subject matter claim in Ohio

2023Franklin Nos. 12AP-557, 12AP-655, 12AP-558, and 12AP- 558, 2013-Ohio-177 , ¶ 12, quoting In re Sims, 13 Ohio App.3d 37, 42-43 , 468 N.E.2d 111 (12th Dist. 1983). {¶57} In these cases, CPSU filed complaints that alleged the children were neglected under R.C. 2151.03(A)(2) and dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C).

2001The basis of R.C. 2151.27 and Juv.R. 10(B)(1) is twofold: * * * First, in an action involving the possible severance of custody rights, a respondent to such a complaint is entitled to be apprised of the basis of the state's claim in order to properly prepare a defense. * * * Second, the juvenile court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, must be able to ascertain at an early state of the proceeding whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. [ State v. Sims (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 37 , 42-43 .] The Ohio Supreme Court held in the first paragraph of the syllabus of

2006Id.

2003Id. {¶ 69} Here, the commission's notice of the April 30, 2001 hearing before a DHO apprised the parties that the subject matter would be "(1) request to terminate temporary total, [and] (2) extent of disability/MMI." The notice did not apprise the parties that the subject matter of the hearing would include claimant's motion for TTD based upon reports of her attending psychiatrist, Dr. Cohen. {¶ 70} It is important to note that prior to the April 30, 2001 hearing, claimant had only been paid TTD compensation based upon her physical injuries.

2006Id.

2006Comm. (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 100 (reasonable notice of hearing necessarily includes notice of the subject matter of the hearing). {¶ 30} Clearly, claimant is incorrect in asserting that the commission actually adjudicated relator's voluntary abandonment claim.

2002No. 138, effective June 18, 2002. {¶ 28} In denying plaintiffs motion for a protective order, the trial court stated that “[p]laintiff may not initiate a lawsuit to compel defendant to return payments made under the settlement agreement and then deny defendant the evidence necessary to defend itself in the lawsuit.” (Jan. 10, 2002 Decision, 4.) The court’s statement is in accord with the subject matter waiver doctrine first enunciated in Hearn v. Rhay (E.D.Wash.1975), 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 , and subsequently followed by courts in other jurisdictions and in Ohio, including this court.

2002The test to be applied in deciding whether subject-matter waiver applies is set forth in Hearn v. Rhay (E.D.Wash.1975), 68 F.R.D. 574 , a case that has been followed by several Ohio courts, including this court.

1999Finley v. Dusty Drilling Co. (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 323 , 324-325 , this court found notice to be insufficient when the Industrial Commission of Ohio advised a relator of the time, place and location of a hearing, but no notice of the subject matter of the hearing.

1991Finley v. Dusty Drilling Co. (1981), 2 Ohio App.3d 323 , 2 OBR 366, 441 N.E.2d 1128 , the notice provided to relator set forth the time, date and location of the hearing before the district hearing officer and defined the subject matter of the hearing as “further consideration.” This court held in its syllabus: “1.

1999Appellant Forbes argues that the Ayers case stands for the 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO proposition that presumptions, statutory or otherwise, are not provided to juries when evidence as to the subject matter of the presumption has been presented. {¶ 13} In State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 190 , 55 O.O.2d 447 , 271 N.E.2d 245 , this court stated: “In a trial of a person for the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the presumption provided by R.C. 4511.19(B) may be included in the court’s instructions to the jury and used by them in arriving at their decisio

1999Appellant Forbes argues that the Ayers case stands for the 3 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO proposition that presumptions, statutory or otherwise, are not provided to juries when evidence as to the subject matter of the presumption has been presented. {¶ 13} In State v. Myers (1971), 26 Ohio St.2d 190 , 55 O.O.2d 447 , 271 N.E.2d 245 , this court stated: “In a trial of a person for the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, the presumption provided by R.C. 4511.19(B) may be included in the court’s instructions to the jury and used by them in arriving at their decisio

1895No case has been called to our attention, and we are not aware of any case, where such evidence has been admitted.” See, also, Emerson v. Gas Co., 6 Allen, 146 , where the physician was not permitted to testify that the plaintiff said that the inhaling of gas had made him sick.

1895No case has been called to our attention, and we are not aware of any case, where such evidence has been admitted.” See, also, Emerson v. Gas Co., 6 Allen 146 , where the physician was not permitted to testify that the plaintiff said that the inhaling of gas had made him sick.

2024Similarly, “[i]t is clearly the law in Ohio that an equitable action in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment will not lie when the subject matter of that claim is covered by an express contract[.]” Lehigh Gas-Ohio, LLC v. Cincy Oil Queen City, LLC, 2016-Ohio-4611 , 66 N.E.3d 1226 , ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), quoting Ryan v. Rival Mfg.

2024Similarly, “[i]t is clearly the law in Ohio that an equitable action in quasi-contract for unjust enrichment will not lie when the subject matter of that claim is covered by an express contract[.]” Lehigh Gas-Ohio, LLC v. Cincy Oil Queen City, LLC, 2016-Ohio-4611 , 66 N.E.3d 1226 , ¶ 24 (1st Dist.), quoting Ryan v. Rival Mfg.

2023Defiance No. 4-19-14, 2020-Ohio-718, ¶ 21 , quoting In re D.P., 10th Dist.

2022In re A.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104869, 104870, 104871, 104872, 104873, 104875, and 104876, 2017-Ohio-8058, ¶ 15 , citing In re D.C., 2017-Ohio-114 , 75 N.E. 3d 1040 , ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). {¶ 50} In this matter, despite Jonathan’s contentions, the record reveals that he had notice of both the hearing on the Appellees’ emergency motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and of the subject-matter of the hearing.

2022In re A.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 104869, 104870, 104871, 104872, 104873, 104875, and 104876, 2017-Ohio-8058, ¶ 15 , citing In re D.C., 2017-Ohio-114 , 75 N.E. 3d 1040 , ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). {¶ 50} In this matter, despite Jonathan’s contentions, the record reveals that he had notice of both the hearing on the Appellees’ emergency motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement and of the subject-matter of the hearing.

2021Under § 301(a), even if appellants' state law claims concern works within the subject matter of copyright, such claims will only be preempted if they assert rights that are ‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106[.]’ ” (Footnote omitted.) Wrench, 256 F.3d at 455-456 , quoting 17 U.S.C. 301(a). {¶ 29} The exclusive rights under Section 106 include authors’ “exclusive rights to reproduce, prepare derivatives, perform, distribute, and display their work.

2005National Union's third assignment of error contends the trial court erred in not conducting an in camera inspection of the documents prior to ordering disclosure. {¶ 17} While trial courts generally should conduct an in camera inspection before ruling on matters of privilege in a pending case, In re Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon Attorney Potts, 100 Ohio St.3d 97 , 2003-Ohio-5234 , the trial court in this case did not.

2005Appellee cites Ward v. Graydon, Head & Ritchey (2001), 147 Ohio App.3d 325 , 770 N.E.2d 613 .

2005Appellee cites Ward v. Graydon, Head & Ritchey (2001), 147 Ohio App.3d 325 , 770 N.E.2d 613 .

2001The basis of R.C. 2151.27 and Juv.R. 10(B)(1) is twofold: * * * First, in an action involving the possible severance of custody rights, a respondent to such a complaint is entitled to be apprised of the basis of the state's claim in order to properly prepare a defense. * * * Second, the juvenile court, being a court of limited jurisdiction, must be able to ascertain at an early state of the proceeding whether or not it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim. [ State v. Sims (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 37 , 42-43 .] The Ohio Supreme Court held in the first paragraph of the syllabus of

1996The *149 court, quoting United States v. Carll (1881), 105 U.S. 611, 612 , 26 L.Ed. 1135, 1135 , stated: “ * * * ‘In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements. necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished * * * ’ * * *.” 369 U.S. at 765 , 82 S.Ct. at 1047 , 8 L.Ed.2d at 251 .

1996The *149 court, quoting United States v. Carll (1881), 105 U.S. 611, 612 , 26 L.Ed. 1135, 1135 , stated: “ * * * ‘In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements. necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished * * * ’ * * *.” 369 U.S. at 765 , 82 S.Ct. at 1047 , 8 L.Ed.2d at 251 .

1996The *149 court, quoting United States v. Carll (1881), 105 U.S. 611, 612 , 26 L.Ed. 1135, 1135 , stated: “ * * * ‘In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements. necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished * * * ’ * * *.” 369 U.S. at 765 , 82 S.Ct. at 1047 , 8 L.Ed.2d at 251 .

1996The *149 court, quoting United States v. Carll (1881), 105 U.S. 611, 612 , 26 L.Ed. 1135, 1135 , stated: “ * * * ‘In an indictment upon a statute, it is not sufficient to set forth the offence in the words of the statute, unless those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements. necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished * * * ’ * * *.” 369 U.S. at 765 , 82 S.Ct. at 1047 , 8 L.Ed.2d at 251 .

1988Kinney v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv. (1986), 30 Ohio App. 3d 123 , 30 OBR 240, 507 N.E. 2d 402 , paragraph one of the syllabus. 6 We recognize, however, that to the extent its provisions are not illegal, the agreement between appellant and appellee was and is a valid and enforceable contract.

1988Kinney v. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv. (1986), 30 Ohio App. 3d 123 , 30 OBR 240, 507 N.E. 2d 402 , paragraph one of the syllabus. 6 We recognize, however, that to the extent its provisions are not illegal, the agreement between appellant and appellee was and is a valid and enforceable contract.

1982Clearly, it is concluded, the former cause-of-action concept of pleading is more limiting than a claim for relief pleading, which is unlimited as to right and remedy, citing the following language from a decision interpreting the federal rule: “* * * [I]t is necessary to remember that in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the word ‘claim’ has a somewhat broader connotation than that which prior to the Rules pertained to a ‘cause of action.’ ‘It is used to denote the aggregate of operative facts which give rise to a right enforceable in the courts.’ * * * ‘The theory adopted in the new rules

1954Judge Doyle, of our 9th Court of Appeals, sitting by designation as a member of the 8th District Court of Appeals in Cuyahoga County, wrote the opinion in Fawick Airflex Company, Incorporated, v. Electrical Workers, etc., 56 Abs 419 , a contempt case against one Joseph Kres, a union member involved in strike picketing, ruled as follows: Syllabus, par. (7) “* * * A witness who has refused to answer three questions relating to his membership in the Communist Party is guilty of but one act of contempt.” (Emphasis by this court.) Accordingly, the court applying said rule to the instant defendants,