green
Positive treatment
Doctrinal family: United States v. Cruikshank ↗
Issue: subject matter claimOH ↗
Issue: elementary principleFL ↗
Issue: elementary principleUT ↗
Quoted verbatim 3×
29.4 score
Quick Summary
An indictment is sufficient only if the statutory terms fully, directly, and expressly set forth all elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.
An indictment for uttering a forged obligation of the United States fails to allege that the defendant knew the instrument was counterfeit. The court considers whether an indictment that merely repeats the statutory language without specifying the necessary elements of the offense is sufficient. The court holds that an indictment must expressly set forth all elements necessary to constitute the intended offense and cannot rely on inferences of legislative intent or common law principles to supply missing facts. Because the indictment omits the essential allegation of knowledge, it fails to charge a crime.
G Cite
cited 9× by 7 distinct cases, last quoted 2007 · 6 courts↓ Fading ·
…those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.
at p. 612
✓
cited 5× by 5 distinct cases, last quoted 1994 · 5 courts↓ Fading ·
…those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.
at p. 612
✓
cited 3× by 3 distinct cases, 2014–2025 · 2 courts ·
…must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.
⚠ not in text
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1900
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2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
How cited ↗
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Box
the validity of alleging the elements of an offense in the language of the statute is, of course, well established.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. Young-Bey
the validity of alleging the elements of an offense in the language of the statute is, of course, well established.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
United States v. McHugh
the validity of alleging the elements of an offense in the language of the statute is, of course, well established.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sargent
Analysis An indictment must “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mark Alan Deakins
Generally, an indictment is sufficient if it charges the offense “in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sargent
Analysis An indictment must “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.” Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 765 (1962) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Kelley
When the general words of the criminal statute defining the offense “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished,” the indictment may describe the offense using those general terms “accompanied with such a statement of facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense, coming under the general description, with which he is charged.” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117–18 (first quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881); and then 4 quoting Unite…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mijares
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974), quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bray
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sweet
More specificity is required, however, when a statute’s text does not itself “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Alazo
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974), quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Warnagiris
It is generally sufficient, however, for an indictment to “set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)); see United States v. Williamson, 903 F.3d 124, 130 (D.C.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Bennett
Rather, it is “generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). “[T]o be sufficient, [it] need only inform the defendant of the precise offense of which he is accused so that he may prepare his defense and plead double jeopardy in any further prosecution for…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Oloyede v. USA - 2255
Fatal errors are those related to “substance” and not those “of form only.” United States v. Camp, 541 F.3d 737 , 739–40 (8th Cir. 1976) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Gossjankowski
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any 24 uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Dennis
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). “[T]o be sufficient, [it] need only inform the defendant of the precise offense of which he is accused so that he may prepare his defense and plead double jeopardy in any further prosecution for the sam…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Price
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment [or information] set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). “[T]o be sufficient, [it] need only inform the defendant of the precise offense of which he is accused so that he may prepare his defense and plead double jeopardy in any further prosec…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Price
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment [or information] set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). “[T]o be sufficient, [it] need only inform the defendant of the precise offense of which he is accused so that he may prepare his defense and plead double jeopardy in any further prosec…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
State v. Garcia.
Id. at 398, 69 P.3d at 526 . 13 See also State v. Apollonio, 130 Hawai‘i 353, 359, 311 P.3d 676, 682 (2013) (holding that “[a] charge that fails to charge a requisite state of mind cannot be construed reasonably to state an offense and thus the charge is dismissed without prejudice because it violates due process.”); United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 613 (1881) (concluding “knowledge that the 9 Here, because the information does not define intent to defraud, and thus does not specify the states of mind for forgery in the second degree, the information violates article I sections 5 …
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Rodriguez
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be 2 punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974), quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Williams
(2×)
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974), quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Miller
In such cases, “it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881); see also Hess, 124 U.S. at 487 7 (“Undoubtedly, the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offense, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offense,…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Sargent
Further, “[i]t is generally sufficient 3 that an indictment set forth the offence in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ALVAREZ v. SUPERINTENDENT OBERLANDER
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. U.S., 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting U.S. v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Malik Nasir
Indeed, going back at least as far as Blackstone, it has been a given that the jury – not appellate judges after the fact – must find “the truth of every accusation” for a conviction to be sustained.16 4 William United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Malik Nasir
Indeed, going back at least as far as Blackstone, it has been a given that the jury – not appellate judges after the fact – must find “the truth of every accusation” for a conviction to be sustained.16 4 William United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bradley v. United States
“It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Barber v. Hansen
“It is generally sufficient that [a charging document] set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” /d. (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)). “‘Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offence, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the spe…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Joaquin Davalos-Lopez
Because the indictment “set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself,” however, “[i]t is generally sufficient . . . as long as ‘those words . . . fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1881)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Com. v. Waltemyer, T.
This may be accomplished through use of the words of the statute itself as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 [ ](1974), quoting, United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ ] ( [1881]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Com. v. Baroni, M.
This may be accomplished through use of the words of the statute itself as long as "those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished." Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 [](1974), quoting, United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [] ([1881]).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Calvin Weatherspoon v. State of Florida
(2×)
Article I § 16 of the Florida Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand, be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, and shall be furnished a copy of the charges[.]” “Thus, to apprise the accused of the specific charges against him, an information or indictment must contain all facts essential to the ‘offence intended to be punished.’” Insko v. State, 969 So. 2d 992, 995 (Fla. 2007) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612-13 (1881)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.
See, e. g., United States v. Turley, 352 U. S. 407, 411 (1957) (“We recognize that where a federal criminal statute uses a common-law term of established meaning without otherwise defining it, the general practice is to give that term its common-law meaning”); Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 263 (1952); United States v. Cavil, 105 U. S. 611, 612-613 (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Resendiz-Ponce
Our precedents make clear that the indictment must “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the of-fence intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611, 612 (1882) (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Lockhart
"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’" Hamling, 418 U.S. at 117 (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Cefaratti
However, an indictment may "set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as `those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.' " Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) (quoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Edwards
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Carll and Torres are explicit that the indictment’s reciting the words of the statute is sufficient only so long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.” Carll, 105 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added); Torres, 191 F.3d at 805 .
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Du Bo
(3×)
also: Cited "see, e.g."
As the Supreme Court stated over a century ago, the omission of a necessary element of an offense is a *1181 “matter of substance, and not a defect or imperfection in matter of form only....” Carll, 105 U.S. at 613 (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
U.S. V. Billmyer
"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as 'those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence [sic] intended to be punished.1" Id. (guoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
U.S. V. Billmyer
"It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as 'those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence [sic] intended to be punished.1" Id. (guoting United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Harold Lee Smith
It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as "those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished." United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Mavroules
(2×)
It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth the offence intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ 26 L.Ed. 1135 ] (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cash v. State
(2×)
This pleader alleged the breaking and entry of a “building and structure occupied by Kevin Schlatterer and Clyde Hill, on South Chestnut Street.” In so doing, the pleader failed to communicate the core idea, through the two modifiers, joint occupation and street location, that the structure entered was a “home or place of lodging.” Because that essential idea and element, which serves solely to distinguish the Class C from the Class B offense, was totally omitted from the pleading and is in no manner communicated, not even partially or ineptly, the pleading clearly fails to “fully, d…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Cobell
It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ 26 L.Ed. 1135 ] (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Felix Ramos, Edward Marti, Renee Marti
The degree to which simple “tracking” of the pertinent statute is permissible depends on the language of the statute itself: It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ 26 L.Ed. 1135 ] (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Carrier
It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ 26 L.Ed. 1135 ] (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Whalen v. United States
(2×)
In so reasoning, the lower court acted in conformity with this Court's long tradition of reading criminal statutes enacted by Congress "in the light of the common law. . . ." United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611, 612 (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Carl Clayton Chenaur
It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ 26 L.Ed. 1135 ] (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Carter Camp
It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as “those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ 26 L.Ed. 1135 ] (1882).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
United States v. Romenesko
It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as ‘those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished.’ United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 612 [ 26 L.Ed. 1135 ] (1881). ‘Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used in the general description of an offence, but it must be accompanied with such a statement of the facts and circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
United States
v.
Carll
v.
Carll
1202.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 24, 1882.
The Solicitor- General for the United States., Mr. William O. Roberts for the defendant.
Gray.
Cited by 452 opinions | Published
Mr. Justice Gray,
after stating the ease, delivered the opinion of the court.
In an indictment upon a statute, it is not, sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be-punished; and the fact that the statute in question, read in the light of the common law, and of other statutes on the like matter, enables the court[*613] to infer the intent of the legislature, does not dispense with the necessity of alleging in the indictment all the facts necessary to bring the case within that intent. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; United States v. Simmons, 96 id. 360; Commonwealth v. Clifford, 8 Cush. (Mass.) 215; Commonwealth v. Bean, 11 id. 414; Commonwealth v. Bean, 14 Gray (Mass.), 52; Commonwealth v. Filburn, 119 Mass. 297.
The language of the statute on which this indictment is founded includes the'case of every person, who, with intent to defraud, utters any forged'obligation -of the United States. But the offence at which it is aimed is similar to the common-law offence of uttering a forged or counterfeit bill. In this case, as in that, knowledge that the instrument is forged and counterfeited is essential to make out the crime; and an uttering, with intent to defraud, of an instrument in fact counterfeit, but supposed by the defendant to be genuine, though within the words of the statute, would not be within its meaning and object. v
This indictment, by omitting the allegation contained in the indictment in United States v. Howell (11 Wall. 432), and in all approved precedents, that the defendant knew the instrument which he uttered to be false, forged, and counterfeit, fails to charge Jiim with any crime. The omission is of matter of substance, and not a “ defect or imperfection in matter of form only,” within the meaning of sect. 1025 of the Revised Statutes By the settled rules of criminal pleading, and the authorities above cited, therefore, the question of the sufficiency of the indictment must be
Answered in the negative.