debt as due to the factor, so as in an actioh brought by the principal, to set-off a debt due from the factor to himself. [Paley’s Agency, 326 to 335.] Mr. Justice Story, in his treatise on ’ the Law of Agency, says, if the agent is the only known or supposed principal, the person dealing with him will be entitled to the same rights of set-off as if the agent | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nettles v. State
green
1 sentence2007Thus, we held that the excluded evidence “ ‘lent a new aura of credibility,’ ” Nettles, 683 So.2d at 13 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Opinion of the Justices No. 380
green
2 sentences2005More recently, the Justices of this Court acknowledged this principle in concluding that the separation-of-powers provisions of the Alabama Constitution do not "permit either the House or the Senate, through action or inaction, effectively to veto a contract entered into by the executive branch." Opinion of the Justices No. 380 , 892 So.2d at 337 . 2005More recently, the Justices of this Court acknowledged this principle in concluding that the separation-of-powers provisions of the Alabama Constitution do not "permit either the House or the Senate, through action or inaction, effectively to veto a contract entered into by the executive branch." Opinion of the Justices No. 380, 892 So.2d at 337 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Ex Parte First Nat. Bank of Jasper
green
2 sentences1998In the FNB of Jasper III , this Court acknowledged that the rule established in Ex parte First National Bank of Jasper , 675 So.2d 348 (Ala. 1995), and First National Bank of Jasper v. Crawford , 689 So.2d 43 (Ala. 1997) (hereinafter FNB of Jasper I and FNB of Jasper III , had resulted in a race to certification in putative class action lawsuits. 1998In the FNB of Jasper III, this Court acknowledged that the rule established in Ex parte First National Bank of Jasper, 675 So.2d 348 (Ala.1995), and First National Bank of Jasper v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 43 (Ala.1997) (hereinafter FNB of Jasper I and FNB of Jasper II ), had resulted in a race to certification in putative class action lawsuits. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
First Nat. Bank of Jasper v. Crawford
green
2 sentences1998In the FNB of Jasper III , this Court acknowledged that the rule established in Ex parte First National Bank of Jasper , 675 So.2d 348 (Ala. 1995), and First National Bank of Jasper v. Crawford , 689 So.2d 43 (Ala. 1997) (hereinafter FNB of Jasper I and FNB of Jasper III , had resulted in a race to certification in putative class action lawsuits. 1998In the FNB of Jasper III, this Court acknowledged that the rule established in Ex parte First National Bank of Jasper, 675 So.2d 348 (Ala.1995), and First National Bank of Jasper v. Crawford, 689 So.2d 43 (Ala.1997) (hereinafter FNB of Jasper I and FNB of Jasper II ), had resulted in a race to certification in putative class action lawsuits. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Evans v. Sanders
neutral
1 sentence1964On first January, eighteen hundred and thirty-six (with interest from 1835,) I promise to pay Moses Sanders, or bearer, twelve hundred and forty-three dollars, and eighty-three cents, for value received. “(Signed) Harris Smith Evans.” The opinion of this court in Evans v. Sanders, supra (omitting citations of cases), is as follows: “It is an acknowledged rule, in the construction of written contracts, that the intention of the parties, as ascertained from its terms, and the subject matter, determines its meaning * *. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Phinizy v. Foster
green
2 sentences1955We quote various passages from the opinion of Clopton, J., in Phinizy v. Foster, 90 Ala. 262 , 7 So. 836 , 837, which has been followed many times since: “It is also an acknowledged rule that the law inclines to regard estates as vested, rather than contingent. 1955We quote various passages from the opinion of Clopton, J., in Phinizy v. Foster, 90 Ala. 262 , 7 So. 836 , 837, which has been followed many times since: "It is also an acknowledged rule that the law inclines to regard estates as vested, rather than contingent. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Stuart v. Laird
green
2 sentences1913As early as 1803 it was held by this court, in Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299, 309 , 2 L. 1913As early as 1803 it was held by this court, in Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299, 309 , 2 L. | 1 | 1913–1913 |
Childress v. Childress
green
1 sentence1873Childress v. Childress, 3 Ala. 752 ; Purdom v. Tipton, 9 Ala. 914 . | 1 | 1873–1873 |
Purdom v. Tipton
neutral
1 sentence1873Childress v. Childress, 3 Ala. 752 ; Purdom v. Tipton, 9 Ala. 914 . | 1 | 1873–1873 |
Town of Wolcott v. Pond
green
1 sentence1857In Hoffman v. Hoffman, 26 Ala. 545 , it was said, “Whenever a statute is leveled against an abuse, or in furtherance of an acknowledged principle of right and justice, every reason exists for its most liberal application.” See, also, Wolcott v. Pond, 19 Conn. 597 . | 1 | 1857–1857 |
Murray v. Long
neutral
1 sentence1847R. 324; 9 East R. 361; Meigs’ R. 84.] It is an acknowledged rule that malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause, but the want of probable cause cannot be inferred from the most express malice. [ 1 Wend. | 1 | 1847–1847 |
Crenshaw v. Hardy
neutral
1 sentence1846In Crenshaw v. Hardy, 3 Ala. Rep. 653 , it was held, that where an infant ward marries, and the accounts of her guardian are audited and reported for final settlement, a decree for a balance in his hands must be rendered in favor of both the husband and wife. | 1 | 1846–1846 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.