Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1992). · Go Syfert
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Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated”
158 citation events (113 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Kemp v. Berschback (fladistctapp, 2016-08-10)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Kemp v. Berschback
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
e give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jacobo v. Board of Trustees of Miami Police
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Britt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Metropolitan Dade County v. Milton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
to dismiss from employment; to terminate employment of a person.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Magaha (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. · 2000 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
if necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) XYZ 300, LLC, Trustee of the Mirror Lake Land Trust UAD March 20, 2013 v. City of St. Petersburg
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Fundamentally, statutory construction demands "that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kinsale Insurance Company v. Pride of St. Lucie Lodge 1189, Inc.
11th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
“If neces- sary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascer- tained by reference to a dictionary.” Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992); see also State v. Kinchen, 490 So. 2d 21, 22 (Fla. 1985) (using dictionary definition to define “fairly” in the context of the “fairly susceptible test,” a common law standard about comments on the defendant’s failure to testify, where prior court had not de- fined the word “fairly” when creating the test); State v. Grissom, 492 So. 2d 1324, 1325 (Fla. 1986) (same). 2 Thus, we turn to the ordinary meaning of the wo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Samantha Elaine Tsuji v. H. Bart Fleet, etc.
Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
When necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of words can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”) (first quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992); and then Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d 281, 286 (Fla. 2001)) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF FLORIDA v. ANTHONY LEVERN WAITERS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · confidence medium
Consequently, "the plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary." Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida v. Peter Peraza
Fla. · 2018 · confidence medium
Although neither of the two statutes defines the word “person,” it must be given its “plain and ordinary meaning.” Green v. Siaie, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992). ln common understanding, “person” refers to a “human being,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1686 (1993 ed.), which is not occupation-specific and plainly includes human beings serving as law enforcement officers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Marcy Nicole Overstreet, Wife v. Dwayne Stanley Overstreet, Husband
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
"When a term is undefined by statute, '[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction' requires that we give a statutory term 'its plain and ordinary meaning.' " Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So. 2d 294, 298 (Fla. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So. 2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brittany's Place Condominium Association, Inc. v. U.S. Bank, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
“One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Id. (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)). “[I]t is axiomatic that all parts of a statute must be read together in order to achieve a consistent whole.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dunn v. City of Boynton Beach
S.D. Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
In other -words, the tools must be “objects which actually facilitate the breaking and entering.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (holding that gloves are not burglary tools).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Megiel-Rollo v. Megiel
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
We must “give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citing Se.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Putnam County Environmental Council v. St. Johns River Water Mangement District
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
The language must be given “its plan and ordinary meaning.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. D.C.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Ctr., Inc. v. See, 79 So.3d 1, 9 (Fla.2012); see State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ortiz v. Regalado
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
We must “give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citing Se.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Financial Services v. Peter R. Brown Construction, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Dist., 774 So.2d at 915 . “[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of [a] word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) R.T.G. Furniture Corp. v. Coates
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1269 (Fla.2006), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Motes v. State, 37 So.3d 301 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gaulden
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) King v. King
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
We must “give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citing Se.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Johnson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
See Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.2005) (when a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute’s plain language or resort to rules of construction); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (“If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” (citation omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bennett v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, Inc. (2×)
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
When a term is not defined within a statute, a fundamental construction tool requires giving a statutory term its "plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992); Dianderas v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 973 So.2d 523, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Conner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Bd., 975 So.2d 1116, 1122 (Fla.2008) ("It is appropriate to refer to dictionary definitions when construing statutes or rules.”); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) ("If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pena v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Orhs v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
When a term is not defined within a statute, a fundamental construction tool requires giving a statutory term its "plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992); Dianderas v. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 973 So.2d 523, 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dianderas v. FL. BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
When a term is undefined by statute, "[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction" requires that we give a statutory term "its plain and ordinary meaning." Green. v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Broward County v. Fairfield Resorts Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
We must then give that language its plain and ordinary meaning, “unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harden v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)(citing Southeastern Fisheries Ass’n, Inc. v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla.1984)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Church of the Palms-Presbyterian (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance
M.D. Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crist v. Jaber
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Further, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that in the absence of a statutory definition, courts can resort to definitions of the same term found in case law." Rollins v. Pizzarelli, 761 So.2d 294, 298 (Fla.2000) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)); see also Level 3 Communications, LLC, 841 So.2d at 452 n. 4.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Montgomery v. State
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dept. of Rev. v. New Sea Escape Cruises
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
Complicating the analysis in the instant matter is the fact that the sales and use tax statute does not define the term "intrastate." However, as we have determined, When a term is undefined by statute, "[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction" requires that we give a statutory term "its plain and ordinary meaning." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hicks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
One maxim of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, dictates that when "an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Del Castillo
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reform Party of Florida v. Black
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its *317 plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Id. (citing Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Burris
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bryant v. Adventist Health Systems Sunbelt, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Burkhart
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001)(quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dept. of Children and Family Services v. By
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nehme v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc.
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless words are defined in the statute or by *205 the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Nettles v. State (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
Second, the court applied the principle of ejusdem generis, which provides that "where an enumeration of specific things is followed by *491 some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated." Id. (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 472 (Fla.1992) ).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Burris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nettles v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
In Green v. State, relied upon by Wilson , the Florida Supreme Court determined that a pair of gloves would not be viewed as burglary tools under a statutory scheme prohibiting possession of "`any tool, machine, or implement with intent to use the same, or allow the same to be used, to commit any burglary....'" 604 So.2d 471, 472 (Fla.1992) (quoting *246 § 810.06, Fla. Stat. (1989)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Orange County v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370, 372 (Fla.1997); Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelly v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992), the court stated that “[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature.” See also Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285 (Fla.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kelly v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992), the court stated that "[o]ne of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." See also Raulerson v. State, 763 So.2d 285 (Fla.2000).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wilson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Second, the principle of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis provides that "where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 472 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
By construing section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (1997), to outlaw lewd or lascivious speech, the majority opinion dishonors at least three canons of statutory construction, viz.: "One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature." Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992). "[W]here criminal statutes are susceptible to differing constructions, they must be construed in favor of the accused." Thompson v. State, 695 So.2d …
Anthony E. GREEN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
79183.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Aug 27, 1992.
604 So. 2d 471
McDonald.
Cited by 124 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 86%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Florida (1)

[*472] Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and Lynn A. Williams, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, Crim. Appeals, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Laura Rush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent.

McDONALD, Justice.

Anthony Green petitions this Court to review Green v. State, 591 So.2d 965, 967 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in which the district court certified the following question as being of great public importance:

Are items of personal apparel, such as common gloves, included under the terms "tool, machine, or implement" as used in section 810.06, Florida Statutes?

We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. We answer the certified question in the negative and quash the decision below.

On January 24, 1990, the victim of a burglary telephoned for emergency assistance after she heard a noise and saw a human shadow on the porch adjacent to her bedroom. The officers who responded to the victim's call saw Green running on the street near the victim's home and apprehended him after a brief chase. At trial, one of the officers testified that the temperature was between the fifties and sixties at the time of the arrest and that Green was wearing a jump suit and garden gloves.

Green was charged with burglary[1] and with possession of burglary tools,[2] based on his possession of gloves when apprehended. The jury found Green guilty of both offenses. On appeal, the district court affirmed his conviction and sentences and certified the question.

Section 810.06, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in pertinent part: "Whoever has in his possession any tool, machine, or implement with intent to use the same, or allow the same to be used, to commit any burglary or trespass shall be guilty of a felony." Although the state concedes that gloves do not fall within the commonly accepted meaning of "machine," it argues[*473] that the plain meanings of "tool" and "implement" include personal apparel such as gloves. We disagree.

Common household objects, which generally might have a useful and lawful purpose, may be classified as burglary tools if they are used with the intent to commit a burglary. Thomas v. State, 531 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1988). For example, this Court has upheld convictions for possession of bolt cutters[3] and screwdrivers[4] as burglary tools. We recognize the potential for gloves to be used in conjunction with tools in the process of committing a burglary.[5] While gloves can provide a means for burglars to avoid leaving fingerprints, they and other items of personal apparel are not objects which actually facilitate the breaking and entering of a dwelling.

One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the legislature. Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla. 1984). If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary. Gardner v. Johnson, 451 So.2d 477 (1984). The dictionary defines "tool" as "something that serves as a means to an end: an instrument by which something is effected or accomplished." Merriam-Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2408 (1986). "Tool" is also defined as "an implement or object used in performing an operation or carrying on work of any kind." Id. As the state points out, gloves are essential tools of the trade for some workers, such as firefighters and surgeons. However, the essential nature of clothing in those types of situations does not warrant the broad expansion of the definition of "tool" that the state proposes. As Judge Allen stated in his dissent in the decision below, the plain meaning of "tool" simply does not include articles of personal apparel that may be used as instruments to commit a burglary.

Another maxim of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, is applicable to our our interpretation of the phrase "tool, machine or implement." Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated. State ex rel. Wedgworth Farms, Inc. v. Thompson, 101 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1958). With respect to the language in section 810.06, the word "implement" should be interpreted to refer to objects similar in nature to "tools" or "machines." Because gloves are not included in the definitions of "tool" or "machine," the doctrine of ejusdem generis limits the word "implement" to a definition that does not include gloves.

If this Court stretched the phrase "tool, machine, or implement" to include items of personal apparel, we would be in grave danger of destroying both the legislature's intent as to and the common person's understanding of the statutory language. Therefore, we answer the certified question in the negative and conclude that items of personal apparel, such as common gloves, are not included under the terms "tool, machine, or implement" as used in section 810.06. We therefore quash the decision under review and direct the district court to reverse the conviction for possession of burglary tools. We decline to address the other issues raised by Green.

It is so ordered.

BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.

1 § 810.02, Fla. Stat. (1989)
2 § 810.06, Fla. Stat. (1989).
3 Desin v. State, 414 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1982).
4 Thomas v. State, 531 So.2d 708 (Fla. 1988).
5 Other jurisdictions have upheld convictions for possession of burglary tools when the defendant has been found with gloves. In those cases, however, tools such as chisels, tire irons, and hammers were also found in the defendants' possession. Fuqua v. State, 246 Miss. 191, 145 So.2d 152 (1962), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 372 U.S. 709, 83 S.Ct. 1018, 10 L.Ed.2d 125 (1963); People v. Ross, 161 A.D.2d 1191, 555 N.Y.S.2d 524 (App.Div. 1990); State v. Nichols, 268 N.C. 152, 150 S.E.2d 21 (1966); but see Moore v. State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1063, 89 S.Ct. 714, 21 L.Ed.2d 705 (1969).