substitute procedural requirement in Illinois

1988In Mackey, the court stated that a suspension of a driver’s license for a statutorily defined cause implicates due process and further stated that a determination of what process is due requires a balancing of the following three considerations: “ ‘[FJirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra

1988In Mackey, the court stated that a suspension of a driver’s license for a statutorily defined cause implicates due process and further stated that a determination of what process is due requires a balancing of the following three considerations: “ ‘[FJirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administra

2021Consistent with this precedent, we find that some evidence must be shown to support the length of time that the State seeks to administer psychotropic medication, in order to meet its statutory burden to prove that the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm. - 20 - ¶ 97 Having found that the trial court’s action led to erroneous deprivation of Rob’s liberty interest, we consider the third and final factor under the procedural due process framework— the State’s interest, “ ‘including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedura

2006In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 48-49 .

1988In the first, Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105 , 52 L.

1988In the first, Dixon v. Love (1977), 431 U.S. 105 , 52 L.

2021When the State moves to terminate parental rights, “it must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.” See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54 . ¶ 24 In determining whether administrative procedures are constitutionally sufficient, we consider (1) the “private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if -7- No. 1-21-0197 any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”, and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involve and the fiscal and admi

2004Two private interests are at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights: the parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of his or her child ( Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-59 , 102 S.Ct. at 1397 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 610 ; M.H., 196 Ill.2d at 365, 256 Ill.Dec. 297 , 751 N.E.2d 1134 ), and the child's interest in a "normal family home" ( Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. at 1398 , 71 L.Ed.2d at 610 ), or, as our appellate court described it, an "interest in a loving, stable and safe home environment" ( 338 Ill.App.3d at 152 , 272 Ill.Dec. 829 , 788 N.E.2d 133 ).

2014As the Supreme Court recognized in Miller, "[O]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults. *** [I]t is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for children." (Emphasis in original and interal quotation marks omitted.) Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 . "[C]riminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 . 22 No. 1-13-2540 ¶ 53 Consideration of the foregoing factors compels the conclusion that the Act, with its manda

2014As the Supreme Court recognized in Miller, “[O]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults. *** [I]t is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for children.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller, 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S. Ct. at 2470 . “[C]riminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 . ¶ 53 Consideration of the foregoing factors compels the conclusion that the Act, with its mandated registry

2014As the Supreme Court recognized in Miller, "[O]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults. *** [I]t is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for children." (Emphasis in original and interal quotation marks omitted.) Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 . "[C]riminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be flawed." Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 . 22 No. 1-13-2540 ¶ 53 Consideration of the foregoing factors compels the conclusion that the Act, with its manda

2014As the Supreme Court recognized in Miller, “[O]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults. *** [I]t is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for children.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller, 567 U.S. at ___ , 132 S. Ct. at 2470 . “[C]riminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 76 . ¶ 53 Consideration of the foregoing factors compels the conclusion that the Act, with its mandated registry

2011Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). ¶ 77 Building on Mathews , the circuit court next looked to Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir.2002), a case similar to the one before us.

2011Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). ¶ 77 Building on Mathews, the circuit court next looked to Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2002), a case similar to the one before us.

1992In considering the sufficiency of the due process protections afforded by a State statute, it is necessary to balance the private interest affected by the official action, “ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest *** and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards’ ”; and the State’s interest, “ ‘including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ ” Parham v. J.R. (1979), 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 , 61 L.

1992In considering the sufficiency of the due process protections afforded by a State statute, it is necessary to balance the private interest affected by the official action, “ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest *** and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards’ ”; and the State’s interest, “ ‘including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’ ” Parham v. J.R. (1979), 442 U.S. 584, 599-600 , 61 L.

1987Eppinga v. Edgar (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 101, 107 , 492 N.E.2d 187, 189 , the court stated: “[T]here are three factors for consideration in determining when a prior hearing is required to afford due process: ‘[1] the [nature of the] private interest that will be affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedu

1987Eppinga v. Edgar (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 101, 107 , 492 N.E.2d 187, 189 , the court stated: “[T]here are three factors for consideration in determining when a prior hearing is required to afford due process: ‘[1] the [nature of the] private interest that will be affected by the official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedu

2021The Illinois Supreme Court has listed the following factors that should be considered in evaluating a procedural due process claim: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 5 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2021The Illinois Supreme Court has listed the following factors that should be considered in evaluating a procedural due process claim: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 5 interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

2021In re P.S., 2021 IL App (5th) 210027, ¶ 52 .

2001Those factors are as follows: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." See In re C.J., 272 Ill.App.3d 461 , 465, 208 Ill.Dec. 833 , 650 N.E.2d 290 (1995); In re M.R. et al., Minors, 316 Ill.App.3d 399, 402-

2001Those factors are as follows: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." See In re C.J., 272 Ill.App.3d 461 , 465, 208 Ill.Dec. 833 , 650 N.E.2d 290 (1995); In re M.R. et al., Minors, 316 Ill.App.3d 399, 402-

2001Those factors are as follows: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." See In re C.J., 272 Ill.App.3d 461 , 465, 208 Ill.Dec. 833 , 650 N.E.2d 290 (1995); In re M.R. et al., Minors, 316 Ill.App.3d 399, 402-

1986Ed. 2d 725 , 95 S. Ct. 729 .) These interests include “the [nature of the] private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; [and] the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” People ex rel.

1980Ed. 2d 18, 33 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 ; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (1977), 431 U.S. 816 , 53 L.

1980Ed. 2d 18, 33 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 ; Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (1977), 431 U.S. 816 , 53 L.

1979(Kropel v. Conlisk (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 17 , 322 N.E.2d 793 ; see Powell v. Jones (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 70 , 305 N.E.2d 166 .) But finding the specific requirements of due process in a particular case has been held by the United States Supreme Court to require consideration of three distinct factors: “[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including th

1979(Kropel v. Conlisk (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 17 , 322 N.E.2d 793 ; see Powell v. Jones (1973), 56 Ill. 2d 70 , 305 N.E.2d 166 .) But finding the specific requirements of due process in a particular case has been held by the United States Supreme Court to require consideration of three distinct factors: “[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including th

1979Ed. 2d 18, 33 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 .) And the procedures required need not include a prior hearing “where the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures underlying the decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination ° ” (Memphis Light, 436 U.S. 1, 19 , 56 L.

1979Ed. 2d 18, 33 , 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 .) And the procedures required need not include a prior hearing “where the potential length or severity of the deprivation does not indicate a likelihood of serious loss and where the procedures underlying the decision to act are sufficiently reliable to minimize the risk of erroneous determination ° ” (Memphis Light, 436 U.S. 1, 19 , 56 L.