v.
David Myers
FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 21 2023 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: DAVID EDWARD MYERS; No. 22-16615 MARY ANN MYERS, Debtors, ______________________________ D.C. No. 2:21-bk-11376-NMC
LVNV FUNDING, LLC, MEMORANDUM* Appellant, v. DAVID EDWARD MYERS; MARY ANN MYERS, Appellees.
Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada Natalie M. Cox, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding
In re: DAVID EDWARD MYERS; No. 22-60037 MARY ANN MYERS, BAP No. 22-1005 Debtors, ------------------------------
LVNV FUNDING, LLC
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appellant, v. DAVID EDWARD MYERS; MARY ANN MYERS, Appellees.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Lafferty III, Brand, and Taylor, Bankruptcy Judges, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 3, 2023
Las Vegas, Nevada
Before: RAWLINSON and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and FITZWATER,** District Judge.
Appellant LVNV Funding, LLC (“LVNV”) filed a proof of claim in the Chapter
13 bankruptcy proceeding of Appellees David and Mary Myers (“the Debtors”) using Official Form 410, which the bankruptcy court allowed over the Debtors’ objection.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) vacated and remanded the allowance order.
On remand, based on the parties’ stipulation and the BAP’s decision, the bankruptcy court disallowed LVNV’s claim. LVNV now appeals both the BAP’s decision and the bankruptcy court’s order disallowing the claim. We have jurisdiction under 28
**
The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) over the appeal from the BAP’s decision, and under 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(2)(A) over the appeal from the bankruptcy court’s disallowance order.[1] We
REVERSE the BAP’s decision and the bankruptcy court’s disallowance order and REMAND.[2] claim.[3]
Under Erie principles, federal bankruptcy courts apply federal procedural law and state substantive law. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450 (2007). To determine whether a state law applies in a federal action, “we decide whether the state law conflicts with a valid [federal procedural rule].” Martin v. Pierce Cnty., 34 F.4th 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 2022). A federal procedural rule is valid if it “is a ‘general rule[] of practice and procedure’ that does
‘not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right’ and is ‘procedural in the ordinary use of the term.’” Id. at 1128-29 (citation omitted).
of procedure have been properly promulgated under the applicable enabling statute and do not impinge on substantive rights. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471
(1965). And Rule 3001, in particular, is a typical procedural rule: it does no more than set out the procedural requirements for a proof of claim, see Rule 3001(a)-(e), and specify when a properly executed proof of claim constitutes prima facie evidence of its validity and amount, see Rule 3001(f)-(g). Consequently, Rule 3001 prevails over the Nevada laws, meaning that the Nevada laws are not “applicable law” that can render a claim “unenforceable” under 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1). Thus LVNV’s failure to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 97A.160 and 97A.165 is not a ground for disallowing its proof of claim.