Richard v. Gray (1953)
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· 61 citation events
across 9 courts.
Showing the 29 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 1953 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
195319892026
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John Lapikas v. Mariner Sands Country Club, Inc. (2026)
A publication is defamation per se when it, considered alone, “tends to injure one in his trade or profession.”4 Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
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Richard Keith Alan, II v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2015)
Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla.1953).
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One for Israel v. Reuven (2022)
Fla. 2014), aff’d (11th Cir. 14-13855 Feb. 17, 2015) (quoting Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla.1953)).
A publication is defamatory per se if, among other things, it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime or “tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
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Compass Building Services, LLC v. Andrea P. Koch, Hubert Koch, Balinda Gonser, and Todd Dehn (2026)
A publication is libelous per se when: “(1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
Ctr., Inc. v. Sadow, 43 So. 3d 710, 729 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010). “[A] 6 publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Blake v. Giustibelli, 182 So. 3d 881, 884 (Fla. 4th…
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Mishiyev v. Davis, Beasley Media Group, LLC (2025)
See generally Pullum, 647 So. 2d at 258 ; cf., e.g., Blake v. Giustibelli, 182 So. 3d 881, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[A] publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.…
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Daly, D.O. v. Markel Service Incorporated (2024)
That’s because: (1) the statements, “considered as the ‘common mind would naturally understand’ them, . . . would plausibly injure Daly in her profession as a doctor”; and (2) two professional liability insurers, in fact, “rejected Daly from coverage.” Id. at 15 (quoting Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953)).
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Techtronic Industries Company Limited v. Bonilla (2023)
“A publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953) (citations omitted).
citations omitted
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Block v. Matesic (2023)
Defamation “[A] publication is libellous [sic] per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
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Block v. Matesic (2023)
Defamation “[A] publication is libellous [sic] per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
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ANNE MCQUEEN v. CAROLE BASKIN (2023)
See, e.g., Blake v. Giustibelli, 182 So. 3d 881, 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("[A] publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se [against a nonmedia defendant], if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession." (first al…
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Block v. Matesic (2023)
“To state a claim of defamation, the plaintiff must allege that ‘(1) the defendant published a false statement (2) about the plaintiff (3) to a third party and (4) that the falsity of the statement caused injury to the plaintiff.’” Id. at 865 (quoting Valencia v. Citibank Int’l, 728 So. 2d 330, 330 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1999)); see also Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1106 (Fla. 2008) (“Defamation has the following five elements: (1) publication; (2) falsity; (3) acto…
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San Juan Products, Inc. v. River Pools & Spas, Inc. (2023)
“A statement is ‘actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo, it: (1) charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) tends to injure one in his trade or profession.’” Shatner, 2018 WL 3769968 , at *6 (quoting Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953)).
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Paris v. Guberman PMC, LLC (2022)
A written publication constitutes libel per se if, “when considered alone without innuendo,” it, inter alia, “tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
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Thomas v. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office (2021)
A published statement is libelous per se if: “(1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla.1953) (en banc) (citations omitted).
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Murray v. Pronto Installations, Inc. (2020)
Supply Co., 378 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1967). 4 distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (3) tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Id. (quoting Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953)) (emphasis added).
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Turner v. Wells (2016)
A written publication is defamatory per se if it “(1) charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (3) tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Id. (citing Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla.1953)).
These are factual allegations, and the evidence showed they were false. ■ As part of their “free speech” claim, Blake and Birzon point out that the judgment references defamation “per se.” They argue that libel per se no longer exists as a legal concept after the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). “[A] publication is libelous per se, or actionable per se, if, when considered alone without innuendo: (1) …
“When a statement charges a person with committing a crime, the statement is considered defamatory per se.” (citation omitted)
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Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc. (2014)
A published statement is libelous per se if: “(1) it charges that a person has committed an infamous crime; (2) it charges a person with having an infectious disease; (3) it tends to subject one to hatred, distrust, ridicule, contempt, or disgrace; or (4) it tends to injure one in his trade or profession.” Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla.1953) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also Ordo-nez, 2011 WL 3843890 , at *7.
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Rapp v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. (2006)
To evaluate the content of a communication, "the words should be given a reasonable construction in view of the thought intended to be conveyed," construed as the "`common mind' would naturally have understood them." Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So.2d 774, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); see also Adams, 84 So.2d at 551 ; Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
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Leavitt v. Cole (2003)
Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla.1953) (citations omitted).
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Shafran v. Parrish (2001)
Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953).
LeMoine v. Spicer, 146 Fla. 758 , 1 So.2d 730 (1941) ; see Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597 (Fla. 1953) (en banc).
en banc
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Marron v. Maduro Moros (2023)
See Richard v. Gray, 62 So. 2d 597, 598 (Fla. 1953) (en banc) (per curiam); Scott v. Busch, 907 So. 2d 662, 667 (Fla. Sth DCA 2005).
en banc
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Thomas v. Jacksonville Television, Inc. (1997)
Accord Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597, 598 (Fla.1953); Axelrod v. Califano, 357 So.2d 1048, 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
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Moody v. Crist (1973)
See Richard v. Gray, Fla.1953, 62 So.2d 597 ; Wolfson v. Kirk, supra. I do not think that it clearly appears from the averments of the complaint and the letters attached thereto that such letters constituted a qualified privilege.
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Wolfson v. Kirk (1973)
See Diplomat Electric, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., 5th Cir.1967, 378 F.2d 377 , Adams v. News-Journal Corporation, Fla. 1955, 84 So.2d 549 , Walsh v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., Fla. 1955, 80 So.2d 669 , Richard v. Gray, Fla. 1953, 62 So.2d 597 , *778 McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., Fla.App. 1962, 139 So.2d 197, 200 .
See Richard v. Gray, 62 So.2d 597 .