Johnson v. Nickerson (1996)

To establish a prima facie case of libel per quod, “the plaintiff must show the defendant ‘(1) published a statement that (2) was defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff, and (4) resulted in injury to the plaintiff.’ ” Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 175 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

To establish a prima facie case of defamation under Iowa law, the plaintiff must show the defendant “(1) published a statement that (2) was defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff, and (4) resulted in injury to the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Iowa 1996).

Defamation is “an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name” that is comprised of the “twin torts of libel and slander—the former being written and the latter being oral.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

This controversy is clearly a public controversy involving questions of “public concern.” See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761-62 , 105 S.Ct. 2939, 2946-47 , 86 L.Ed.2d 593 (1985) (plurality opinion); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publications, Inc., 627 F.2d 1287, 1296-97 (D.C.Cir.) (defining a public controversy as one raising issues that might reasonably be expected to have an impact beyond the parties directly enmeshed in the particular contr…

Cir.) (defining a public controversy as one raising issues that might reasonably be expected to have an impact beyond the parties directly enmeshed in the particular controversy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980); Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Iowa 1996) (same).

Hurt feelings alone cannot serve as the basis of a defamation action.” Id. at 513 (citation omitted).

Per se defamation has “a natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff to wrath or expose [her] to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive [her] of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

A, at 384–85 (1977)). 6 Defamation per se is an exception: falsity is presumed “when a statement has a ‘natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse.’” Bandstra v. Covenant Reformed Church, 913 N.W.2d 19, 46 (Iowa 2018) (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

Libel per quod requires an audience to “refer to facts 12 or circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish the defamation.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

“A statement is libelous per se if it has ‘a natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse.’” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996) (quoting Prewitt v. Wilson, 103 N.W. 365, 367 (Iowa 1905)).

Ctr., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 74, 83 (Iowa 2001); Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996); Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Iowa 1994).

Ctr., Inc., 636 N.W.2d 74, 83 (Iowa 2001); Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996); Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Iowa 1994).

In the case of statements that are not libelous per se but libelous per quod, Iowa law requires that a “plaintiff must first prove actual damage to reputation before the plaintiff can recover for mental anguish or hurt feelings.” Schlegel v. Ottumwa Courier, 585 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1998); Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 513 (1996) (stating that “[t]o recover in an action for defamation, a plaintiff must ordinarily prove some sort of cognizable injury, such as injury to re…

Citing Iowa Civil Jury Instruction 2100.5, Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510, 512 (Iowa 1996), and Haldeman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 376 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Iowa 1985), the Court defined actual malice in Instruction No. 16: The Defendant made the statements with actual malice if the statements were made with ill-will or wrongful motive.

Meanwhile, “[a] statement is libelous per quod if it is necessary to refer to facts or circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish the defamation.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

As our supreme court once said, “Hurt feelings alone cannot serve as the basis of a defamation action.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Iowa 1996).

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Iowa 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832, 839 (Iowa 2004) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

Defamation per se includes statements that have “a natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse.” Schlegal v. Ottumwa Courier, a Div. of Lee Enterprises, Inc., 585 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

The centuries-old tort of defamation of character protects a person’s common law “interest in reputation and good name.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

See Murray v. Holnam, Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 138 , 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The focus of defamation is not on the hurt to the defamed party's feelings, but on the injury to his reputation." (quoting Fleming v. Rose, 338 S.C. 524, 532 , 526 S.E.2d 732, 737 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 350 S.C. 488 , 567 S.E.2d 857 (2002))); see also Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Iowa 1996) ("While a defamation suit can be viewed as serving the purpose of vin…

See Murray v. Holnam, Inc., 344 S.C. 129, 138 , 542 S.E.2d 743, 748 (Ct. App. 2001) ("The focus of defamation is not on the hurt to the defamed party's feelings, but on the injury to his reputation." (quoting Fleming v. Rose, 338 S.C. 524, 532 , 526 S.E.2d 732, 737 (Ct. App. 2000), rev'd on other grounds, 350 S.C. 488 , 567 S.E.2d 857 (2002))); see also Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Iowa 1996) ("While a defamation suit can be viewed as serving the purpose of vin…

“A statement is [defamation] per se if it has a natural tendency to provoke the plaintiff to wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

In cases of defamation per quod—as Gustafson alleged—“a plaintiff must ordinarily prove all the above six elements, including ‘some sort of cognizable injury, such as injury to reputation.’” Bierman, 826 N.W.2d at 444 (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Iowa 1996)).

Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

Mahaska’s business defamation or disparagement claim also fails on the merits.' The elements of defamation under Iowa law are that a defendant “(1) published a statement that (2) was defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff, and (4) resulted in injury to the plaintiff.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

“Defamation is an invasion of the interest in reputation and good name.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

The centuries-old tort of defamation of character protects a person’s common law “interest in reputation and good name.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

The centuries-old tort of defamation of character protects a person’s common law “interest in reputation and good name.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

Bd. of Review, 653 N.W.2d 345 , 348 n. 1 (Iowa 2002); Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Iowa 1996); State v. Walker, 236 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 1975).

Bd. of Review, 653 N.W.2d 345 , 348 n.1 (Iowa 2002); Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 513 (Iowa 1996); State v. Walker, 236 N.W.2d 292, 294 (Iowa 1975).

“A statement is libelous per quod if it is necessary to refer to facts or circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish the defamation.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

“A statement is libelous per quod if it is necessary to refer to facts or circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish the defamation.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

Under Iowa law, to prove a claim *999 (or counterclaim) for defamation, the claimant must prove that the opposing party “ ‘(1) published a statement that (2) was defamatory (3) of and concerning the [claimant], and (4) resulted in injury to the [claimant].’ ” Kiesau v. Bantz, 686 N.W.2d 164, 175 (Iowa 2004) (quoting Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

On the other hand, “[a] statement is libelous per quod if it is necessary to refer to facts or circumstances beyond the words actually used to establish the defamation.” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

“Libel involves written statements, while slander involves oral statements.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996)).

The Merits A. Defamation Defamation, the sullying of ones good name, “is made up of the twin torts of libel and slander....” Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

See, e.g., Schlegel, 585 N.W.2d at 224 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), as holding that public officials and public figures must prove actual malice regarding defamatory statements about them); Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 511 (Iowa 1996) (“[T]he court [in Gertz ] prescribed two levels of protection.

Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

App. P. 4; Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

Hurt feelings alone cannot serve as the basis of a defamation action.” 542 N.W.2d at 513 (citation omitted).

Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996); Lara v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 777, 785 (Iowa 1994).

Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

See Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 1996). 5 Although we do not reach the merits of this claim, the merits depend entirely on whether Johnson had a duty to respond differently to the particular voir dire questions, see Cannon v. Lockhart, 850 F.2d 437, 439-40 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing McDonough -6- Knox argues that failure to consider his juror misconduct claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

See Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 1996). 5 .

See Johnson v. Nickerson, 542 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Iowa 1996).

See Johnson v. Nickerson , 542 N.W.2d 506 , 511 (Iowa 1996).