United States v. Terence D. Dexter (1999)

This court has “consistently held that ‘[a] reasonable investigation following a justifiable traffic stop may include asking for the driver’s *707 license and registration.” Id. at 702 , quoting United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.1999) (alteration in original); see also United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir.1999) (“Asking for a vehicle’s registration papers is clearly a legitimate wa…

The pertinent question instead is whether it was reasonable for [the officer] to believe [that a violation had been committed].”); United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) (stop proper when officer has probable cause to believe a violation has occurred, even if officer is wrong).

The pertinent question instead is whether it was reasonable for [the officer] to believe [that a violation had been committed].”); United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) (same).

We have consistently held that “[a] reasonable investigation following a justifiable traffic stop may include asking for the driver’s license and registration[.]” Allegree, 175 F.3d at 650 (citing United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Asking for a vehicle’s registration papers is clearly a legitimate way to verify a vehicle’s registration status.”).

We agree with the Seventh Circuit that “[t]he law of the case doctrine should not be read so rigidly that it precludes a party from raising an argument that it had no prior opportunity to raise.” United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir.1997)).

We agree with the Seventh Circuit that "[t]he law of the case doctrine should not be read so rigidly that it precludes a party from raising an argument that it had no prior opportunity to raise." United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir.1997)).

United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir.1999).

There is no evidence that the tag lacked any required information, United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1060 (D.C.Cir.1997), that it was improperly displayed, United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (7th Cir.1999), or that it was concealed in any way, United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 560 (10th Cir.1994).

Cir. 1997), that it was improperly displayed, United 5 States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (7th Cir. 1999), or that it was concealed in any way, United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 558, 560 (10th Cir. 1994).

In United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of a traffic stop that the defendant officer initiated because he could not see any license plate on the vehicle when in fact the vehicle had a temporary tag displayed behind a tinted rear window.

We agree with the Seventh Circuit that “[t]he law of the case doctrine should not be read so rigidly that it precludes a party from raising an argument that it had no prior opportunity to raise.” United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) (quoting Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir.1997)).

See United States v. Wilbourn, 799 F.3d 900, 909 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that police officers’ proffered justification for a Terry stop—that they had reasonable suspicion “based on facts known to them as a result of [an] investigation” into the defendant—was invalid because the record was “devoid of any facts” indicating that the officers knew about the investigation at the time of the stop); United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that a Te…

See Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 787 (3d Cir.2003) (holding law of the case does not prevent defendants added subsequent to disposition of previous appeal from relitigating factual issues); United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) (“[t]he law of the case doctrine should not be read so rigidly that it precludes a party from raising an argument that it had no prior opportunity to raise” (quoting Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir.1997)) );18B Ch…

The government cites United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999), as an example of such an objectively reasonable, good faith belief for a traffic stop where there might not have been a violation in fact.

Grace & Co., 591 F.3d 164, 174 (3d Cir.2009) (refusing to consider prior opinion as law of the case because that opinion "did not involve the same parties and issues, as is required for application of the law of the case doctrine” (footnote omitted)); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) ("We acknowledge that because [defendant] was not a party to the merits decision in the original appeal [by his co-defendant] he is not precluded from raising…

We have consistently held that “[a] reasonable investigation following a justifiable traffic stop may include asking for the driver’s license and registration^]” Allegree, 175 F.3d at 650 (citing United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir.1994)); see also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir.1999) (“Asking for a vehicle’s registration papers is clearly a legitimate way to verify a vehicle’s registration status.”).

See United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir.1999).

See United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Brown, 79 F.3d 1499, 1504 (7th Cir.1996).

See United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1123-26 (7th Cir.1999) (because officer could not see temporary registration sticker through darkly tinted windows, officer had reasonable suspicion to believe he was witnessing traffic violation and could lawfully stop vehicle even though no traffic violation actually occurred); United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.) (officer reasonably believed, although mistakenly, that vehicle violated operating statutes and so…

See United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1123-26 (7th Cir. 1999) (because officer could not see temporary registration sticker through darkly tinted windows, officer had reasonable suspicion to believe he was witnessing traffic violation and could lawfully stop vehicle even though no traffic violation actually occurred); United States v. Allegree, 175 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir.) (officer reasonably believed, although mistakenly, that vehicle violated operating statutes and s…

Regardless of whether or not the trailer actually was in violation of the South Dakota statute, Officer Jorgenson was justified in making the stop if he “objectively ha[d] a reasonable basis for believing that the driver has breached a traffic law.” United States v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir.1996); accord United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999).

Therefore, we will not consider this placement violation as a justification for the traffic stop. -4- v. Thomas, 93 F.3d 479, 485 (8th Cir. 1996); accord United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999).

See Dexter, 165 F.3d at 1126; see also United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 , 1279-80 (7th Cir. 1996).

See also United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir.1999) (reiterating that the stop and detention in Tip-ton were valid); United States v. Dumas, 94 F.3d 286, 290 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Tipton : “[t]he driver’s failure to display prominently a registration sticker, alone, would provide an officer with reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify at the very least an investigatory stop”) (emphasis in original). [¶ 15.] Harrison had an articulable suspicion that Vento vio…

See United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir. 1999) (“The law of the case doctrine should not be read so rigidly that it precludes a party from raising an argument that it had no prior opportunity to raise.” (quoting Bagola v. Kindt, 131 F.3d 632, 637 (7th Cir. 1997))).3 ¶ 39 Comparing the following two cases shows why the law of the case doctrine provides George no refuge. ¶ 40 In State v. Parry, 390 P.3d 879 , 882-86 (Kan. 2017), the defendant moved to suppres…

See, e.g., United States v. Dexter, 165 F.3d 1120, 1124 (7th Cir.1999) (“Dexter argues that the van in which he was riding was not in violation of the traffic laws at the time Trooper Lewis stopped the van and, therefore, the stop was illegal.