best-interest standard in Alabama

2018On appeal, the father first argues that the Coffee Circuit Court erred by applying the custody-modification standard set out in Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1984) ("the McLendon standard"), rather than the best-interest standard set out in Ex parte Couch , 521 So.2d 987 , 989 (Ala. 1988).

2018On appeal, the father first argues that the Coffee Circuit Court erred by applying the custody-modification standard set out in Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1984) ("the McLendon standard"), rather than the best-interest standard set out in Ex parte Couch , 521 So.2d 987 , 989 (Ala. 1988).

2011App. 2006), this court stated: "`Because the parties had joint custody, this case is governed by Ex parte Couch , 521 So. 2d 987 *Page 5 (Ala. 1988), which held that the best-interest standard applies to the modification of an existing joint-custody arrangement.' Nave v. Nave , 942 So. 2d 372 , 376 (Ala. Civ.

2011In Richardson v. Fotheringham, 950 So.2d 339 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), this court stated: “ ‘Because the parties had joint custody, this case is governed by Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988), which held that the best-interest standard applies to the modification of an existing joint-custody arrangement.’ Nave v. Nave, 942 So.2d 372, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). “ ‘[Wjhere a trial court bases its custody determination on an improper custody-modification standard, that judgment is due to be reversed.’ Spears v. Wheeler, 877 So.2d 607, 608 (Ala.Civ.App.2003).

2024As the mother concedes, "[t]he legal standard to be applied in the dispositional phase of a 12 CL-2023-0157, CL-2023-0158, CL-2023-0159, and CL-2023-0160 dependency proceeding is the best-interest standard." B.L.T. v. V.T., 12 So. 3d 123, 125 (Ala. Civ.

2024As the mother concedes, "[t]he legal standard to be applied in the dispositional phase of a 12 CL-2023-0157, CL-2023-0158, CL-2023-0159, and CL-2023-0160 dependency proceeding is the best-interest standard." B.L.T. v. V.T., 12 So. 3d 123, 125 (Ala. Civ.

2025Analysis The father's sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by applying the custody-modification standard set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984), in determining whether to modify the child's custody instead of applying the parental-custody presumption and the best-interest standard pursuant to Ex parte Terry, 494 So. 2d 628, 632 (Ala. 1986).

2018However, that case is distinguishable because, among other reasons, it was "undisputed that the trial court was bound to apply the standard set forth in Ex parte McLendon , 455 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1984)," as opposed to the best-interest standard used in making an initial custody determination. 949 So.2d at 166 .

2015Means v. Means, 512 So.2d 1386, 1388 (Ala. Civ.

2012The father had the burden to prove that there had been a material change of circumstances since that judgment was entered and that “ ¾ [is] in the [child’s] best interests that the [judgment] be modified...' '' Nave v. Nave, 942 So.2d 372, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (quoting Means v. Means, 512 So.2d 1386, 1388 (Ala.Civ.App.1987)).

2011In Richardson v. Fotheringham, 950 So.2d 339 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), this court stated: “ ‘Because the parties had joint custody, this case is governed by Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988), which held that the best-interest standard applies to the modification of an existing joint-custody arrangement.’ Nave v. Nave, 942 So.2d 372, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). “ ‘[Wjhere a trial court bases its custody determination on an improper custody-modification standard, that judgment is due to be reversed.’ Spears v. Wheeler, 877 So.2d 607, 608 (Ala.Civ.App.2003).

2006"Because the parties had joint custody, this case is governed by Ex parte Couch , 521 So.2d 987 (Ala. 1988), which held that the best-interest standard applies to the modification of an existing joint-custody arrangement." Nave v. Nave , 942 So.2d 372 , 376 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005). "[W]here a trial court bases its custody determination on an improper custody-modification standard, that judgment is due to be reversed." Spears v. Wheeler , 877 So.2d 607 , 608 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003).

2025See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981).

2024In making that determination, the trial court should consider the factors traditionally cited by the appellate courts in this state, see Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981), but it should also consider factors such as the interrelationship of the children, the children's ages, the similarity of interests and activities of the children, whether the children previously resided with the custodial parent, the parents' involvement in the children's upbringing, the parents' emotional stability, the parents' previous lack of cooperation regarding visitation, the children's preference,

2011In Ex parte W.T.M., 851 So.2d 55, 57-58 (Ala.Civ.App.2002), the main opinion stated: “ ‘The rule [established in] Ex parte Perkins[, 646 So.2d 46 (Ala.1994),] is that when the trial court uses an improper, higher standard to deny relief to a party requesting a modification of a prior custody order, the appellate court will not review the evidence under the correct lower standard and direct the award of custody.

2006In *Page 343 Ex parte W.T.M. , 851 So.2d 55 , 57-58 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002), the main opinion stated: "The rule [established in] Ex parte Perkins [, 646 So.2d 46 (Ala. 1994),] is that when the trial court uses an improper, higher standard to deny relief to a party requesting a modification of a prior custody order, the appellate court will not review the evidence under the correct lower standard and direct the award of custody.

2005The juvenile court's determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon. ")) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child's dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) ( See In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that "the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one"); cf. E

2005The juvenile court’s determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon.”)) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child’s dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) (see In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that “the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one”); cf. Ex

2005The juvenile court's determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon. ")) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child's dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) ( See In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that "the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one"); cf. E

2005The juvenile court’s determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon.”)) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child’s dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) (see In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that “the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one”); cf. Ex

2005The juvenile court's determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon. ")) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child's dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) ( See In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that "the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one"); cf. E

2005The juvenile court’s determination of dependency obviated any necessity to apply the heightened custody-modification standard found in Ex parte McLendon.”)) and the standard to be applied to custody proceedings after a child’s dependency has ceased (the McLendon standard) (see In re F.W., 681 So.2d 208, 211 (Ala.Civ.App.1996) (stating, in a case involving a custody award in a dependency proceeding with no indication of continuing DHR supervision, that “the McLendon standard applies both to custody questions arising in divorce actions and in juvenile dependency cases such as this one”); cf. Ex

2005This court has consistently recognized that trial courts must observe a distinction between the standard to be applied in dependency proceedings (the best-interest standard) ( see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-71(a)(4); and L.L.M. v. S.F., 919 So.2d 307, 311 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) ("Because this is a dependency case, the juvenile court needed to determine only if transferring legal custody of the child to the father was in the best interest of the child. . . .

2005This court has consistently recognized that trial courts must observe a distinction between the standard to be applied in dependency proceedings (the best-interest standard) (see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-71(a)(4); and L.L.M. v. S.F., 919 So.2d 307, 311 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (“Because this is a dependency case, the juvenile court needed to determine only if transferring legal custody of the child to the father was in the best interest of the child....

2011In Richardson v. Fotheringham, 950 So.2d 339 (Ala.Civ.App.2006), this court stated: “ ‘Because the parties had joint custody, this case is governed by Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988), which held that the best-interest standard applies to the modification of an existing joint-custody arrangement.’ Nave v. Nave, 942 So.2d 372, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2005). “ ‘[Wjhere a trial court bases its custody determination on an improper custody-modification standard, that judgment is due to be reversed.’ Spears v. Wheeler, 877 So.2d 607, 608 (Ala.Civ.App.2003).

2010See Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988); Richardson v. Fotheringham, 950 So.2d 339, 342 (Ala.Civ.App.2006) (quoting Nave v. Nave, 942 So.2d 372, 376 (Ala.Civ.App.2005)) (“ ‘Because the parties had joint custody, this case is governed by Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987 (Ala.1988), which held that the best-interest standard applies to the modification of an existing joint-custody arrangement.’ ”).

2025Analysis The father's sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court erred by applying the custody-modification standard set forth in Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984), in determining whether to modify the child's custody instead of applying the parental-custody presumption and the best-interest standard pursuant to Ex parte Terry, 494 So. 2d 628, 632 (Ala. 1986).

2024In making that determination, the trial court should consider the factors traditionally cited by the appellate courts in this state, see Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696-97 (Ala. 1981), but it should also consider factors such as the interrelationship of the children, the children's ages, the similarity of interests and activities of the children, whether the children previously resided with the custodial parent, the parents' involvement in the children's upbringing, the parents' emotional stability, the parents' previous lack of cooperation regarding visitation, the children's preference,

2024See Steed v. Steed, 877 So. 2d 602, 604 (Ala. Civ.

2015See S.T.S. v. C.T., 746 So.2d 1017, 1020 (Ala.Civ.App.1999).

2015See Rehfeld, 885 So.2d at 795 (applying Rule 45, Ala. R.

2010Although she concedes that the juvenile court had wide discretion under the best-interest standard to determine the children’s placement upon the finding of dependency, see Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-314(a), and W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64, 70 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (explaining, under former Ala.Code 1975, § 12-15-71, the predecessor statute to § 12-15-314(a), that the best-interest standard governs the dispositional phase of a dependency proceeding), she also argues that the juvenile court’s permanent placement of the children with relatives is tantamount to a termination of her parental *413 righ