People v. D.H. (2016)

(See In re D.H., supra, 10 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 730 [condition requiring minor to attend school “regularly” not vague when viewed in context of another condition directing him to “[o]bey school rules”].) Third, Minor contends the condition providing that his internet usage is “subject to monitoring by Probation, parents or school officials” is vague because it does not define “school officials.” He notes that the United States Department of Education defines “school official”…

The term “pornography” has been held to be “inherently vague and subjective.” (In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 728 (D.H.).) Condition No. 31 attempts to avoid this defect with various definitions of “pornographic material” as depictions of “graphic sexual activity actual or simulated,” “sexual deviance,” and “any material decreed off-limits by the defendant’s counselor, sex offender program, or probation officer.” These definitions, however, are themselves vague and ove…

Although E.V. did not raise any 5 objection to this condition at his dispositional hearing, the People acknowledge—and we agree—that we may consider E.V.’s claim because he is challenging the condition as facially vague, “without reference to the particular sentencing record developed in the trial court.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 , 887 (Sheena K.).) “In such circumstances, an issue of law arises that is subject to de novo review on appeal.” (In re Edward B. (20…

The condition is not sufficiently precise to notify Reyes of prohibited conduct because the term “pornographic material” is inherently subjective. 2 (In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 728-729 (D.H.).) Determining whether material is “pornographic” is a process heavily influenced by the individual, social, and cultural experience of the person making the determination.

Defendant contends this no-pornography condition is unconstitutionally vague. 16 “The vagueness doctrine bars enforcement of ‘ “[a probation condition] which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” ’ ” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890 ; In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 727 (D.H.).) The Attorney General also concedes the no-pornograp…

(Id. at p. 889.) “[W]e review constitutional challenges to a probation condition de novo.” (In re Shaun R. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143 .) A. Vagueness “ ‘ “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are ‘embodied in the due proc…

Condition No. 10(p) (Pornography Possession) Relying on In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 727-729 (D.H.), Davis contends probation condition 10(p) that he “not knowingly possess any pornographic material, including computer files and disks, or knowingly be in 11 places where [he] know[s], or [his probation officer] or other law enforcement officer inform[s] [him], that pornographic materials are the main items for sale” is unconstitutionally vague and must be stricken bec…

Constitutional Vagueness “ ‘ “[T]he underpinning of a vagueness challenge is the due process concept of ‘fair warning.’ [Citation.] The rule of fair warning consists of ‘the due process concepts of preventing arbitrary law enforcement and providing adequate notice to potential offenders’ [citation], protections that are ‘embodied in the due process clauses of the federal and California Constitutions.’ ” ’ ” (In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 727 (D.H.).) To withstand a va…

D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 727 (D.H.).) “[A juvenile] court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (Welf. & Inst.

Orally, the court required defendant to “keep [the] Probation [Office] advised of her residency at all times.” (Italics added.) Because, as the People concede, the oral pronouncement of sentence controls over a subsequently entered minute order (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2 [“The record of the oral pronouncement of the court controls over the clerk’s minute order.”]; In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 724-725 [applying this principle to probation cond…

(Cf. In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 730 [probation condition requiring minor “to attend school 5 regularly” not vague when read in conjunction with “obey school rules”]).

Code, § 730, subd. (b) ; see also id ., § 202, subd. (b).) ' " 'In fashioning the conditions of probation, the ... court should consider the minor's entire social history in addition to the circumstances of the crime.' " [Citation.] The court has "broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation" [citation], although "every juvenile probation condition must be made to fit the circumstances and the minor." ' [Citation.]" ( In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722 , 727, 208 Cal…

When the reporter’s transcript and clerk’s transcript are in conflict, “‘[they] will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not possible that part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin 5 and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation].’” (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 ; accord, In re D.H. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 722, 725 (D.H.).) This principle reconciles two conflicting concepts: while the record of the oral pronouncemen…