McKinney v. Commonwealth (1971)

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where such a defendant, short of effectuating an escape, can be said to have voluntarily absented himself from trial, considering he is under the custody and control of the jailer and is incapable of free volition as to his movements. 59 absence; the defendant is entitled to show that his absence was not voluntary.” McKinney v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Ky. 1971) (citing Fleming v. Commonwealth, 280 S.W.2d 148 (Ky. 1955)…

McKinney v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Ky. 1971) (“If . . . the Commonwealth proves that the defendant had knowledge of the trial date, and did not appear, we think an inference may be indulged that the absence was intentional, knowing and voluntary, particularly where the defendant is one with previous acquaintanceship with court procedure as a defendant on criminal prosecutions.”).

We strongly agree with the reasoning of McKinney v. Commonwealth, Ky. 474 S.W.2d 384, 387 (1971), in which it was said on this point that “it is proper to tailor the requirements as to proof to the realities of the situation.” To do otherwise would be to allow defendants to orchestrate the progress of their trials at their own convenience.

See McKinney, 474 S.W.2d at 387 (in determining whether an absence was voluntary, “it is proper to tailor the requirements as to proof to the realities of the situation”).

See McKinney, 474 S.W.2d at 387 (in determining whether an absence was voluntary, "it is proper to tailor the requirements as to proof to the realities of the situation").

See McKinney, supra. Here, appellant did not personally appear in court on any of the five dates scheduled for trial between the date of his arraignment and the date of his sentencing hearing.