best-interest framework in Iowa

2023We are “required to use the best-interest framework established in section 232.116(2) when [we] decide what is in the best interest of the child[ren].” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010).

2022The date of discharge is in 2027. 4 best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,” and “the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) (referencing the best-interest framework of section 232.116(2)).

2026“If a ground for termination is established, the court must, secondly, apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights.” Id. at 706–07.

2024Because the father does not challenge all grounds for termination relied on by the juvenile court, we move to the second step of the termination analysis and “apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 706–07.

2026If we conclude affirmatively, we next “determine whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights.” Id. at 219–20.

2026If we conclude affirmatively, we next “determine whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights.” Id. at 219–20.

2025See In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially) (describing safety as the defining element of the best-interest analysis).

2025See J.E., 723 N.W.2d at 802 (Cady, J., concurring specially) (describing the child’s safety as the defining element of the best-interest analysis).

2026In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011).

2025H.S., 805 N.W.2d at 748 . 12 We start our analysis by recognizing that the bond between a parent and child may be considered in conducting a best-interest analysis.

2026Lindsay maintains we should not consider Silas’s claims “because they were not raised or developed at all at trial (not to mention the utter lack of any evidence whatsoever of any racial or gender bias on behalf of the trial court).” Specifically, interspersed throughout Silas’s brief on appeal are the following claims:  “The [district] court abused its discretion by upholding its unconstitutional order and creating harmful precedent for Iowa families”;  “The district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial and refusing to consider critical evidence on the developmental harm caused

2020“Utilizing the best-interest standard ‘provides the flexibility necessary to consider unique custody issues on a case-by-case basis.’” Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 696 .

2025We also consider the statutory framework outlined in chapter 232, which directs the court to “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Id. § 232.116(2); see A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d at 690–91 (finding it useful to apply the best- interest framework of section 232.116(2) and (3) to the best-interest analysis under chapter 600A).

2025We also consider the statutory framework outlined in chapter 232, which directs the court to “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Id. § 232.116(2); see A.H.B., 791 N.W.2d at 690–91 (finding it useful to apply the best- interest framework of section 232.116(2) and (3) to the best-interest analysis under chapter 600A).

2026“Utilizing the best-interest standard ‘provides the flexibility necessary to consider unique custody issues on a case-by-case basis.’” Id. (citation omitted).

2025“The children’s best interest is the ‘controlling consideration.’ Utilizing the best-interest standard ‘provides the flexibility necessary to consider unique custody issues on a case-by- case basis.’” In re Marriage of Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d 26, 32 (Iowa 2015) (citations omitted).

2026DISCUSSION To obtain a modification of physical care, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions have materially and substantially changed since entry of the prior decree and that the changes 4 were not contemplated at the time of the decree, are “more or less permanent,” and “relate to the welfare of the children.” In re Marriage of Frederici, 338 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Iowa 1983); accord Hoffman, 867 N.W.2d at 32 .

2019“Utilizing the best-interest standard ‘provides the flexibility necessary to consider unique custody issues on a case-by-case basis.’” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 696 (Iowa 2007)).

2024When determining best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116 (2); accord In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Iowa 2019) (stating that “we look to the child’s long- range as well as immediate interests, consider what the future holds for the child if returned to the parents, and weigh the child’s safety and need for a permanent home” (cleaned up)).

2024When determining best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116 (2); accord In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Iowa 2019) (stating that “we look to the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests, consider what the future holds for the child if returned to the parents, and weigh the child’s safety and need for a permanent home” (cleaned up)).

2020See G.A., 826 N.W.2d at 131 (noting a stepparent’s willingness to adopt as a favorable consideration in assessing whether termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest).

2020See id. (considering the lack of close relationship between the child and the parent whose rights were sought to be terminated in the best-interest analysis).

2017However, prior to termination of a parent’s parental rights, the State must make reasonable efforts “to make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home.” Iowa Code § 232.102 (6)(b); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).

2017However, prior to termination of a parent’s parental rights, the State must make reasonable efforts “to make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home.” Iowa Code § 232.102 (6)(b); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).

2026See, e.g., In re T.C., 522 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“We will not refuse to terminate the rights of parents who would otherwise be terminated because an adoptive home has not been secured.”); In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); In re T.M., No. 25-0252, 2025 WL 1706566 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025); In re D.M., No. 25-1473, 2025 WL 3654241 , at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025).

2026See, e.g., In re T.C., 522 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (“We will not refuse to terminate the rights of parents who would otherwise be terminated because an adoptive home has not been secured.”); In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 342 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998); In re T.M., No. 25-0252, 2025 WL 1706566 , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025); In re D.M., No. 25-1473, 2025 WL 3654241 , at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025).

2026Lindsay maintains we should not consider Silas’s claims “because they were not raised or developed at all at trial (not to mention the utter lack of any evidence whatsoever of any racial or gender bias on behalf of the trial court).” Specifically, interspersed throughout Silas’s brief on appeal are the following claims:  “The [district] court abused its discretion by upholding its unconstitutional order and creating harmful precedent for Iowa families”;  “The district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial and refusing to consider critical evidence on the developmental harm caused

2022“When the juvenile court orders termination of parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate on one of the sections to affirm.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). 6 A. Grounds for termination. 1.

2021“Courts are empowered to modify the custodial terms of a paternity decree only when there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the time of the decree, not contemplated by the court when the decree was entered, which was more or less permanent, and relates to the welfare of the child.” Melchiori v. Kooi, 644 N.W.2d 365, 368 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002).

2021See In re R.K.B., 572 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Iowa 1998) (noting that even where the paternal grandmother initiated visitations for the father, his indifference was the focus of the best-interest analysis).

2021Evidence is ‘clear and convincing’ when there are no ‘serious or substantial doubts as to the correctness or conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.’”3 Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a three-step analysis by determining: (1) if a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established; (2) whether the best-interest framework stated 1 In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280 , 293 (Iowa 2021). 2 Id. 3 In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 2010) (quoting In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000)). 4 in section 232.116(2) supports termination; and (3) whether any excepti

2021See Nagle v. Nagle, 871 A.2d 832 , 837 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2005) (noting court may modify passport provision in decree to satisfy the best-interest standard); see also In re D.L.N., 609 S.W.3d 237 , 247 (Tex. App. 2020) (finding no abuse of discretion in trial court’s finding that mother should have right to maintain children’s passports).

2019Cf. Northland v. Starr, 581 N.W.2d 210, 213 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (considering whether factors overcome the parental preference in a best-interest analysis).

2017See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 37 (Iowa 2010) (directing court to apply “the best-interest framework established in section 232.116(2)”); S.O., 483 N.W.2d at 604 (terminating despite “strong bond” between mother and children when mother failed to protect children from abusive father).

2017“For evidence to be ‘clear and convincing,’ it is merely necessary that there be no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusion drawn from it.” Raim v. Stancel, 339 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); see also M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 219 .

2016See M.E.B., 2007 WL 1345895, at *5 .

2016The father’s attorney said yes as to the best-interest standard only, but when asked if he had any evidence for the father, he replied in the negative. 8 Additionally, the father’s prior attempts at sobriety have been unsuccessful, and “[t]he future can be gleaned from evidence of the parents’ past performance and motivations.” In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000).