Remak v. State (2014)
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· 9 citation events
across 2 courts.
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Remak v. State, 142 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. Dist.
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Shaffer v. Secretary, State of Florida (2024)
Allen’s Claim 21 makes no mention of a federal constitutional speedy trial violation and, indeed, expressly states that Allen ‘was not brought to trial within the required time frame set forth in Florida statute.’”); cf. Remak v. State, 142 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. Dist.
stating that, to meet Strickland’s prejudice requirement, a defendant must show that the state could not have brought him to trial within the recapture window
Remak v. State, 142 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
Consequently, Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable probability that the State would have been unable to proceed during the recapture period, which ended on November 13, 2013.2 See Remak v. State, 142 So. 3d 3, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“[t]o plead a facially sufficient claim of prejudice, a movant must allege specific facts that demonstrate that the State could not have brought the movant to trial within the recapture window provided in rule 3.191(p)(8) .. . .…
“[t]o plead a facially sufficient claim of prejudice, a movant must allege specific facts that demonstrate that the State could not have brought the movant to trial within the recapture window provided in rule 3.191(p)(8) .. . .”
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Samuels v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (2020)
The post-conviction court denied the claim for the following reasons (Respondent’s Exhibit 12 at 3–4) (state court’s record citations omitted): In his first sub-claim, Defendant argues that Counsel was ineffective in failing to “timely file Notice of Expiration of Speedy Trial Time.” “[A] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on a failure to assert a movant’s speedy trial rights under rule 3.191 requires a movant to show that trial counsel made an unreasonable dec…