Gage v. Raffensperger (1996)
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· 22 citation events
across 1 courts.
Showing the 12 strongest citers on record
(one row per citing case, strongest signal kept).
Treatment trajectory · 1997 → 2026 · click a year to view the case as of then
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Williams v. Ithaca Dispatch, Inc. (2022)
"Striking a vehicle in the rear is negligence as a matter of law absent a sufficient excuse" ( Gage v Raffensperger , 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [3d Dept 1996] [citation omitted]).
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Watson v. Peschel (2020)
However, "[t]he emergency doctrine is only applicable when a party is confronted by [a] sudden, unforeseeable occurrence not of their own making" ( Gage v Raffensperger , 234 AD2d 751, 752 [3d Dept 1996]; see McGraw v Glowacki , 303 AD2d 968, 969 [4th Dept 2003]).
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Shehab v. Powers (2017)
A trailing driver’s conduct in failing to leave reasonable distance creates the possibility that a sudden stop will be necessary (see Pappas v Opitz, 262 AD2d at 471 ; Sass v Ambu Trans., 238 AD2d 570 [1997]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [1996]).
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Cajas-Romero v. Ward (2013)
Auth., 97 AD3d 728 [2012]; Pappas v Opitz, 262 AD2d 471 [1999]; Sass v Ambu Trans., 238 AD2d 570 [1997]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [1996]).
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Cajas-Romero v. Ward (2013)
Auth., 97 AD3d 728 [2012]; Pappas v Opitz, 262 AD2d 471 [1999]; Sass v Ambu Trans., 238 AD2d 570 [1997]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [1996]).
A trailing driver’s conduct in failing to leave reasonable distance creates the possibility that a sudden stop will be necessary, (see Pappas v Opitz, 262 AD2d at 471 ; Sass v Ambu Trans., 238 AD2d 570 [1997]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [1996]).
A trailing driver’s conduct in failing to leave reasonable distance creates the possibility that a sudden stop will be necessary, (see Pappas v Opitz, 262 AD2d at 471 ; Sass v Ambu Trans., 238 AD2d 570 [1997]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [1996]).
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Ranaudo v. Key (2011)
This duty includes seeing what should be seen and taking ordinary care under the circumstances to avoid an accident (see Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 752 [1996]; DeAngelis v Kirschner, 171 AD2d 593, 595 [1991]).
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Jacobellis v. New York State Thruway Authority (2008)
It is typically not available to defendants in rear-end collisions (see Campahella v Moore, 266 AD2d 423, 424 [1999]) particularly where, as here, the driver was obligated to maintain a safe rate of speed and a reasonable distance between the vehicles (see Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1129; Pappas v Opitz, 262 AD2d 471 [1999]; Sass v Ambu Trans., 238 AD2d 570 [1997]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 752 [1996]).
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Frutchey v. Felicita (2007)
From that evidence it could be inferred that DeLosa was operating his vehicle at an unsafe speed and was following the Nichols vehicle too closely. “[T]he mere fact that an emergency situation subsequently develops does not insulate [DeLosa] from liability for prior tortious conduct—such as traveling at an excessive rate of speed or maintaining an unsafe following distance— which contributed to bringing about the emergency, and thus indirectly caused the accident” (Herbert v…
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National Interstate v. A.J. Murphy Co. (2004)
Jaycox v Hardesty, 305 AD2d 720, 721 [2003]; Riley v County of Broome, 256 AD2d 899 [1998]; Warren v Donovan, 254 AD2d 201 [1998]; Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751, 751-752 [1996]).
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Muye v. Liben (2001)
“An emergency instruction should not be given where, as here, the defendant driver should reasonably have anticipated and been prepared to deal with the situation with which [he] was confronted” (Pincus v Cohen, 198 AD2d 405, 406 ; Caristo v Sanzone, 96 NY2d 175 ; Hardy v Sicuranza, 133 AD2d 138 ; see also, Gage v Raffensperger, 234 AD2d 751 ).