best-interest factors in Ohio

2026For the first time, both children were thriving and doing well in their placements in MCCS’s temporary custody. 7 Considering these facts, as well as the guardian ad litem’s recommendation and the trial court’s finding of a need for a legally secure placement, we find clear and convincing evidence supporting the trial court’s determination that it was in the children’s best interest to grant MCCS permanent custody. {¶ 19} Although Mother apparently had made headway on her case-plan objectives, the best-interest analysis is “focused on the child, not on Mother or her case-plan progress per se.”

2026No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance.’” In re A.W., 2025-Ohio-5657, ¶ 53 (2d Dist.), quoting In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104 , ¶ 57, quoting In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513 , ¶ 56. “‘Juvenile courts need not “expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors,” and “[c]onsideration is all the statute requires.”’” (Bracketed text in original.) Id., quoting In re H.V.F., 2024-Ohio-5838, ¶ 41 (2d Dist.), quoting In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102 , ¶ 31. {¶ 35} In reviewing the trial court’s decision, the trial court analyzed all the statutory factors contained in R.C. 2151.414(D)

2026In re S.W., 2023-Ohio-118, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.).

2025In re S.W., 2023-Ohio-118, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.).

2025In re J.H., 2017-Ohio-7070, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). “[T]he best-interest determination focuses on the child, not the parent.” In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.), citing In the Matter of: Austin Mayle, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379 (July 27, 2000 8th Dist.).

2024In re J.H., 2017-Ohio-7070, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.).

2026“Under the best-interest test, no single factor is controlling, and the weight to be given to any 6 factor lies within the trial court’s discretion.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-963 34 (2d Dist.), citing In re L.L., 2020-Ohio-5609, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).

2025“Under the best-interest test, no single factor is controlling, and the weight to be given to any factor lies within the trial court’s discretion.” In re L.L., 2020-Ohio-5609, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).

2026Because “[t]he knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses 20 and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record[,] . . . the reviewing court in such proceedings should be guided by the presumption that the trial court’s findings were indeed correct.” (Citation omitted.) Id. {¶ 53} With the foregoing standards in mind, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s legal-custody determination when considering the relevant best-interest factors. {¶ 54} Parent’s Wishes: Mother testified that she was not fit to have custody o

2025Mr. Mahbub’s repeated threats against Ms. Son weigh heavily in our consideration of the best-interest analysis. {¶ 62} Under App.R. 12(C), if we determine the trial court’s final order was against the manifest weight of the evidence, as we have done in this case, we may either remand for further proceeding or “weigh the evidence in the record and render the judgment.” Justice Douglas’ concurrence in Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 75 (1988), is instructive as to the practical realities of remanding this matter back to the trial court stating, “I am at a loss to determine what this court wo

2026Relevant Law {¶11} “‘Decisions concerning child custody matters rest within the sound discretion of the trial court.’” Krill v. Krill, 2014-Ohio-2577, ¶ 26 (3d Dist.), quoting Walker v. Walker, 2013-Ohio-1496, ¶ 46 (3d Dist.), citing Wallace v. Willoughby, 2011-Ohio-3008, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.) and Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988).

2021See Krill, 2014-Ohio-2577, at ¶ 29 .

2024In re M/E at ¶ 18 , citing In re F.B.D., 2019-Ohio-2562, ¶ 11 (1st Dist.), and In re D.Z.F. at ¶ 21. {¶15} In making the decision to award legal custody to maternal grandparents, the juvenile court relied on—among other things—the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), which include, but are not limited, to: (1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through

2022Hamilton No. C-180356, 2019-Ohio-2562, ¶ 11 . {¶23} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) sets forth the following best-interest factors: (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (c) The custody history of the child * * *; (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether t

2021See Fisher, 116 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2007-Ohio-5589 , 876 N.E.2d 546, at ¶ 29 (determining that the custody statute distinguishes between “plan” and “decree”).

2021See Fisher, 116 Ohio St.3d 53 , 2007-Ohio-5589 , 876 N.E.2d 546, at ¶ 29 (determining that the custody statute distinguishes between “plan” and “decree”).

2026“In accordance with R.C. 2151.23(F)(1), the best-interest standard set forth in R.C. 3109.04 applies in making custody determinations.” In re D.D.J., 2024-Ohio-2581, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing In re S.A., 2019-Ohio-4161, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.).

2024In re S.A., 2019-Ohio-4161, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.); see also In re Bonfield, 2002-Ohio-6660, ¶ 49-50 (When exercising its authority under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), the trial court “shall exercise its discretion in giving due consideration to all known factors in determining what is in the best interest of the children.”).

2026When assessing best interest in a custody determination under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), this court has found that “the court is to consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to those set forth under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).” In re S.A. at ¶ 24, citing Nicely v. Weaver, 2013-Ohio-1621, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.). “[T]here is no requirement that a trial court separately address each factor enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and absent evidence to the contrary, an appellate court will presume the trial court considered all of the relevant ‘best interest factors.’” Id., citing id.

2026When assessing best interest in a custody determination under R.C. 2151.23(A)(2), this court has found that “the court is to consider all relevant factors, including but not limited to those set forth under R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).” In re S.A. at ¶ 24, citing Nicely v. Weaver, 2013-Ohio-1621, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.). “[T]here is no requirement that a trial court separately address each factor enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and absent evidence to the contrary, an appellate court will presume the trial court considered all of the relevant ‘best interest factors.’” Id., citing id.

2025In re J.H., 2017-Ohio-7070, ¶ 53 (8th Dist.). “[T]he best-interest determination focuses on the child, not the parent.” In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 59 (8th Dist.), citing In the Matter of: Austin Mayle, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379 (July 27, 2000 8th Dist.).

2024In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, at ¶ 59 (8th Dist.).

2026In her appeal, Mother asserts no specific challenge to the juvenile court’s best interest determination. {¶ 38} In determining the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires consideration of the enumerated factors and “does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).” In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102 , ¶ 31.

2026In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102 , at ¶ 19. {¶ 73} "R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e).

2026In short, the focus of a best-interest analysis is on the child, not the parent.” In re A.K., 2017-Ohio-8100, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). {¶ 31} Based on its review of the record, the juvenile court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statutory best-interest factors supported awarding legal custody of P.W. to Father.

2020Montgomery No. 27575, 2017-Ohio-8100, ¶ 11 . {¶ 20} Here the trial court appropriately evaluated the evidence, including Mother’s case-plan progress, and applied the best-interest factors.

2025“As a result, the juvenile court ‘“should consider the totality of the circumstances, including, to the extent they are applicable, the best interest factors set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F).”’” Id., quoting Memic at ¶ 26 , quoting In re Pryor, 86 Ohio App.3d 327, 336 (4th Dist. 1993). {¶12} Mother asserts that the juvenile court did not properly apply the best-interest factors in R.C. 3109.04 because it did not mention them in its dispositional entry.

2023Lorain Nos. 15CA010850, 15CA010860, 2017-Ohio-1, ¶ 17 ; In re Pryor, 86 Ohio App.3d 327, 336 , 620 N.E.2d 973 (4th Dist.1993); see also Best Interests of the Child, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (explaining that the best-interest-of-the-child standard is one “by which a court determines what arrangements would be to a child’s greatest benefit, often used in deciding child-custody and visitation matters and in deciding whether to approve an adoption or a guardianship” and listing some of the best-interest factors courts commonly consider as “the emotional tie between the child and the

2023Id. {¶15} When determining the best interest of a child in a legal-custody dispute, the juvenile court may consider the best-interest factors enumerated under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) or 3109.04(F)(1).

2022See Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 218 , 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶9} We first reiterate that the trial court declined to terminate the shared- parenting plan, as requested by Father, after thoroughly analyzing the best-interest factors included in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (2).

2026We disagree. {¶ 49} “An award of legal custody ‘vests in the custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.’” In re J.C., 2020-Ohio-5540, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.), quoting R.C. 2151.011(B)(21).

2021Id. {¶ 86} Based on the foregoing findings, the trial court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the aforementioned best-interest factors supported awarding legal custody of T.F.1, D.W.1, and D.W.2 to M.H. and legal custody of T.F.2 to E.D.

2024Costilla v. Weimerskirch, 2021-Ohio-165, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.).

2021Hancock No. 5-20-12, 2021-Ohio-165, ¶ 32 , citing Krill, 2014-Ohio-2577, at ¶ 29 .

2020Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d at 416-418 ; Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219 . {¶30} On appeal, Todd asserts that the trial court failed to properly apply and consider the best-interest factors and argues that the manifest weight of the evidence supported granting his motion for custody or motion for shared parenting.

2014Mother also fails to convince us that the court erred in its weighing of the best-interest factors. {¶ 22} The second assignment of error is overruled. {¶ 23} “[C]ustody issues are some of the most difficult and agonizing decisions a trial 10 judge must make.” Davis,77 Ohio St.3d at 418, 674 N.E.2d 1159 .