United States v. Lucas (2014)

And “[n]othing in the statute authorizes [a] district court to extend the benefit of a concurrent sentence to . . . defendants . . . who have previously served sentences, now completed, for related crimes.” United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 629 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 5 The Sentencing Guidelines follow suit.

Lucas , 745 F.3d at 629 ("[A]bsent express statutory authority, a statutory minimum term of imprisonment does 'proscribe' the conferral of a sentencing break." (emphasis in original)). 3 IV.

Cf.United States v. Cofske, 157 F.3d 1, 1-2 (1st Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (holding, where the defendant was serving probation on a state-court sentence, that “an undischarged term of probation is not an ‘undischarged term of imprisonment’”under section 5G1.3). “‘[u]ndischarged’ means ‘ongoing.’” United States v. Phipps, 68 F.3d 159, 162 (7th Cir. 1995) (citingUnited States v. Yahne, 64 F.3d 1091, 1095-97 (7th Cir. 1995)); cf. United States v. Lucas, 745 F.…

Rather, it matters that the Court can come up with a rational basis for the legal sentencing distinction between the two offenses. “[A] distinction between . . . sentences need only survive rational basis review to pass constitutional muster.” United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 2014).

See Lucas, 745 F.3d at 629 n.5 (“[I]n the absence of a mandatory minimum sentence, the district court retains the discretion to take into account any prior discharged sentences served by a defendant to the extent that the fact of such a prior sentence bears on the determination of what sentence is sufficient, but not more than necessary, to serve the purposes of punishment set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a).”); see also United States v. Los Santos, 283 F.3d 422, 428 (2d Cir. …

See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 629-30 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“A district court must impose a mandated minimum unless a more specific statutory provision allows the court to impose a lower sentence.”).

See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 630-31 (2d Cir. 2014). 2 In fairness to the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the version of § 5G1.3(b) that they reviewed differed from the one applicable in Gonzalez-Murillo’s case.

See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626 , 628 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (reserving the same question).

For these reasons, we will affirm. 26 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)(1). 27 Id.; see also United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626 , 629 n.4 (2d Cir. 2014) (collecting cases). 8

See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 630-31 (2d Cir. 2014) (per curiam); United States v. Dunham, 295 F.3d 605, 610-11 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Otto, 176 F.3d 416, 418 (8th Cir. 1999).

See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 628 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that Section 3584 “makes clear that a court retains the discretion to run terms consecutively when it sees fit”).

See United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 630 (2d Cir.2014) (federal courts lack the authority to order that a sentence run concurrently with a sentence which has been completely discharged).

Pa. June 15, 2016) (emphasis added); see also Prescod, Jr. v. Schuylkill, 630 F. App’x 144, 147 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Lucas, 745 F.3d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 2014) (federal courts lack the authority to order that a sentence run concurrently with a sentence which has been completely discharged); Hasan v. Sniezek, 379 F. App’x 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that § 5G1.3 “refers only to undischarged terms of imprisonment” and that the defendant had “completed his …