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13 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1887–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sanders v. Stategreen2 sentences2012See Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) ( affirming the imposition of a five-year previously-suspended sentence based upon the defendant’s commission of 4 three new offenses and a positive test for cocaine). 2012See Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 955-58 (upholding the imposition of a five-year previously suspended sentence based upon the defendant’s commission of three new offenses and a positive test for cocaine). 7 Finally, even though it was established that Saunders violated these conditions of probation, he maintains that the trial court improperly considered the number of convictions that he had amassed in Tennessee in revoking his probation. | 2 | 2 |
Blakely v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2006See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). 2006See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) ("Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). | 1 | 1 |
Dayton Walther Corp. v. Caldwellgreen2 sentences2001See Dayton Walther Corp. v. Caldwell, 273 Ind. 191 , 402 N.E.2d 1252 (1980). 2001See Dayton Walther Corp. v. Caldwell, 273 Ind. 191 , 402 N.E.2d 1252 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultzgreen2 sentences2000For example, with regard to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her medical records, federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), and apply a balancing test, considering the potential conflict between the patient’s right to privacy and the asserted right of access to the reco rds. 29 With respect to confidential information contained in bank records, an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is also diminished when those records are compelled by “normal legal process.” California Bankers Ass 2000For example, with regard to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her medical records, federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), and apply a balancing test, considering the potential conflict between the patient’s right to privacy and the asserted right of access to the reco rds. 29 With respect to confidential information contained in bank records, an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is also diminished when those records are compelled by “normal legal process.” California Bankers Ass | 1 | 1 |
Rosann C. Scheetz Kenneth L. Scheetz, Jr. v. The Morning Call, Inc. Terry L. Mutchler John Doe And/or Jane Doegreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., Carrelli v. Ginsburg, 956 F.2d 598, 607 (6th Cir.1992) (upholding the constitutionality of an (Ohio) state horse racing commission drug testing program and reversing the district court’s ruling that the commission violated an individual’s privacy interest by repeatedly publicizing Ms positive test result for illegal drug use) (“Though the contours of constitutional confidentiality are murky, the positive test result, information contained in the urine, is not “private” in a constitutional sense.”) (citing Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 , 207 n. 5 (3d Cir.1991)). 28 2000See, e.g., Carrelli v. Ginsburg, 956 F.2d 598, 607 (6th Cir.1992) (upholding the constitutionality of an (Ohio) state horse racing commission drug testing program and reversing the district court's ruling that the commission violated an individual's privacy interest by repeatedly publicizing his positive test result for illegal drug use) ("Though the contours of constitutional confidentiality are murky, the positive test result, information contained in the urine, is not "private" in a constitutional sense.") (citing Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 , 207 n. 5 (3d Cir.1991)). [2 | 1 | 1 |
Carrelli v. Ginsburggreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., Carrelli v. Ginsburg, 956 F.2d 598, 607 (6th Cir.1992) (upholding the constitutionality of an (Ohio) state horse racing commission drug testing program and reversing the district court’s ruling that the commission violated an individual’s privacy interest by repeatedly publicizing Ms positive test result for illegal drug use) (“Though the contours of constitutional confidentiality are murky, the positive test result, information contained in the urine, is not “private” in a constitutional sense.”) (citing Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 , 207 n. 5 (3d Cir.1991)). 28 2000See, e.g., Carrelli v. Ginsburg, 956 F.2d 598, 607 (6th Cir.1992) (upholding the constitutionality of an (Ohio) state horse racing commission drug testing program and reversing the district court's ruling that the commission violated an individual's privacy interest by repeatedly publicizing his positive test result for illegal drug use) ("Though the contours of constitutional confidentiality are murky, the positive test result, information contained in the urine, is not "private" in a constitutional sense.") (citing Scheetz v. The Morning Call, Inc., 946 F.2d 202 , 207 n. 5 (3d Cir.1991)). [2 | 1 | 1 |
Sipe v. Merchants Trust Co.green1 sentence1947Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt, Admx. (1936), 210 Ind. 509, 518 , 1 N. E. (2d) 585, 4 N. E. (2d) 202; Reeder v. Antrim (1917), 64 Ind. App. 83 , 110 N. E. 568 , 112 N. E. 551 .” Sipe v. Merchants Trust Co. (1941), 109 Ind. App. 566, 570, 571 , 34 N. E. (2d) 968. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hutchinson's Estate v. Arnt, Admx.
neutral
2 sentences1947Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt, Admx. (1936), 210 Ind. 509, 518 , 1 N. E. (2d) 585, 4 N. E. (2d) 202; Reeder v. Antrim (1917), 64 Ind. App. 83 , 110 N. E. 568 , 112 N. E. 551 .” Sipe v. Merchants Trust Co. (1941), 109 Ind. App. 566, 570, 571 , 34 N. E. (2d) 968. 1941Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt, Admx. (1936), 210 Ind. 509, 518 , 1 N. E. (2d) 585, 4 N. E. (2d) 202; Reeder v. Antrim (1917), 64 Ind. App. 83 , 110 N. E. 568 , 112 N. E. 551 . | 2 | 1941–1947 |
Reeder v. Antrim
green
2 sentences1947Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt, Admx. (1936), 210 Ind. 509, 518 , 1 N. E. (2d) 585, 4 N. E. (2d) 202; Reeder v. Antrim (1917), 64 Ind. App. 83 , 110 N. E. 568 , 112 N. E. 551 .” Sipe v. Merchants Trust Co. (1941), 109 Ind. App. 566, 570, 571 , 34 N. E. (2d) 968. 1947Hutchinson’s Estate v. Arnt, Admx. (1936), 210 Ind. 509, 518 , 1 N. E. (2d) 585, 4 N. E. (2d) 202; Reeder v. Antrim (1917), 64 Ind. App. 83 , 110 N. E. 568 , 112 N. E. 551 .” Sipe v. Merchants Trust Co. (1941), 109 Ind. App. 566, 570, 571 , 34 N. E. (2d) 968. | 2 | 1941–1947 |
Johnathon I. Carter v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2019Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2018 | May 8, 2019 Page 5 of 9 Id. at 112 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re AH
green
1 sentence2017She argues that DCS’s case was based solely on her drug usage and that “[t]he evidence supporting this consists in its entirety on a positive test for methamphetamine on June 16, 2016, Mother’s admission that she had used opiates for which she had no prescription ‘about a month and a half ago,’ and her admission that prior to the June 16 positive methamphetamine screen she had last used that drug in 2011.” Id. at 7 (citing Transcript Volume 2 at 14). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Oman v. State
green
1 sentence2006Id. at 1148 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Stark v. Connally
green
2 sentences2000For example, with regard to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her medical records, federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), and apply a balancing test, considering the potential conflict between the patient’s right to privacy and the asserted right of access to the reco rds. 29 With respect to confidential information contained in bank records, an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is also diminished when those records are compelled by “normal legal process.” California Bankers Ass 2000For example, with regard to an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her medical records, federal courts follow the Supreme Court's lead in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), and apply a balancing test, considering the potential conflict between the patient's right to privacy and the asserted right of access to the records. [29] *1146 With respect to confidential information contained in bank records, an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is also diminished when those records are compelled by "normal legal process." California Bank | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Whalen v. Roe
green
2 sentences2000For example, with regard to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her medical records, federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), and apply a balancing test, considering the potential conflict between the patient’s right to privacy and the asserted right of access to the reco rds. 29 With respect to confidential information contained in bank records, an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is also diminished when those records are compelled by “normal legal process.” California Bankers Ass 2000For example, with regard to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her medical records, federal courts follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 , 97 S.Ct. 869 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), and apply a balancing test, considering the potential conflict between the patient’s right to privacy and the asserted right of access to the reco rds. 29 With respect to confidential information contained in bank records, an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is also diminished when those records are compelled by “normal legal process.” California Bankers Ass | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Ferguson v. City of Charleston
green
2 sentences2000The hospital's policy “was not to arrest patients but to facilitate their treatment and protect both mother and unborn child.” Id. 186 F.3d at 475 n. 3 (internal quotations omitted). 2000The hospital's policy "was not to arrest patients but to facilitate their treatment and protect both mother and unborn child." Id. 186 F.3d at 475 n. 3 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Roudebush v. Nash
neutral
2 sentences1944Section 7 of the Act provides: “Any chattel mortgage or other instrument given pursuant to this act shall be executed by the mort *507 gagor by proper signature thereto and duly acknowledged before an officer authorized to make acknowledgment of instruments in writing duly indorsed thereon.” It is beyond question, we think, that a chattel mortgage made and given after the effective date of the Act must, if its validity be asserted as against any person not a party thereto, meet the positive requirement of the statute, Roudebush v. Nash (1931), 93 Ind. App. 283 , 177 N. E. 335 , which demands t 1944Section 7 of the Act provides: “Any chattel mortgage or other instrument given pursuant to this act shall be executed by the mort *507 gagor by proper signature thereto and duly acknowledged before an officer authorized to make acknowledgment of instruments in writing duly indorsed thereon.” It is beyond question, we think, that a chattel mortgage made and given after the effective date of the Act must, if its validity be asserted as against any person not a party thereto, meet the positive requirement of the statute, Roudebush v. Nash (1931), 93 Ind. App. 283 , 177 N. E. 335 , which demands t | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Eastes v. Eastes
neutral
1 sentence1911In every divorce suit the State, for the enforcement of its policy concerning the marital relation,- constitutes the third party, and no admission can be made by the other parties which will affect the public interest. ’ ’ In the ease of Eastes v. Eastes (1881), 79 Ind. 363, 368 , this court held that the provision of said section, requiring the filing of said affidavit, was mandatory. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Rogers v. Goodwin
green
1 sentence1887Board, etc., v. Bunting, 111 Ind. 143 ; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 221 ; People v. Supervisors, 100 Ill. 495 ; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475 ; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299 ; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 ; State v. French, 2 Pinney (Wis.), 181. | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Stuart v. Laird
green
1 sentence1887Board, etc., v. Bunting, 111 Ind. 143 ; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 221 ; People v. Supervisors, 100 Ill. 495 ; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475 ; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299 ; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 ; State v. French, 2 Pinney (Wis.), 181. | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Minor v. Happersett
green
1 sentence1887Board, etc., v. Bunting, 111 Ind. 143 ; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 221 ; People v. Supervisors, 100 Ill. 495 ; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475 ; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299 ; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 ; State v. French, 2 Pinney (Wis.), 181. | 1 | 1887–1887 |
People ex rel. Lynch v. Board of Supervisors
neutral
1 sentence1887Board, etc., v. Bunting, 111 Ind. 143 ; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 221 ; People v. Supervisors, 100 Ill. 495 ; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475 ; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299 ; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 ; State v. French, 2 Pinney (Wis.), 181. | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Board of Commissioners v. Bunting
green
1 sentence1887Board, etc., v. Bunting, 111 Ind. 143 ; Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. 221 ; People v. Supervisors, 100 Ill. 495 ; Rogers v. Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475 ; Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch, 299 ; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 ; State v. French, 2 Pinney (Wis.), 181. | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.