McGath v. Price (2003)

See McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 31 (2003) (“we do not have jurisdiction to review the [trial court’s] order, because it is an agreed order”). ¶ 42 Although defendants averred in its supplemental brief that plaintiff may keep his firearms, it may now use the majority’s order to claim that the majority reversed the trial court’s order that reinstated the plaintiff's FOID card.

App. 3d 19, 33 , 793 N.E.2d 801, 812 (2003) (noting the reviewing court had jurisdiction of all prior unspecified orders which were steps in the procedural progression that led to the order specified in the notice of appeal). ¶ 19 II.

App. 3d 19, 33 , 793 N.E.2d 801, 812 (2003) (noting the reviewing court had jurisdiction of all prior unspecified orders which were steps in the procedural progression that led to the order specified in the notice of appeal). ¶ 13 II.

McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 34 (2003). 7 ¶ 25 The rulings entered in 2022 were not part of the same procedural progression as the September 2024 order.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 33 (2003). ¶ 46 The trial court granted defendant’s motion to stay discovery on July 21, 2022, when it dismissed plaintiffs’ original complaint.

McGath v. Price, 342 Ill.

Similarly, in Smock v. Hale, 197 Ill. App. 3d 732, 738 (1990), we had jurisdiction to review unspecified orders disqualifying plaintiff’s medical expert and closing the discovery schedule, since they “directly contributed” to the summary judgment specified in the notice of appeal. ¶ 35 However, in McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 34 (2003), a notice of appeal referencing an order granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim was not sufficient to …

McGath v. Price, 342 Ill.

As such, the circuit court could not have addressed defendant’s motion to reconsider in those proceedings. -7- appealed from was the circuit court’s September 9, 2019, order denying him leave to file a successive petition. ¶ 26 Although the failure to list the proper order in a notice of appeal “is not always fatal to our review of that order,” we have jurisdiction to consider only “prior unspecified orders that are a step in the procedural progression leading to an order th…

McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 33 (2003).

In McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 34 (2003), the court explained, “It is not enough merely that the unspecified order precedes the specified order.” Instead, the orders must be “sufficiently intertwined.” Id.

McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 31 (2003).

Bensman v. Reed, 299 Ill. App. 531, 534 (1939) (“The liability of the owner does not arise by merely proving that he gave permission to an incompetent driver to drive his automobile but it must also appear that the incompetency alleged was the proximate cause of the commission of the negligent act which caused the injury.”); Giers v. Anten, 68 Ill. App. 3d 535, 540-41 (1978) (same); King v. Petefish, 185 Ill. App. 3d 630, 634 (1989) (same); Jones v. Beker, 260 Ill. App. 3d 4…

The circuit court’s findings on February 11, 2004, that “there [was] no just reason for delaying either enforcement or appeal or both,” made the good-faith orders final and appealable (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a); McGath v. Price, 342 Ill. App. 3d 19, 26 , 793 N.E.2d 801, 807 (2003)) before the circuit court entered its order granting the forum non conveniens motion.

App. 3d at 785 (where the notice of appeal specified that an appeal was being taken from the orders entered on August 11, 1998, and January 14, 1999, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s February 3, 1999, order because the February 3 order was not a “step in the procedural progression” leading to the ultimate judgment); McGath, 342 Ill.

See D’Amico, 2018 WL 1532798 , at *3 (granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the plaintiff failed to proffer evidence that could support the first element of a negligent entrustment claim— incompetence or unfitness on the part of the entrustee that was or should have been known to the defendant); see also McGath, 793 N.E.2d at 808–810 (same); Eyrich, 765 N.E.2d at 507 (same). defendant breached that duty; and (iii) the defendant’s breach was the proximat…

See McGath v. Price, 342 Ill.

Further, we note that an “unspecified judgment is reviewable if it is a ‘step in the procedural progression leading’ to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal.” Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979), quoting Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d Cir. 1977); see also McGath v. Price, 342 Ill.