elementary principle in Florida

2025Thus, in the context of subsection (5), “enacted or amended by the Legislature” would be a superfluous modifier of “criminal statute,” but the phrase is an effective modifier of “any defense.” “It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003); see also Johnson v. Feder, 485 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1986) (“Statutory interpretations that

2025Thus, these cases are neither binding nor persuasive. 5 3d 1020, 1029 (Fla. 2023) (noting surplusage canon is “an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible” (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003))); see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 174 (defining surplusage canon) (“If possible, every word and every provision is to be given effect (verba cum effectus sunt accipienda).

2005See Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003) ("It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible and words in a statute *769 should not be construed as mere surplusage."); State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817, 824 (Fla.2002) ("[A] basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.").

2004See Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003) ("It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage."); State v. Goode, 830 So.2d 817, 824 (Fla.2002) ("[A] basic rule of statutory construction provides that the Legislature does not intend to enact useless provisions, and courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless.").

2023Dept. of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“No part of a statute [or rule], not even a single word, should be ignored, read out of the text, or rendered meaningless, in construing the provision.”); Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006) (“It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect 21 must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840

2014Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006) (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003)).

2025Thus, in the context of subsection (5), “enacted or amended by the Legislature” would be a superfluous modifier of “criminal statute,” but the phrase is an effective modifier of “any defense.” “It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of New York, 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003); see also Johnson v. Feder, 485 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1986) (“Statutory interpretations that

2024Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N. Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003) (“It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”); Johnson v. Feder, 485 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1986) (“We are compelled by well-established norms of statutory construction to choose that interpretation of statutes and rules which renders their provisions meaningful.”).

2021Bd. of Palm Beach Cnty., 3 So. 3d at 1233 (“Basic to our examination of statutes, and an important aspect of our analysis here, is the elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, -8- phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2020Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 3 So. 3d at 1233 (“Basic to our examination of statutes, and an important aspect of our analysis here, is the elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2018“It is an elementary principle that a person can dispose of his or her property by will as he or she pleases so long as that person’s intent is not contrary to any principle of law or public policy.” McKean v. Warburton, 919 So. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 2005). “[O]nce the intent of the testator is ascertained, the entire will should be considered and construed liberally to effectuate the testator’s intent.” Id.

2018“It is an elementary principle that a person can dispose of his or her property by will as he or she pleases so long as that person’s intent is not contrary to any principle of law or public policy.” McKean v. Warburton, 919 So. 2d 341, 344 (Fla. 2005). “[O]nce the intent of the testator is ascertained, the entire will should be considered and construed liberally to effectuate the testator’s intent.” Id.

2024Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 366 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003)).

2023Our conclusion rests upon the Florida Supreme Court’s pronouncement in American Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2005): [I]t is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.

2006Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla.2003) (citing Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So.2d 993 (Fla.1999)).

2003See Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So.2d 993 (Fla.1999).

2025See Martinez v. State, 981 So. 2d 449, 452 (Fla. 2008) (rejecting an interpretation that would render a statutory exception superfluous); see also Tsuji, 366 So. 3d at 1029 (describing the “canon against surplusage” as “an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible” (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993, 996 (Fla. - 30 - 2003))).

2023Regul., 441 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“Every statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts.”); Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 1995) (“[T]he context in which a term is used may be referred to in ascertaining the meaning of that term.”); Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So. 2d 475 , 476–77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (“Our task as a reviewing court is to afford a logical construction according to the general terms and intentions of the entire . . . [a]ct

2023Regul., 441 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (“Every statute must be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts.”); Miele v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 656 So. 2d 470, 472 (Fla. 1995) (“[T]he context in which a term is used may be referred to in ascertaining the meaning of that term.”); Ceco Corp. v. Goldberg, 219 So. 2d 475 , 476–77 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969) (“Our task as a reviewing court is to afford a logical construction according to the general terms and intentions of the entire . . . [a]ct

2023Dept. of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135, 139 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (“No part of a statute [or rule], not even a single word, should be ignored, read out of the text, or rendered meaningless, in construing the provision.”); Gulfstream Park Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 948 So. 2d 599, 606 (Fla. 2006) (“It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect 21 must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage.” (quoting Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840

2019Nature of fundamental error Second, I emphasize a basic feature of fundamental error: the whole point of identifying an error as “fundamental” is to permit an appellant to argue that the error supports reversal even if the 3 The importance of a court’s duty to remain neutral and to refrain from making arguments for one side of a proceeding was discussed at length in the dissenting opinion of Lee v. State, 264 So. 3d 225, 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (Makar, J., dissenting).

2018The testator’s intent to devise a homestead is “‘that which is manifest, either expressly or by necessary implication, from the language of the will, as viewed, in case of ambiguity, in the light of the situation of the testator and the circumstances surrounding him at the time it was executed, although technical words are not used[.]’” Pajares v. Donahue, 33 So. 3d 700, 702-03 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Rewis v. Rewis, 84 So. 93, 94 (Fla. 1920)).

2018The testator’s intent to devise a homestead is “‘that which is manifest, either expressly or by necessary implication, from the language of the will, as viewed, in case of ambiguity, in the light of the situation of the testator and the circumstances surrounding him at the time it was executed, although technical words are not used[.]’” Pajares v. Donahue, 33 So. 3d 700, 702-03 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (quoting Rewis v. Rewis, 84 So. 93, 94 (Fla. 1920)).

2017“It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute '- if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage,” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). “[Wjhere the language of a statute clearly limits the application to a particular class of cases, leaving no room for doubts as to the meaning of the legislature, the statute may not be enlarged or expanded to cover cases not falling within its provisions;” Chu v. State, 521 So.2d 330,

2017“It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that significance and effect must be given to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of the statute '- if possible, and words in a statute should not be construed as mere surplusage,” Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So.2d 993, 996 (Fla. 2003). “[Wjhere the language of a statute clearly limits the application to a particular class of cases, leaving no room for doubts as to the meaning of the legislature, the statute may not be enlarged or expanded to cover cases not falling within its provisions;” Chu v. State, 521 So.2d 330,

2010As the supreme court explained in Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla.1976), “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the testimony and evidence from the record on appeal before it.” Rather, the test is “whether the judgment of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.” Shaw, 334 So.2d at 16 .

2010As the supreme court explained in Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13, 16 (Fla.1976), “[i]t is not the function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court through re-evaluation of the testimony and evidence from the record on appeal before it.” Rather, the test is “whether the judgment of the trial court is supported by competent evidence.” Shaw, 334 So.2d at 16 .

2009See Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (concluding that “[o]nce a marriage is shown to have been ceremonially entered into it is presumed to be legal and valid” and that that the party attacking the legality of such a marriage bears the burden of rebutting this presumption); Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (“It is an elementary principle of domestic relations law that a marriage, once shown to have been ceremonially entered into ..., is presumed to be legal and valid” and that “the burden of proving the continuance of the previous marriage and the i

2009See Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (concluding that “[o]nce a marriage is shown to have been ceremonially entered into it is presumed to be legal and valid” and that that the party attacking the legality of such a marriage bears the burden of rebutting this presumption); Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (“It is an elementary principle of domestic relations law that a marriage, once shown to have been ceremonially entered into ..., is presumed to be legal and valid” and that “the burden of proving the continuance of the previous marriage and the i

2009See Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (concluding that “[o]nce a marriage is shown to have been ceremonially entered into it is presumed to be legal and valid” and that that the party attacking the legality of such a marriage bears the burden of rebutting this presumption); Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (“It is an elementary principle of domestic relations law that a marriage, once shown to have been ceremonially entered into ..., is presumed to be legal and valid” and that “the burden of proving the continuance of the previous marriage and the i

2009See Stewart v. Hampton, 506 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (concluding that “[o]nce a marriage is shown to have been ceremonially entered into it is presumed to be legal and valid” and that that the party attacking the legality of such a marriage bears the burden of rebutting this presumption); Grace v. Grace, 162 So.2d 314, 317 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) (“It is an elementary principle of domestic relations law that a marriage, once shown to have been ceremonially entered into ..., is presumed to be legal and valid” and that “the burden of proving the continuance of the previous marriage and the i