best-interest factors in Michigan

2026See In re Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32 (“[o]nly one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence to terminate a respondent’s parental rights”). -7- The trial court may also consider a parent’s history of domestic violence, the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption. [In re White, 303 Mich App at 713-714 (quotation marks and citations omitted).] When a minor child is placed with a relative, that placement “is an explicit factor to conside

2026Although the trial court should weigh all the available evidence, id. at 713 , and must consider relative placement, In re Mason, 486 Mich at 164, all of the other best-interest factors are discretionary, see In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41 (“[T]he court may consider . . . ”); see also In re White, 303 Mich App at 714 (“[T]he court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include . . . ”).

2024Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 509 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). “[A] proper cause or change in circumstance is a significant circumstance regarding one or more of the best- interest factors that has the potential for a significant effect on the well-being of the child or children whose custody is at issue.” Merecki, 336 Mich App at 646 (footnote omitted).

2024“The movant . . . has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that either proper cause or a change of circumstances exists before the trial court can consider whether an established custodial environment exists and conduct a review of the best-interest factors.” Id. at 509 .

2026Upon satisfaction of that first step (which are sometimes referred to as the D’Onofrio factors), the trial court must (step two) “determine whether an established custodial environment exists,” (step three) “determine whether the change of domicile would modify or alter that establish custodial environment, and (step four) “determine whether the change in domicile would be in the child’s best interests by considering whether the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23 have been established by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 325 .

2025Finally, if, and only if, the trial court finds that a change of domicile would modify or alter the child’s established custodial environment must the trial court determine whether the change in domicile would be in the child’s best interests by considering whether the best-interest factors in MCL 722.23 have been established by clear and convincing evidence. [Rains, 301 Mich App at 325 (footnote omitted).] MCL 722.31(4) lists the five factors that the trial court must consider: (a) Whether the legal residence change has the capacity to improve the quality of life for both the child and the re

2026That said, “although [a] trial court must determine whether each of the best-interest factors applies,” if a “trial court determines that a particular factor is irrelevant to the immediate issue, it need not make substantive factual findings concerning the factor beyond this determination, but need merely state that conclusion on the record.” Id. at 91, 93 .

2024But child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.’ ” Id. at 585; 680 NW2d 432 , quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c). [Pierron, 486 Mich at 85-86 (footnotes omitted).] In making a ruling that would result in a change to the child’s established custodial environment, “the trial court must consider all the best-interest factors because a case in which the proposed change would modify the custodial environment is essentially a change-of-custody case.” Id. at 92-93 .

2026Although the trial court should weigh all the available evidence, id. at 713 , and must consider relative placement, In re Mason, 486 Mich at 164, all of the other best-interest factors are discretionary, see In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41 (“[T]he court may consider . . . ”); see also In re White, 303 Mich App at 714 (“[T]he court should consider a wide variety of factors that may include . . . ”).

2026Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41 . -7- Respondent finally argues that the trial court erred because it failed to specifically address the best-interest factors on the record.

2024COOPERATION AND AGREEMENT As noted above, a trial court’s analysis of the best-interest factors also requires consideration of “the general level of cooperation and agreement between the parties when considering joint custody.” Dailey, 291 Mich App at 667 ; see also MCL 722.26a(1)(b).

2022“In determining the best interests of the child, the court must review the best-interest factors listed in MCL 722.23.” Dailey, 291 Mich App at 667 .

2023See, e.g., Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 358-359 ; 683 NW2d 250 (2004) (noting that the trial court had entered a temporary order governing custody pending trial, but stating that ordinarily a trial court cannot resolve a custody dispute without holding an evidentiary hearing). -8- Assuming that the trial court had to hold an evidentiary hearing and make findings on the best-interest factors before entering its temporary order, see Daly v Ward, 501 Mich 897 ; 901 NW2d 897 (2017), any error would not warrant relief.

2019Thompson v Thompson, 261 Mich App 353, 355 ; 683 NW2d 250 (2004). -7- Finally, defendant argues that the trial court’s factual findings as to the best-interest factors were against the great weight of the evidence.

2026The trial has discretion to give differing weight to each of the best-interest factors, Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705 ; 747 NW2d 336 (2008), and this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact “unless the factual determination clearly preponderates in the opposite direction,” Sabatine, 513 Mich at 284 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026The trial has discretion to give differing weight to each of the best-interest factors, Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 705 ; 747 NW2d 336 (2008), and this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact “unless the factual determination clearly preponderates in the opposite direction,” Sabatine, 513 Mich at 284 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025“A court need not give equal weight to all the factors, but may consider the relative weight of the factors as appropriate to the circumstances.” Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 184 ; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). “[T]he trial court need not make its custody determination on the basis of a mathematical calculation and may assign differing weights to the various best-interest factors . . . .” Berger, 277 Mich App at 712 .

2025“A court need not give equal weight to all the factors, but may consider the relative weight of the factors as appropriate to the circumstances.” Sinicropi v Mazurek, 273 Mich App 149, 184 ; 729 NW2d 256 (2006). “[T]he trial court need not make its custody determination on the basis of a mathematical calculation and may assign differing weights to the various best-interest factors . . . .” Berger, 277 Mich App at 712 .

2025See Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889 ; 526 NW2d 889 (1994) (“[U]pon a finding of error an appellate court should remand the case for reevaluation, unless the error was harmless.”); Brown, 332 Mich App at 26 (deeming an error in a trial court’s best-interest analysis harmless when “in all other respects the remaining best-interest factors overwhelmingly supported” the court’s ultimate decision).

2025See Fletcher v Fletcher, 447 Mich 871, 889 ; 526 NW2d 889 (1994) (“[U]pon a finding of error an appellate court should remand the case for reevaluation, unless the error was harmless.”); Brown, 332 Mich App at 26 (deeming an error in a trial court’s best-interest analysis harmless when “in all other respects the remaining best-interest factors overwhelmingly supported” the court’s ultimate decision).

2024While the trial court was required to consider the best-interest factors pursuant to MCL 722.23, a trial court may consider the factors set forth in MCL 722.27a(7) when “determining the frequency, duration, and type of parenting time,” MCL 722.27a(7); see Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 31-32 ; 805 NW2d 1 (2010).

2024While the trial court was required to consider the best-interest factors pursuant to MCL 722.23, a trial court may consider the factors set forth in MCL 722.27a(7) when “determining the frequency, duration, and type of parenting time,” MCL 722.27a(7); see Shade v Wright, 291 Mich App 17, 31-32 ; 805 NW2d 1 (2010).

2023Here are 20 factors this Court has recognized as pertinent to a best-interest inquiry in a termination of parental rights setting:  “[T]he child’s bond to the parent,” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted);  “[T]he parent’s parenting ability,” id. (quotation marks and citation omitted);  “[T]he child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home,” id. (quotation marks and citation omitted);  The “parent’s history of domestic violence,” id.;  The parent’s compliance with a

2023Here are 20 factors this Court has recognized as pertinent to a best-interest inquiry in a termination of parental rights setting:  “[T]he child’s bond to the parent,” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713 ; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted);  “[T]he parent’s parenting ability,” id. (quotation marks and citation omitted);  “[T]he child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home,” id. (quotation marks and citation omitted);  The “parent’s history of domestic violence,” id.;  The parent’s compliance with a

2024At the new hearing, the court must consider all relevant, up- to-date information, and “it is possible that in light of the up-to-date information, the court might weigh the best-interest factors differently, rendering any review of them now premature.” Griffin v Griffin (Amended Opinion), 323 Mich App 110 , 124-125 n 10; 916 NW2d 292 (2018).

2024At the new hearing, the court must consider all relevant, up- to-date information, and “it is possible that in light of the up-to-date information, the court might weigh the best-interest factors differently, rendering any review of them now premature.” Griffin v Griffin (Amended Opinion), 323 Mich App 110 , 124-125 n 10; 916 NW2d 292 (2018).

2024See In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 80 . -6- The trial court also considered more than just generalities in its analysis of the best-interest factors and respondent-mother’s parenting skills.

2022Considering the full record and the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to a best- interest analysis (see In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90 ; 836 NW2d 182 (2013)), we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred by declining to terminate father’s parental rights.

2026“We defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and the trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors.” Kessler v Kessler, 295 Mich App 54, 64 ; 811 NW2d 39 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2026“We defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and the trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors.” Kessler v Kessler, 295 Mich App 54, 64 ; 811 NW2d 39 (2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2024In fact, father’s proposed approach to the best-interest analysis conflicts with the goal of the Child Custody Act, which is “to promote the best interests the child and to provide a stable environment for children that is free of unwarranted custody changes.” Marik v Marik, 325 Mich App 353, 360 ; 925 NW2d 885 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2022See Marik, 325 Mich App at 359 . -3- the best-interest factors in relation to the issue of school choice.

2023Adopting wholesale, without further comment, a party’s best-interest analysis in a pretrial brief does not satisfy a trial court’s obligation to “consider and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with respect to each of [the best- interest] factors.” Foskett, 247 Mich App at 9 .

2018Discretionary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, including a trial court’s determination on the issue of custody. [Foskett v Foskett, 247 Mich App 1, 4-5 ; 634 NW2d 363 (2001) (quotation marks and citations omitted).] The best-interest factors that must be considered by the trial court are found in MCL 722.23(a) through (l): (a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child. (b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the ch

2025In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 411 ; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).

2025See In re Schadler, 315 Mich App at 411 ; In re White, 303 Mich App at 714-716 ; In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90 ; In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-43 .

2023This is not to say that whether XAF’s “safety and well-being [can be] reasonably assured” in respondent-father’s care cannot outweigh the other factors, see, e.g., In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 120, 142 ; 809 NW2d 412 (2011); only that the trial court’s best-interest analysis should weigh all the available evidence, In re Trejo, 462 Mich at 364 .

2019We declined to impose a requirement that a trial court apply each of the best-interest factors from the Child Custody Act to a termination proceeding because it “would not be sensible or indeed even possible.” In re JS & SM, 231 Mich App 92, 100 ; 585 NW2d 326 (1998), overruled on other grounds by In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341 ; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

2022“The court must do so by holding an evidentiary hearing and considering the relevant best-interest factors contained in MCL 722.23.” Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 247 ; 765 NW2d 345 (2009).

2022“The court must do so by holding an evidentiary hearing and considering the relevant best-interest factors contained in MCL 722.23.” Pierron v Pierron, 282 Mich App 222, 247 ; 765 NW2d 345 (2009).

2026In resolving both issues, the court should consider all up-to-date information brought to its attention.” Kubicki v Sharpe, 306 Mich App 525, 545 ; 858 NW2d 57 (2014). [Quint v Quint, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368002); slip op at 4.] In this case, plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly decided legal custody without a finding of proper cause or change of circumstances, without a determination of the appropriate burden of proof, and without analyzing the best-interest factors.

2026In resolving both issues, the court should consider all up-to-date information brought to its attention.” Kubicki v Sharpe, 306 Mich App 525, 545 ; 858 NW2d 57 (2014). [Quint v Quint, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d ___ (2024) (Docket No. 368002); slip op at 4.] In this case, plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly decided legal custody without a finding of proper cause or change of circumstances, without a determination of the appropriate burden of proof, and without analyzing the best-interest factors.

2018“In child custody cases, the family court must consider all the factors delineated in MCL 722.23 and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with respect to each of them.” Spires v -5- Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 443 ; 741 NW2d 523 (2007). “[T]he trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 705 .

2018“In child custody cases, the family court must consider all the factors delineated in MCL 722.23 and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with respect to each of them.” Spires v -5- Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 443 ; 741 NW2d 523 (2007). “[T]he trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 705 .

2026In addition, a trial court’s factual findings and conclusions under the best-interest factors “need not include consideration of every piece of evidence entered and argument raised by the parties.” MacIntyre v MacIntyre, 267 Mich App 429, 452 ; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). -6- Also, in cases where a referee has made a custody recommendation, a trial court may uphold the recommendation “without making any independent findings concerning the child’s best interests.” Rivette v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich App 327, 330 ; 750 NW2d 603 (2008).

2024With respect to the best-interest factors, the trial court’s “findings and conclusions need not include consideration of every piece of evidence entered and argument raised by the parties.” MacIntyre v MacIntyre, 267 Mich App 449, 452 ; 705 NW2d 144 (2005).

2026In addition, a trial court’s factual findings and conclusions under the best-interest factors “need not include consideration of every piece of evidence entered and argument raised by the parties.” MacIntyre v MacIntyre, 267 Mich App 429, 452 ; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). -6- Also, in cases where a referee has made a custody recommendation, a trial court may uphold the recommendation “without making any independent findings concerning the child’s best interests.” Rivette v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich App 327, 330 ; 750 NW2d 603 (2008).

2026In addition, a trial court’s factual findings and conclusions under the best-interest factors “need not include consideration of every piece of evidence entered and argument raised by the parties.” MacIntyre v MacIntyre, 267 Mich App 429, 452 ; 705 NW2d 144 (2005). -6- Also, in cases where a referee has made a custody recommendation, a trial court may uphold the recommendation “without making any independent findings concerning the child’s best interests.” Rivette v Rose-Molina, 278 Mich App 327, 330 ; 750 NW2d 603 (2008).

2024But child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child.’ ” Id. at 585; 680 NW2d 432 , quoting MCL 722.27(1)(c). [Pierron, 486 Mich at 85-86 (footnotes omitted).] In making a ruling that would result in a change to the child’s established custodial environment, “the trial court must consider all the best-interest factors because a case in which the proposed change would modify the custodial environment is essentially a change-of-custody case.” Id. at 92-93 .

2017It is true that this Court stated in Brown v Loveman, 260 Mich App 576 , 598 n 7; 680 NW2d 432 (2004)—and in cases issued after Brown, see, e.g., Spires v Bergman, 276 Mich App 432 , 437 n 1; 741 NW2d 523 (2007), and Sulaica v Rometty, 308 Mich App 568, 581-583 ; 866 NW2d 838 (2014)—that it is “[o]nly when the parents share joint physical custody” that a best- interest analysis must be completed.

2018“In child custody cases, the family court must consider all the factors delineated in MCL 722.23 and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with respect to each of them.” Spires v -5- Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 443 ; 741 NW2d 523 (2007). “[T]he trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 705 .

2018“In child custody cases, the family court must consider all the factors delineated in MCL 722.23 and explicitly state its findings and conclusions with respect to each of them.” Spires v -5- Bergman, 276 Mich App 432, 443 ; 741 NW2d 523 (2007). “[T]he trial court has discretion to accord differing weight to the best-interest factors.” Berger, 277 Mich App at 705 .

2026When determining whether the appointment of a guardian is in a child’s best interests, “the court may consider the best-interest factors from the Child Custody Act, [MCL 722.21 et seq.], the Adoption Code [MCL 710.21 et seq.], or any other factors that may be relevant under the circumstances of a particular case.” In re COH, 495 Mich at 208 .

2025In deciding whether the appointment of a guardian is in the child’s best interests, “the court may consider the best-interest factors from the Child Custody Act, the Adoption Code, or any other factors that may be relevant under the circumstances of a particular case.” In re COH, 495 Mich 184, 208 ; 848 NW2d 107 (2014).