People v. Leever (1985)

(See People v. Aguilar (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1556, 1568-1569 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 879 ] (Aguilar); People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 865-866 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ] (Leever).) In Aguilar , defense doctors in a murder case testified the defendant had paranoid personality traits, which might result in overreaction, excessive response, or impaired judgment.

(See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 24(a); cf. People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 881 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ].) Cottle, P. J., concurred.

None of the authorities cited by defendant supports his argument that the jury must determine whether charges leading to multiple prior convictions *591 were "brought and tried separately." Defendant cites People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal. App.3d 853, 871 [ 219 Cal. Rptr. 581 ] for the proposition that "the elements of a section 667 enhancement must be pleaded and, if contested, proved beyond a reasonable doubt." But, in Leever , the jury's role was limited to finding true th…

(See People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 864 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ] [a qualified professional’s report “which merely contains evaluations without specific reference to the defendant’s competency” will not furnish substantial evidence of incompetency]; see also People v. Burney (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 497, 503 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 329 ] [“[t]he expert must state with particularity that in his professional opinion the accused is . . . incapable of understanding the purpose or …

(See fn. [7], ante.) Thus, proof that a defendant has been convicted for a violation of section 2113(a) (entitled ‘Bank Robbery and Incidental Crimes’) does not establish which type of offense was committed. [Citation.] . . . [T]he burglary-type offenses described in the second paragraph, while arguably establishing felony burglary in this state (§§ 459-461; [case citations omitted]), do not establish the applicable serious felony, ‘burglary of a residence’ (§ 1192.7, subd. …

(People v. Burnett, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d at p. 1321 [“[Sjince the standard for determining competence to stand trial is lower than the standard for determining competence to waive counsel, the fact that a person has been found mentally competent to stand trial with the assistance of counsel . . . therefore does not necessarily mean he or she is competent to waive the right to counsel and proceed to trial unassisted.”]; People v. Powell (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 469, 482-483 [ 2…

(See, e.g., People v. Powell (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 469, 479 [ 225 Cal.Rptr. 703 ] [reconsideration required only where substantial evidence points to impairment of ability to make knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel]; People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 864 [219 Cal.Rptr. *891 581] [reevaluation required where substantial evidence of incompetency to stand trial or inability to make knowing and intelligent waiver of right to counsel]; People v. Clark (1…

(People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 334, 339-343 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 872-873 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ]; People v. Enriquez (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1, 3-5 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) 3 As a result, because the federal offense did not include the specific intent requirement, the courts in Ellis, Leever, and Enriquez reasoned it could not serve as a serious felony.

Various Courts of Appeal noted that a violation of 18 United States Code section 2113 (a) did not require a specific intent to permanently deprive the victim of the property taken in the bank robbery. ( People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal. App.3d 334, 339-343 [ 240 Cal. Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal. App.3d 853, 872-873 [ 219 Cal. Rptr. 581 ]; People v. Enriquez (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 1, 3-5 [ 205 Cal. Rptr. 238 ].) [3] As a result, because the federal offense did …

(People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 334, 340 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 708 ]; People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 872-873 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ]; People *1268 v. Enriquez (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 1, 3 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 238 ]; contra, People v. Miramon (1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 118, 126-134 [ 189 Cal.Rptr. 432 ].) The trial court, however, was incorrect in advising appellant that his admission preserved his right to appeal whether his federal bank robbery conviction constituted a seri…

(People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 865-866 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ] (criticized on another point in People v. Ellis (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 334, 340-341 [ 240 Cal.Rptr. 708 ]).) *1570 Here, as in Leever, supra, we are persuaded no miscarriage of justice resulted from the error.

(People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 874 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ].) The situation is far different where, as here, the evidence is costly to acquire and may be subject to variability.

(People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 865-866 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ].) We conclude that appellant’s ingestion of one Triavil nearly five hours before the charged offense, if relevant at all, pertained only to its effect on his mental disease and did not establish intoxication.

(People v. Leever (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 853, 869 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 581 ]; see People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ],) 2 *1080 More specifically, the only issue on appeal is whether it is reasonably probable the jury found Hoover was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the killing.

The court stated: “The rule that a defendant must know what he is doing is ‘wrong and criminal’ has been recognized as the accepted formulation ‘since the first decision in this state (People v. McDonell, 47 Cal. 134 ) and has been followed consistently. . . .’ (People v. Daughterly (1953) 40 Cal.2d 876 , 893-894 . . . , noting that the rule had been approved again in People v. Wells, supra, 33 Cal.2d 330 , 349-350 . . . .) Affirming the judgment in People v. Rittger (1960) …

See People v. Leever, 173 Cal. App. 3d 853 , 864 *390 (1985); State v. Bauer, 310 Minn. 103, 123 (1976).