Parker v. State (2015)

According to Reading Law, “The lawyer on one side privately told the client that a court would probably say that 30 days would be commercially reasonable; the other lawyer privately told the client that a court would probably say that 48 hours would be commercially reasonable (a week at the outside).” Id. at 391-392.

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (“[W]here the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.”). 6 App. 207, 213-214 (1) ( 729 SE2d 505 ) (2012) (“[T]he trial court abused its discretion in admitting opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the …

According to Reading Law, “The lawyer on one side privately told the client that a court would probably say that 30 days would be commercially reasonable; the other lawyer privately told the client that a court would probably say that 48 hours would be commercially reasonable (a week at the outside).” Id. at 391-392.

Accordingly, we vacate Parker’s convictions and the order denying his motion for material witness certificates, reverse the trial court’s exclusion of Parker’s proffered documents, and remand the case “to the trial court with direction to issue a new order on Parker’s motion after considering his proffers, along with any *718 other unprivileged evidence submitted by Parker and the State on remand.” Parker, 296 Ga. at 596 (4).

Thus, we do not read Smith as determinative of the question before us today. 12 Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 591-594 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (addressing whether the rules of evidence apply to a proceeding for issuance of a material witness certificate under the out-of-state witness act).

In considering a motion for certification of materiality of an out-of-state witness, a trial court is not prohibited from considering hearsay evidence, but should give hearsay evidence “such weight as the court’s judgment and experience counsel.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 596 (4) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (punctuation omitted). “[T]he trial court retains the prerogative as the fact-finder to determine the weight and credibility of the evidence submitted, and in making this…

They were not meant to “change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.” Id.; see also Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592-593 (3) (a) n. 10 ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (“Thus, not every discrepancy between the wording of the new Evidence Code and the version of the Federal Rules of Evidence that was in effect on January 1, 2013, signifies a different meaning.”). 10 rules.

They were not meant to "change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility." Id.; see also Parker v. State , 296 Ga. 586 , 593 (3) (a) n. 10, 769 S.E.2d 329 (2015) ("Thus, not every discrepancy between the wording of the new Evidence Code and the version of the Federal Rules of Evidence that was in effect on January 1, 2013, signifies a different meaning.").

See generally Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (“[WJhere the new Georgia [evidence] rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.”). 9 Georgalis, 631 F2d at 1205 (IV). 10 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) MKT Reps S.A.

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (“[W]here the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look *15 to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.”).

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

See Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 1; Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 590 (2) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

Prior to the transfer hearing, A. G. filed a notice of his intent to admit evidence that Winn was arrested for an act of domestic violence against A. G.’s mother 12 Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 594 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015). 13 See OCGA § 24-1-2 (c) and (d). 13 approximately three years before the shooting incident.

Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015). 11 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Green v. State, 302 Ga. 816, 817-818 (2) ( 809 SE2d 738 ) (2018).

Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 596 (3), (4) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (a trial court erred in failing to consider documentation concerning the qualifications of a witness offered at a suppression hearing because OCGA § 24-1-104 (c) provides that the rules of evidence do not apply to such proceedings); Daniel v. State, 298 Ga. 4 App. 245, 248 (3) ( 679 SE2d 811 ) (2009) (hearsay is admissible at a suppression hearing, and “the right to confront [a witness] does not apply” there).

(Footnote and citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

“And where the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 593 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015). 2 An Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case presents facts similar to those adduced here.

“And where the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for 6 guidance.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 593 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).2 An Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case presents facts similar to those adduced here.

Cf. Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 594 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 9 These provisions are not a part of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which was approved by the American Bar Association in 1985. 10 (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 18-2-20. 11 (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 18-2-21. 15 329) (2015) (noting absence of catch-all provision in corresponding federal rule of evidence indicated intent of Georgia legislature to create an exclusive list).

Through the adoption of the new Evidence Code, it was “the intent of the General Assembly ... to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States circuit courts of appeal as of January 1, 2013, to the extent that such interpretation is consistent with the Constitution of Georgia.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

Through the adoption of the new Evidence Code, it was “the intent of the General Assembly . . . to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States and the United States circuit courts of appeal as of January 1, 2013, to the extent that such interpretation is consistent with the Constitution of Georgia.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

Appx. 711, 715-716 (II) (A) (11th Cir. 2014). 3 OCGA § 24-1-106 — which was adopted as part of our new Evidence Code — mirrors Federal Rule of Evidence 106, and “the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to th[at] federal rule[ ] and how federal appellate courts have interpreted th[at] rule[ ] for guidance.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

OCGA § 24-1-106 provides that “[w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which, in fairness, should be considered contemporaneously with the writing or recorded statement.” Similarly, OCGA § 24-8-822 provides that, “[w]hen an admission is given in evidence by one party, it shall be the right of the other party to have …

But as held in cases interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, which we look to for guidance in construing our new Evidence Code, see Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015), criminal charges [are] not required for the admission of other acts evidence....

Because our new Evidence Code was based, in large part, on the Federal Rules of Evidence, when “the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015); see Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 724 (2) n.8 ( 783 SE2d 895 ) (2016) (notingthat when …

Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, Carlson on Evidence, p. 214 (5th ed. 2016). 7 Eubanks, 332 Ga. App. at 571 (2) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 8 OCGA § 24-4-403; see Chase v. State, 337 Ga.App. 449, 455 (3) (a) ( 787 SE2d 802 ) (2016) (“[I]t is only unfair prejudice, substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant matter.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original); see also United States v. McGarity, 669 F3d 1218, 1244 (V) …

And where the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (citation omitted).

And where the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (citation omitted).

As we have previously noted, although the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended effective December 2011, after our new Evidence Code was signed into law in May 2011, the changes “were intended to be stylistic only, with no intent to change the result in any ruling on the admissibility of evidence.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) n.10 ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

When we consider the meaning of Rule 804, we may consider the decisions of federal appellate courts, particularly the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, construing and applying our rule’s federal counterpart.4 See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) ( 786 SE2d 633 ) (2016). (a) Bolling argues that Eldridge was not an “unavailable witness”, because 4 As we have previously noted, although the Federal Rules of Evidence were amended effective De…

An admission is a statement offered against a party which is: (A) The party’s own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity[.]” 2 Federal Rule 106 provides: “If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part - or any other writing or recorded statement - that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” OCGA § 24-1-106 “mirror[s]” Rule 106 of the Fe…

As we have stated previously, where “provisions of the new Evidence Code were carried over from our old Evidence Code, and when courts consider the meaning of those provisions, they may rely on Georgia decisions under the old Code.” State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 299 ( 773 SE2d 700 ) (2015). 3 The record reveals that Jones objected to Spiller’s qualifications as an expert, but never objected to her testimony based on any of the requirements of Harper, supra. 4 See Parker v. St…

Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) And here, the provisions differ.

Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

See OCGA § 24-10-1006 (saying that the party desiring to introduce voluminous material in summary form must make “[t]he originals, or duplicates, . . . available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place”); United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F3d 1168 , 1184 *341 (11th Cir. 2006) (saying that under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, 4 which is identical in material respects to OCGA § 24-10-1006, this requirement must be satisfied “pri…

See OCGA § 24-10-1006 (saying that the party desiring to introduce voluminous material in summary form must make”[t]he originals, or duplicates, . . . available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place”); United States v. Arias-Izquierdo, 449 F3d 1168, 1184 (11th Cir. 2006) (saying that under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006,4 which is identical in material respects to OCGA § 24- 10-1006, this requirement must be satisfied “prior to t…

“Where a provision of the new Evidence Code differs in substance from the counterpart federal rule, as interpreted by federal courts, we must correspondingly presume that the General Assembly meant the Georgia provision to be different.” (Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

See OCGA § 24-1-2 (setting forth the proceedings in which all or portions of the new evidence rules apply); Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 590-595 ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (discussing OCGA § 24-1-2).

See OCGA § 24-1-2 (setting forth the proceedings in which all or portions of the new evidence rules 26 apply); Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 590-595 (__ SE2d __) (2015) (discussing OCGA § 24-1-2).

The Supreme Court of Georgia recently held that “where the new Georgia rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.” Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015).

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592 (3) (a) (769 SE2d 329) (2015).

See Parker, 296 Ga. at 597 ; Moore, 290 Ga. at 810 .

See generally Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (Georgia’s new Evidence Code applies to any motion made or hearing or trial commenced on or after January 1, 2013). 18 (b) Johnson asserts that his trial counsel also was ineffective for failing to make a written request for certain jury charges.

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (citing Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101). 31 See Martin, 298 Ga. at 278-279 (6) (d).

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (citing Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101). 31 19.

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015) (citing Ga. L. 2011, p. 99, § 101). 31 19.

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586 , 592 n.10 ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015). 22 cooperative statement or agree to be videotaped, and if this was the first time that the detective had sought an arrest warrant after a defendant gave a statement.

See Parker v. State , 296 Ga. 586 , 588 (1), 769 S.E.2d 329 (2015).

See Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 588 (1) ( 769 SE2d 329 ) (2015). 19 6.