Digitally signed by Reporter of Decisions Reason: I attest to Illinois Official Reports the accuracy and integrity of this document Appellate Court Date: 2022.04.22 13:27:36 -05'00'

In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027 Appellate Court In re P.S. and A.S., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Caption Petitioner-Appellee, v. Charlie S., Respondent-Appellant). District & No. Fifth District Nos. 5-21-0027, 5-21-0028 cons. Filed July 26, 2021 Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison County, Nos. 19-JA-75, 19- Review JA-76; the Hon. Martin J. Mengarelli, Judge, presiding. Judgment Affirmed. Counsel on Anthony G.M. Swarringin, of Edwardsville, for appellant. Appeal Thomas A. Haine, State’s Attorney, of Edwardsville (Patrick Delfino and Jennifer L. Camden, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People. Panel JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Welch concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Wharton dissented, with opinion. OPINION ¶1 Respondent, Charlie S. (Father), appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County terminating his parental rights to his two minor children, P.S. and A.S. For the following reasons, we affirm. ¶2 P.S. and A.S. are the biological children of Father and Amanda H. (Mother), who is not a party to this appeal. P.S. was born on October 31, 2014. On February 1, 2019, Mother gave birth to A.S., whose meconium tested positive for methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana. Mother admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana while pregnant and tested positive for both substances. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) conducted an investigation, during which Mother agreed to DCFS initiating intact family services. ¶3 On April 18, 2019, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship of the minors under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2018)). In the petitions, the State alleged that the minors were neglected because their environment was injurious to their welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) and A.S. had methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana in his system at birth (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(c) (West 2018)). The petitions alleged that (1) Mother had a substance abuse addiction that impaired her ability to adequately care for the minors; (2) Father had a criminal history including, but not limited to, criminal convictions for aggravated battery to a pregnant person and domestic battery; (3) Mother had pending charges for battery and domestic battery and an active warrant for her arrest; and (4) A.S. was born with methamphetamines, amphetamines, and marijuana in his system, and Mother admitted to using said substances during her pregnancy. ¶4 On July 25, 2019, the children were taken into protective custody, and shelter care hearings were conducted on July 25, 2019, and July 30, 2019. On the day of the first shelter care hearing, Father tested positive for methamphetamine. Following the hearings, the trial court found there was probable cause to believe the children were neglected as defined by the Act. The children were removed from their parents’ custody, and temporary custody was given to DCFS. ¶5 On October 1, 2019, the court adjudicated the minors neglected and made them wards of the court. The court found that Mother admitted to using methamphetamine and marijuana while pregnant and that A.S. was born with these substances in his system. The court also found that Mother’s substance abuse impaired her ability to adequately care for the minors, that Father had two criminal convictions for battery, and that Mother had pending criminal charges for battery and an active warrant for her arrest. ¶6 On August 4, 2020, the State filed petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights to the children. The petitions alleged that Father was unfit based on three statutory grounds: (1) he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the children (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)); (2) he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, specifically October 1, 2019, through the date of the filing of the petitions (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)); and (3) he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, specifically October 1, 2019, through the date of the of the filing of the petitions (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)).

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¶7 On November 24, 2020, the court called the cause for a fitness hearing. The proceedings were conducted in open court, via Zoom, a video conferencing platform. At the start of the hearing, Father’s counsel made an oral motion to continue the case until an in-person hearing could be conducted at some later date. The State requested that the case proceed over Zoom. Mother’s counsel stated that Mother would prefer an in-person hearing but had not expressed any concerns about proceeding via Zoom. The court denied Father’s motion to continue. Father then made a motion to have an emergency, in-person hearing that day, which the court denied. ¶8 At the fitness hearing, Gretchen Truax testified that she was assigned as the family’s caseworker in August 2019. Truax testified that after Mother gave birth to A.S., both Mother and A.S. tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamines. Thereafter, DCFS was contacted and conducted an investigation. During the investigation, Mother admitted to using controlled substances during her pregnancy, but Father denied any substance abuse. DCFS also learned that the family had a history of domestic violence. Mother agreed to DCFS initiating intact family services. An intact family service plan was created in April 2019, but conditions required the children to be taken into DCFS care in July 2019. ¶9 In August 2019, after the children were taken into care, Truax created a service plan, which she reviewed every six months. Father’s initial service plan included the following tasks: (1) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, (2) complete a mental health assessment and follow any recommendations, (3) complete a domestic violence assessment and follow any recommendations, and (4) cooperate with DCFS. Truax testified that Father’s most recent service plan was created in June 2020 and included the same tasks. Truax testified that, as of her last review, Father had not made any progress on his service plan. ¶ 10 Truax referred Father to Chestnut Health System (Chestnut) early in the case, and Father had repeatedly advised Truax that he had made an appointment to complete his assessment. Truax stated that when she would follow up with Father, he would always have some excuse for having missed the appointment. Father completed his first assessment in January 2020, and Chestnut recommended that Father engage in outpatient treatment with group and individual sessions. Father did not attend these sessions and was unsuccessfully discharged from the program in February 2020. Truax re-referred Father to Chestnut, and he completed a new assessment in April 2020. Chestnut again recommended that Father complete outpatient services. Father did not attend the sessions, and he was unsuccessfully discharged a second time. Truax referred Father to Chestnut a third time, but Father did not complete that assessment. Truax testified that Father checked himself into Chestnut’s seven-day crisis unit on two occasions. Both times, Father checked himself out, against the advice of the staff, before completing the seven-day treatment. ¶ 11 Truax testified that Father began looking into inpatient substance abuse treatment in July 2020, and that he was put on a waiting list at Gateway Rehabilitation Center (Gateway). Truax did not know if the wait time for Gateway’s inpatient program was impacted by the ongoing coronavirus (or COVID-19) pandemic caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2. Father was admitted to Gateway in October 2020 and was successfully released from the program in the beginning of November. Gateway recommended that Father complete outpatient treatment and referred him to Chestnut. Father completed this assessment at Chestnut on November 17, 2020, which again recommended that he complete group and individual sessions. Truax testified that Father indicated that he was going to start treatment at Chestnut the week of the termination hearing.

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¶ 12 Truax testified that Father tested positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines on September 30, 2019; January 22, 2020; February 19, 2020; February 26, 2020; and March 11, 2020. Father failed to appear for drug testing on December 23, 2019; January 8, 2020; June 17, 2020; July 24, 2020; September 18, 2020; and October 7, 2020. Father tested negative for substances on May 28, 2020. Truax testified there were two gaps in drug testing for Father, one between September 30, 2019, and December 23, 2019, and another between March 11, 2020, and May 28, 2020. With regard to the first gap, Truax testified she did not request drug tests from Father during this period because Father indicated that he was going to engage in substance abuse services with Chestnut and Chestnut would have tested Father. When Truax realized that Father was not engaged in services, she started referring Father to drug tests again. Truax explained that the second gap was due to the regular testing facility temporarily closing due to the coronavirus pandemic. ¶ 13 Father’s service plan also recommended that he complete a mental health assessment and follow any recommendations from the assessment. Truax testified that she referred Father to Chestnut for a mental health assessment. Father advised Truax that he wanted to focus on his substance abuse first, so he did not complete the mental health assessment until April 2020. Chestnut recommended that Father complete outpatient services, but Father did not complete the services and he was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. Truax stated that Father completed a mental health assessment while he was at Gateway in October or November 2020. Gateway recommended Father seek medication and services to alleviate his anxiety, and referred him to Chestnut. Truax testified that Father was currently “working on getting an assessment” at Chestnut but that she was not sure if he had an appointment scheduled. ¶ 14 Truax also testified there were also concerns about domestic violence in the home. Father had a prior conviction for battery against a pregnant woman, and Father did not complete the recommended domestic violence classes ordered as a condition of his probation. Truax stated there were also numerous instances of domestic violence between Mother and Father while the children were in their parents’ care. Truax testified that P.S. described in detail instances of domestic violence that she witnessed between the parents. Truax testified that Father indicated that he wanted to address his substance abuse before his domestic violence issues. Based on the amount of domestic violence present in Mother and Father’s relationship, however, it was determined that Father should not wait to begin domestic violence services. ¶ 15 Truax testified that she referred Father to Group Interventions in order to complete a domestic violence assessment. Father contacted the coordinator on several occasions but failed to show up for any of the appointments. In February 2020, as a result of the missed appointments, Group Interventions indicated that it would no longer make space available for Father to participate in the program. In April 2020, Truax referred Father to Alternatives Counseling to complete an assessment. Father again failed to appear for the appointment. The assessor, however, used the information Father provided over the phone during the initial intake call and recommended that Father complete 26 weeks of sessions. Truax advised Father of the recommendation, but Father did not attend these sessions and he was unsuccessfully discharged from the program. Truax testified that she re-referred Father to Group Intervention and that she believes Father has recently taken some initial steps to engage in the program. ¶ 16 Truax testified that Father has been cooperative with DCFS and respectful to her as the caseworker. She stated that she referred Father to services numerous times but that he has not taken the service plan seriously, which has been the barrier to Father’s progress. Truax testified

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that Father always had excuses, throughout the entirety of the case, for his failure to follow through with starting recommended services or attending appointments. Truax testified that the parents were permitted one hour of supervised visitation per week, which they regularly attended. Truax testified the parents interacted appropriately with the children during the visits, and that Father was very good at making the children laugh. ¶ 17 During cross-examination, Truax testified that the coronavirus pandemic caused some restrictions to be put into place beginning in the third week of March 2020. Truax stated it took approximately two weeks for providers to figure out how to function during the pandemic and that providers had made the necessary adjustments by mid-April. Truax explained that the pandemic complicated visitation because the visits had to be conducted over the telephone instead of in person. With regard to the provision of services, Truax testified the pandemic actually reduced barriers to obtaining services and made some services more readily available than in the past. Truax stated that, for the first time, service providers conducted assessments over the phone and allowed clients to participate in group and individual counseling over the phone or through video conferences. Truax stated she communicated with the parents in early April 2020, and she was able to refer them to remote services within 7 to 10 days. ¶ 18 Father did not testify at the fitness hearing. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court made a verbal finding that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father was an unfit person for failing to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of the minors during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)) and that he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors in any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)). The court found that while Father was currently engaged in services, he did not engage in services or make any progress on his service plan during the relevant time period. ¶ 19 The court then immediately proceeded to the best interests hearing. Father requested a continuance of the best interests hearing so that an in-person hearing could be conducted. The court denied Father’s motion and took judicial notice of the evidence presented during the fitness hearing. ¶ 20 At the best interests hearing, Truax testified that the children have been in their current placement since March 2020. The foster parents also have a 16-year-old daughter whom they adopted at birth. Truax testified the foster parents have completed the DCFS training for foster parents and their background checks. One of the foster parents works full time while the other stays home to care for the children. Truax testified the children are thriving in their placement, as the foster parents have devoted a large amount of attention to the children’s needs. A.S. was born premature and previously struggled to gain weight and to advance his gross and fine motor skills. Under the foster parents’ care, A.S. has gained weight and he received early intervention screening to improve his motor skills. P.S. is doing well in school but suffers from anxiety and is in counseling. The foster parents have worked to develop an understanding of her condition and have followed the recommendations of P.S.’s counselor in order to support the child’s needs. P.S. feels safe in the foster parents’ home and has expressed the desire to stay with, and be adopted by, the foster parents. The foster parents want to adopt the minors and have signed permanency commitments. Truax testified she believes the foster parents will continue to be supportive of the children’s needs in the future and will treat the children as their own.

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¶ 21 Truax testified the children are excited for their visits with Mother and Father, but that P.S. has begun experiencing anxiety leading up to, and after, the visits with her parents. Truax testified that P.S. began expressing a desire not to attend the visits near the end of June 2020. Truax testified that P.S. has stated that she is relieved when a visit is cancelled. P.S. has indicated, however, that she would like to continue to have visits with her parents even if she is adopted by the foster parents. Truax testified that A.S. fusses whenever he leaves the foster parents, which he does not do when he leaves visits with his parents. Truax believed that A.S. had an increased level of attachment to the foster parents over his parents. Truax testified that she believed it would be in the best interest of the children for the parental rights to be terminated. ¶ 22 During cross-examination, Truax testified that she did not believe that more than one hour of visitation per week would have been beneficial because the visits cause P.S. to experience increased anxiety. Truax testified that while P.S. and her parents clearly love each other and are bonded to each other, P.S.’s comments indicate that she did not always feel safe living with her parents. Truax stated she had concerns about the parents’ ability to meet the needs of the children due to the parents’ continued use of controlled substances and their failure to recognize that their personal choices impacted the children. Truax was also concerned that the parents would not keep up with the children’s counseling and therapy appointments because the parents frequently did not keep their own appointments. ¶ 23 Father testified that he was currently working as a forklift driver. Father stated that before DCFS removed the children from the home, he had been a stay-at-home father and that he and P.S. had a great relationship. Father testified that he had three adult children that he had helped raise. Father disagreed with Truax’s testimony that P.S. did not want to participate in visits. Father testified that he and P.S. had good conversations and that she spoke with him on the phone for an hour. After Father testified, the guardian ad litem (GAL) advised the court that she believed it was in the best interests of the children to terminate the parental rights. ¶ 24 The court entered a verbal finding that it was in the children’s best interests that Father’s parental rights be terminated. That same day, the court entered a written order terminating Father’s parental rights. The court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children from the home during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect, and that Father failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to the home during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. The court also found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the minors. The court found the minors were strongly bonded to their foster family and that their needs were being met in the foster home. The court found that the foster parents wished to adopt the minors and had signed permanency commitments. ¶ 25 On December 23, 2020, Father filed a posttrial motion to reconsider. In the motion, Father argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the hearings because the court “denied Father’s right to an in-person trial.” The court denied Father’s motion, and this appeal follows.

¶ 26 ANALYSIS ¶ 27 Prior to discussing respondent’s contentions on appeal, we briefly address the timeliness of our decision. This case has been designated as accelerated pursuant to Illinois Supreme

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Court Rule 311 (eff. July 1, 2018). Rule 311(a)(5) provides, in part, that “[e]xcept for good cause shown, the appellate court shall issue its decision within 150 days after the filing of the notice of appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a)(5) (eff. July 1, 2018). The 150-day deadline expired on June 28, 2021. In this case, Father requested three extensions of time to file his opening brief, and the case was not docketed until June 8, 2021. Furthermore, because the case involves the application of a recently revised Illinois Supreme Court rule and due process issues, we find good cause for issuing our decision after the 150-day deadline. See In re B’Yata I., 2013 IL App (2d) 130558, ¶ 26.

¶ 28 The Trial Court’s Termination of Father’s Parental Rights ¶ 29 On appeal, Father argues the trial court’s determinations that he was unfit and that the termination of his parental rights was in the best interests of the children were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. ¶ 30 Section 2-29(2) of the Act sets forth a two-step process for the involuntary termination of parental rights. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020). First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is an unfit person as defined by the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)). 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020); In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d 329, 337 (2010). If the trial court finds the parent to be unfit, the court must then determine whether the State has proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it is in the child’s best interest that parental rights be terminated. 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2020); In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 367 (2004). During the second stage of the proceedings, the focus of the court’s scrutiny shifts from the rights of the parents to the best interests of the child. In re B.B., 386 Ill. App. 3d 686, 697 (2008). ¶ 31 The trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights involves factual findings and credibility assessments which, on review, are accorded great deference. In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655 (2000). On appeal, the trial court’s findings of parental unfitness and that termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interests will not be disturbed unless they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d 985, 998, 1001 (2004).

¶ 32 Determination of Unfitness ¶ 33 Here, the trial court concluded that the State had successfully proven two grounds of unfitness against Father. The court found that Father failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of the minors during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2020)) and that he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors in any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)). ¶ 34 “Reasonable effort” is a subjective standard and refers to the amount of effort reasonable for the particular parent. In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 998. The court must determine whether the parent has made earnest and conscientious strides toward correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the minor from the home. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180218, ¶ 24. In this case, the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the children from the home were that their parents had issues with substance abuse which impaired their ability to adequately care for the minors, and there were concerns about domestic violence in the home.

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¶ 35 On appeal, Father argues that it was not possible for him to have completed his service plan in nine months, given his ongoing addiction during the coronavirus pandemic. Father contends the nine-month period for assessment “should have been extended to account for the interference of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Father’s contention that the coronavirus pandemic interfered with his efforts to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the children is unsupported by any evidence in the record. Instead, the evidence was that, absent a two-week transition period at the beginning of the pandemic in March 2020, services were more readily available than in the past. ¶ 36 Father was repeatedly referred to substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental health services. Although Father made numerous appointments for services, he chronically failed to appear for his appointments or to follow through on recommendations. Father made almost no effort to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the children until the State sought to terminate his parental rights in August 2020. Based on the evidence, the trial court’s determination that Father was unfit for failing to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for removal of the minors during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 37 The trial court also did not err in finding that Father was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors in any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. “Reasonable progress” is an objective standard and is based upon the amount of progress as measured from the conditions existing at the time of removal. In re Jacorey S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. Reasonable progress requires a measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In re Jacorey S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. A parent has made “reasonable progress” when the trial court can conclude that it will be able to return the child to parental custody in the near future. In re Jacorey S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113427, ¶ 21. If a service plan has been established to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child from the parent, a “failure to make reasonable progress” includes a parent’s failure to substantially fulfill his obligations under the service plan. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2020). ¶ 38 Father’s first service plan was created in August 2019, shortly after the children came into DCFS care. Father’s service plan was revisited every six months, with the tasks remaining the same throughout the case. Father’s last service plan, created in June 2020, included the following tasks: (1) complete a substance abuse assessment and follow any recommendations, (2) complete a mental health assessment and follow any recommendations, (3) complete a domestic violence assessment and follow any recommendations, and (4) cooperate with DCFS. While Father cooperated with DCFS, Father failed to make significant progress on any of the other tasks in his service plan between October 1, 2019, and August 4, 2020. ¶ 39 Father tested positive for controlled substances on five occasions and missed six scheduled drugs tests between September 2019 and October 2020. Father completed substance abuse assessments at Chestnut in January and April 2020 but did not complete the treatment recommended. Father did not successfully complete any substance abuse treatment until November 2020, well after the relevant nine-month time period had passed. As of the date of the termination hearing, Father had not yet followed up with outpatient treatment, as requested. ¶ 40 Father also failed to follow through on his tasks regarding treatment for his mental health and domestic violence issues. Although Father completed mental health assessments in April 2020 and in October or November 2020, Father failed to complete the recommended treatment.

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Father repeatedly failed to appear for appointments to complete an assessment regarding his issues with domestic violence. In April 2020, one program used the information Father provided over the phone as part of its intake procedure to provide Father with a treatment plan, but Father failed to complete any of the recommended treatment. The overwhelming evidence was that Father failed to make any measurable movement toward reunification between October 1, 2019, and August 4, 2020. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court’s finding that Father was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 41 Determination of the Children’s Best Interests ¶ 42 Once a parent has been found to be unfit, the parent’s rights yield to the child’s best interests. In re Tashika F., 333 Ill. App. 3d 165, 170 (2002). Again, this court will not reverse the trial court’s determination as to the child’s best interests unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re R.L., 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1001. ¶ 43 The record clearly reveals Father’s lack of effort and progress to complete the objectives of his service plan, in particular his failure to seek treatment for his substance abuse, mental health issues, and perpetuation of domestic violence. The caseworker’s concerns about Father’s ability or willingness to keep up with the children’s appointments were valid in light of his failure to follow through with his own service plan tasks. By contrast, the children were thriving in their foster home due to the foster parents’ dedication to meeting the needs of the children. P.S. feels safe in the foster home, a feeling she did not have while living with her parents. The children are strongly bonded to their foster family, and the foster parents wish to adopt the children. Based on the circumstances presented, the trial court’s determination that termination of Father’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 44 Denial of Father’s Motions to Continue or for an In-Person Hearing ¶ 45 On November 24, 2020, the trial court called the case for the fitness and best interests hearings. The proceedings were conducted in open court, via the video conferencing platform Zoom. The judge, the GAL, the parties, and counsel for the attorneys and DCFS were all present on the video call. The record suggests that each of the participants were in separate locations, with the exception of the parents, who were together in the same “breakout room.” 1 It is unclear from the record when, but at some point, the caseworker was also included in the call so that she could testify. ¶ 46 At the start of the hearing, Father’s counsel stated that Father did not consent to a videoconference hearing and made an oral motion to continue the case until an in-person

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hearing could be conducted. Father indicated that the cause had originally been set for an in- person hearing but was reset for a Zoom hearing because the Madison County courts were not conducting in-person hearings, except in emergency situations, due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. Counsel indicated that it was counsel’s preference and Father’s “preference” to have the hearing in person, “[g]iven the difference in cross examining the witnesses.” Counsel argued that an in-person hearing would allow the participants to “see the witness, *** see what the witness is doing, [and] who the witness is with.” ¶ 47 The State requested that the case proceed over the Zoom videoconference platform, given the parents’ lack of progress on services, the length of time the case had been pending, and Zoom’s capability to allow the parties to confer privately with their counsel in a breakout room. Mother’s counsel stated that Mother would prefer an in-person hearing, but that she had not expressed any concerns about proceeding via Zoom. ¶ 48 The trial court denied Father’s motion to continue. The court noted that it was a bench trial and found that the parents’ constitutionally protected rights would not be infringed by going forward with a hearing held via videoconference. The court stated that, most importantly, it did not believe that permanency for the children should be further delayed. Father’s counsel then made a motion to have an emergency, in-person hearing that day. The court denied Father’s motion. ¶ 49 During the hearings, counsel requested the opportunity to confer with Father four times: (1) during Truax’s testimony at the fitness hearing, (2) before counsel’s cross-examination of Truax at the fitness hearing, (3) after the State rested during the fitness hearing and before counsel announced that Father would not testify, and (4) after the State rested during the best interests hearing and before counsel announced Father would testify. During each conference, Father and Mother were placed in a breakout room with their attorneys. The court also advised the parties to write down any thoughts or issues they had during the course of the proceedings so that they could be addressed with their attorneys during the breaks. ¶ 50 Early in the fitness hearing, while the State was questioning Truax regarding Mother’s service plan, Father’s counsel objected, indicating that Truax appeared to be looking down at something while testifying. The court instructed Truax not to refer to any notes or documents unless requested to do so. During Father’s testimony at the best interest hearing, the State interjected, stating counsel could hear Mother speaking in the background. The court advised Mother that she could be in the room while Father testified, but that she was not to provide him with any answers to the questions and that she would need to testify separately if she wanted to speak. ¶ 51 On appeal, Father argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to continue the termination hearings and, alternatively, in denying Father’s motion for an immediate in-person hearing. Father argues the trial court’s actions denied Father his “right to an in-person hearing” and violated his “due process right to appear personally at all stages of the proceeding.” Father contends he was prejudiced by the trial court’s decision to conduct the hearings via videoconference. ¶ 52 A parent has a fundamental liberty interest, protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, in maintaining a parental relationship with his or her child. In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d 478, 482 (1999). To protect this interest, parents are entitled to certain due process safeguards in actions to terminate their parental rights. In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 482. These safeguards include the right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material

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to the proceedings, and to cross-examine witnesses. In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 482; 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2020). ¶ 53 The respondent does not have an absolute right to a continuance in a proceeding under the Act. In re S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶ 31. Whether to grant or deny a motion to continue in a proceeding under the Act is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. In re C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d 770, 778 (1999). We will not overturn the trial court’s decision absent manifest abuse or palpable injustice. In re S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶ 31. ¶ 54 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 241 (eff. May 22, 2020) provides that “[t]he court may, upon request or on its own order, for good cause shown and upon appropriate safeguards, allow a case participant to testify or otherwise participate in a civil trial or evidentiary hearing by video conferencing from a remote location.” A “case participant includes any individual involved in a civil case including the judge presiding over the case, parties, lawyers, guardians ad litem, minors in the care of [DFCS], witnesses, experts, interpreters, treatment providers, law enforcement officers, DCFS caseworkers, and court reporters.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). “Good cause is likely to arise when a witness is unable to attend trial for unexpected reasons, such as accident, illness, or limited court operations, but also in foreseeable circumstances such as residing out of state.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). The rule requires that adequate safeguard be taken to “ensure accurate identification of the case participant testifying remotely and to avoid improper influences by any individual who may be present with the case participant at the time of the testimony.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). ¶ 55 The trial court should consider and weigh a multitude of factors when assessing whether it is appropriate to admit video testimony. The committee comments provide that the court “should take into consideration and balance any due process concerns, the ability to questions witnesses, hardships that would prevent the case participant from appearing in person, the type of case, any prejudice to the parties if testimony occurred by video conference, and any other issues of fairness. A court must balance these and other relevant factors in an individual case.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). ¶ 56 On appeal, Father indicates his belief that the question of whether a parent has a right to demand an in-person hearing during proceedings to terminate parent rights is an issue of first impression. Father, however, provides this court with no analysis as to his belief regarding the nature of this alleged right to be personally present. Instead, he baldly asserts that he has a “right to an in-person hearing” and that the denial of this “right” violates his “due process right to appear personally at all stages of the proceeding.” Father does not provide this court with any analysis of Rule 241, the interplay between Rule 241 and his alleged due process right to an in-person hearing, or how conducting the hearing via a videoconferencing platform interfered with his due process right to be present at the proceeding. ¶ 57 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341 (eff. May 25, 2018) sets forth requirements for appellate briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341 (eff. May 25, 2018). Rule 341(h)(7) provides that the argument portion of the appellant’s brief “shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018). “A reviewing court is entitled to the benefit of clearly defined issues with pertinent authority cited and a cohesive legal argument. *** The appellate court is not a depository in which an appellant may dump the entire matter of argument and research.” Wing

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v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11. Arguments that are not supported by citations to legal authority do not meet the requirements of Rule 341(h)(7) and are procedurally defaulted on appeal. Wing, 2016 IL App (1st) 153517, ¶ 11; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. May 25, 2018) (points not argued are forfeited on appeal). Therefore, Father has forfeited this claim on appeal. ¶ 58 Father also forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Bank of New York Mellon v. Rogers, 2016 IL App (2d) 150712, ¶ 32 (issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal); Fawcett v. Reinertsen, 131 Ill. 2d 380, 386 (1989) (holding that issues not raised in the trial court, even constitutional matters, are generally considered to be forfeited on appeal). At the hearing, Father’s only stated reason for the motion to continue was a “preference” for an in-person hearing due to the “difference[s] in cross examining the witnesses” and the ability to observe the witness and the witness’s surroundings. At no time during the hearing did Father assert that he had a due process right to an in-person hearing. The first mention of any alleged “right” to an in-person hearing appeared in Father’s posttrial motion to reconsider. Father’s entire argument on this issue constituted the single statement that, “[i]n denying Father’s motion [to continue], [the court] denied Father’s right to an in- person trial.” As such, Father’s contention that he had “due process” right to an in-person hearing, and that the trial court’s denial of his motion to continue violated this right, have been forfeited on appeal. ¶ 59 Despite this forfeiture, the record demonstrates that the trial court allowed all of the case participants to testify or participate in the hearing remotely via a videoconferencing platform because court operations were limited in Madison County due to the public health concerns presented by the ongoing coronavirus pandemic. The committee comments to Rule 241 specifically indicate that “limited court operations” can constitute “good cause” for proceeding under the rule. In denying Father’s motions, the court considered Father’s concerns regarding examination of the witnesses, the parents’ due process rights, the court’s role in judging the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence, and the children’s need for permanence. ¶ 60 During the proceeding, the court took steps to safeguard the integrity of the proceeding and the parties’ rights. The court repeatedly stopped the proceedings so that the parties could privately confer with their attorneys. When the circumstances were brought to the court’s attention, the trial judge admonished one witness not to refer to documents unless requested and admonished Mother not to provide prompts to Father during his testimony. ¶ 61 Notably, the committee comments anticipated that these specific issues may arise when admitting testimony remotely. The committee comments indicate that the attorneys have an ethical obligation to instruct the case participants that they represent that (1) he or she may not communicate with anyone during their testimony except the examining attorney and the court reporter, and (2) he or she may not consult any written, printed, or electronic information during the examination other than information provided by the examining attorney. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 241, Committee Comments (rev. May 22, 2020). While a trial judge could also offer blanket admonishments regarding these issues prior to the taking of any testimony, in this case none of the parties requested that the court do so, and the curative measures employed by the trial court when those issues arose were appropriate and sufficient safeguards under the circumstances. ¶ 62 While videoconferencing in civil proceedings is relatively new, our supreme court has spoken on the use of videoconferencing by amending Rule 241. Our trial courts are now

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experimenting with technology that allows for private conferences between a party and his or her attorney, private waiting rooms for witnesses so that testimony is not compromised, and other methodologies that enhance the taking of testimony remotely. We find the circuit court used the Zoom videoconference platform to conduct a hearing that protected the rights of the parties, as well as the integrity of the judicial process. ¶ 63 Further, we find that Father has failed to demonstrate that he had a right to demand an in- person hearing during the termination proceedings in this case. Father has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s decision to conduct the proceeding via a videoconferencing platform, consistent with Rule 241, violated Father’s right to personally appear at the termination proceeding. Even though Father was not able to be in the same physical space as every other participant at the hearing, the videoconferencing platform allowed Father to be present, virtually. He was able to testify and was able to be heard, to present evidence, and to cross- examine witnesses. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Father’s request for a continuance and electing to conduct the termination proceedings via a videoconferencing platform in conformity with Rule 241. ¶ 64 Furthermore, Father has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s ruling. On appeal, Father argues that conducting the hearing via videoconference interfered with his ability to consult with his attorney “at all times,” stripped him of his right to see what Truax was looking at during her testimony, and inhibited the court’s ability to observe the witnesses and weigh their credibility. Father’s contentions of prejudice are unfounded. The record indicates that Father conferred with his counsel in a breakout room four times during the hearing and that the court never denied a request from Father or his counsel to be placed in a breakout room for a consultation or to exchange notes. ^[2] ¶ 65 Father also asserts he was prejudiced because he could not see what Truax was looking at during her testimony. The dissent goes so far as to conclude that the video conference created a “specific challenge to the judge in that the witness appeared to be using notes while testifying.” The record belies such an assumption. Indeed, the report of proceedings indicates that Father’s counsel objected early in the fitness hearing because it appeared that Truax was looking down at something while testifying. Obviously, this nuance was not lost on Father’s counsel as a result of the videoconference. Moreover, no one asked what it was that Truax seemed to be looking at. Upon making the objection, however the court instructed Truax not to refer to any notes unless requested to do so. This scenario occurs all of the time when a witness takes notes to the witness stand in anticipation of testimony, and it is not unusual for the trial court to similarly instruct a witness not to use notes. At no time did Father ask what Truax was allegedly referring to during her testimony, and he may not now claim that he is prejudiced by the omission of his own counsel. The fact that the trial court instructed the witness lends validity to the application of Rule 241, as the instruction by the court was an appropriate safeguard contemplated by the rule. ¶ 66 Finally, Father argues he was prejudiced because the trial court’s ability to observe the witnesses and weigh their testimony was inhibited by the use of videoconferencing. Father’s argument is nothing more than conjecture. There is simply no evidence that the videoconferencing platform interfered with or inhibited the trial court’s ability to view the