Galvan v. the State (2015)

Timothy has abandoned his brief, conclusory claim that the trial court erred by failing to exercise its discretion as the “thirteenth juror,” as he has failed to cite any 4 (Punctuation omitted.) Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 592 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 5 (Punctuation omitted.) Evans v. State, 315 Ga. App. 863, 864 ( 729 SE2d 31 ) (2012). 4 legal authority or portions of…

We disagree. 2 “When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 592 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 3…

“When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting [her] conviction, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 592 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (…

We disagree.20 “When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 592 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 3…

“When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 592 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015) (citations and punctuation 2 Huff does not challenge his convictions for Counts 2-4 on appeal. 3 o…

In this case, the evidence showed that the victim was visibly pregnant, that Tyson “beat[] the tar out of” the victim and kicked her in the stomach during the violent attack, that blood appeared to come from between her legs after the attack, and that one eyewitness feared the victim was “going to die.” Having reviewed this evidence, we cannot say that the prosecutor drew unreasonable inferences from it. 14 “[T]he trial court acted within its discretion in permitting the pro…

Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 592 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015).

Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 592 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015) (punctuation omitted); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979).

However, “[e]rror in a trial court’s failure to sustain an objection to improper closing argument is subject to harmless error analysis.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 596 (3) (b) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015).

However, “[e]rror in a trial court’s failure to sustain an objection to improper closing argument is subject to harmless error analysis.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 596 (3) (b) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015).

The fact that the victim was unable to describe the sexual encounter at trial, or that there were inconsistencies in her descriptions of the encounter, “went to the weight and credibility that the jury wished to assign to the State’s otherwise sufficient evidence and presents no basis for reversal.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 593 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015).

The fact that the victim was unable to describe the sexual encounter at trial, or that there were inconsistencies in her descriptions of the encounter, “went to the weight and credibility that the jury wished to assign to the State’s otherwise sufficient evidence and presents no basis for reversal.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Galvan v. State, 330 Ga. App. 589, 593 (1) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015).

To each question, the victim replied, “no.” According to Bill, this testimony did not constitute rebuttal because it “was not offered to refute or explain any of the Defendant’s evidence.” “A trial court’s rulings concerning the scope of rebuttal testimony are subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.” Galvan v. State, 330 Ga.App. 589, 594 (2) ( 768 SE2d 773 ) (2015).

See Galvan v. State , 330 Ga.App. 589 , 595 (3) (a), 768 S.E.2d 773 (2015) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to overrule defendant's objection to prosecutor's closing argument); see also *63 Wingfield v. State , 297 Ga.App. 476 , 478 (2), 677 S.E.2d 704 (2009) ("As the prosecutor's statement was a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, the trial court did not err in overruling [defendant's] objection to the statement or in failing to rebuke the pros…