State v. Rose (1982)
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· 79 citation events
across 1 courts.
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State v. Ondricek (1995)
Proof of "other acts" is admissible if it is relevant to some material issue in dispute in the case. [1] State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982); SDCL 19-12-5 is a "rule of general inadmissibility with limited exceptions." Steele, 510 N.W.2d at 667 (citation omitted). "[T]rial courts must be `ever vigilant' so that the rule is not swallowed up by the exceptions." Id.
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State v. Sieler (1986)
In making such review we are bound by the rule that the question is “not whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.” State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895-96 (S.D.1982), (quoting F.M.
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State v. Steichen (1998)
The review is “‘not whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.’” Id. at 302 (quoting State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895-96 (S.D.1982) (citation omitted)). [¶ 17.] Evidence of a defendant’s other crimes or acts is generally not admissible, unless an exception can be met.
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State v. McDonald (1993)
State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 896 (S.D.1982).
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Hulm v. Hulm (1992)
There is no abuse of discretion if "a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion." State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 896 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Christopherson (1992)
In that review "[w]e are bound by the rule that the question is `not whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.'" State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895-96 (S.D.1982) quoting F.M.
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Johnson v. Johnson (1991)
There is no abuse of discretion if “a judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.” State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 896 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Basker (1991)
SDCL 19-12-1; State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Woodfork (1990)
State v. Reutter, 374 N.W.2d 617, 625 (S.D.1985); State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Perkins (1989)
We find no abuse of discretion here. [4] The standard of review on abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of other criminal wrongs, or other bad acts, was set forth in State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Klein (1989)
“The standard of review in this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.” State v. Bose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982). * Here, two fires were started to avoid financial collapse: (1) Igniting by wrapping cloth around the base of an iron turned on the high position, and (2) ignition by leaving a candle burning in a crawlspace of an attic.
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State v. Rufener (1986)
State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895-96 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Reutter (1985)
State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 197 (S.D.1985); State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D. 1982).
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State v. McCafferty (1984)
This court may not, however, substitute its own reasoning for the rationale upon which the trial court based its ruling. [W]e are bound by the rule that the question is “not whether the judges of this Court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.” 324 N.W.2d at 895-6 (citation omitted); F.M.
citation omitted
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State v. Huber (1984)
State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Holland (1984)
In that review “we are bound by the rule that the question is ‘not whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.’ ” State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895-96 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Wedemann (1983)
State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812 (S.D.1983); State v. Houghton, supra. In that review “[w]e are bound by the rule that the question is ‘not whether the judges of this Court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we believe a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances, could reasonably have reached that conclusion.’ ” State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895-96 (S.D.1982) (quoting F.M.
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State v. Evans (2021)
As we have previously held, when other act evidence has been correctly admitted, a limiting instruction given as part of the final instructions to the jury “fully protects a defendant’s rights.” See State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 896 (S.D. 1982). 2.
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State v. Willis (1985)
However, such evidence is admissible if it is relevant to one of the stated exceptions, State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894, 895 (S.D.1982), and that exception or element is in issue.
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State v. Champagne (1988)
See State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894 (S.D.1982).
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State v. Roden (1986)
See also State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894 (S.D.1982); and State v. Dace, 333 N.W.2d 812, 816 (S.D.1983).
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State v. Fender (1984)
See Rose, supra. Admission of Fender’s prior conduct under the law and the circumstances of this case was a reasonable exercise of the trial court’s discretion.
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State v. McKercher (1983)
See State v. Rose, 324 N.W.2d 894 (S.D.1982).