Mallard v. Forest Heights Water Works, Inc. (2003)

See, e.g., Raszeja v. State, 298 Ga. App. 713, 714-715 (2) ( 680 SE2d 690 ) (2009) (appellant waived argument regarding admission of copies of photographs by failing to move to compel production of the originals or to object to admission of the copies); Mallard v. Forest Heights Water Works, 260 Ga. App. 750, 752 (2) ( 580 SE2d 602 ) (2003) (holding that appellant waived argument that the trial court erred by considering appellee’s summary judgment motion without first rulin…

Thus, she waived this argument.16 And her contention that she alimony and division of property”). 15 271 Ga. 436, 438 ( 519 SE2d 909 ) (1999) (“[B]efore a trial court may enter an order sealing a record, Uniform Superior Court Rule 21.1 specifically requires it to hold a hearing on the issue.”). 16 See, e.g., Raszeja v. State, 298 Ga. App. 713, 714-715 (2) ( 680 SE2d 690 ) (2009) (appellant waived argument regarding admission of copies of photographs by failing to move to co…

(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.) Mallard v. Forest Heights Water Works, 260 Ga. App. 750, 751 (1) ( 580 SE2d 602 ) (2003).

See Mallard v. Forest Heights Water Works, 260 Ga. App. 750, 752 (2) ( 580 SE2d 602 ) (2003) (holding that appellant waived argument that the trial court erred by considering appellee’s summary judgment motion without first ruling on appellant’s motion to compel discovery because appellant never moved to continue the summary judgment ruling or otherwise object at the trial level).

See Mallard v. Forest Heights Water Works, 260 Ga. App. 750, 752 (2) ( 580 SE2d 602 ) (2003). 7 Although Matson describes Promus as a “wholly-owned subsidiary,” she points to no evidence in the record to support that assertion. 8 Given our holding in Division 2, we need not address the trial court’s finding that Promus was also entitled to summary judgment on the merits, and we expressly do not reach the issue of whether Promus could be liable under the franchise agreement o…