best-interest analysis in Texas

2026Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 .

2026Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).

2026Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 .

2026Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).

2026“A best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

2026“A best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

2025See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 (holding absence of evidence supporting some of the best-interest factors would not preclude a factfinder from concluding parental termination is in children’s best interests, “particularly if the evidence were undisputed that the parental relationship endangered the safety of the child”).

2025See M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (“Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of a child.”) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ); In re A.P., 184 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). 51 In a best-interest analysis, the focus is on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent.

2026A separate consideration of alternatives to termination is not required.”), disapproved on other grounds by In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002); cf. In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 91 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that “severance of the parent-child relationship will survive constitutional scrutiny only if . . . it is impossible to achieve the goal through any less restrictive means”).

2026A separate consideration of alternatives to termination is not required.”), disapproved on other grounds by J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 256 ; cf. In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 91 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that “severance of the parent–child relationship will survive constitutional scrutiny only if . . . it is impossible to achieve the goal through any less restrictive means”). 17 Because the best-interest analysis and clear-and-convincing-evidence standard “guarantee[ ] the constitutionality of termination proceedings,” Edwards, 946 S.W.2d at 139 , we decline to apply a separa

2024See Standards for Appellate Conduct, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court ¶ 4, Texas Rules of Court (State) 324–25 (West 2023) (“Counsel will advise the Court of controlling legal authorities, including those adverse to their position, and should not cite authority that has been reversed, overruled, or restricted 16 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 12 without informing the court of those limitations.”) (available at http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1437423/standards-for-appellate-conduct.pdf). 17 Because the scenario presented here is not a close call, we will not request rebriefing or further delay

2024See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. 10 Most importantly, given the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry, we may not discount or minimize that Z.B. is “thriving” and “happy” in his current placement.

2026Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(2); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 733 (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest finding when most of the best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination); see also In re A.V., No. 11-23-00144-CV, 2023 WL 8631492 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding based on, among other things, mother’s lack of parental abilities, history of domestic violence and drug abuse, her inability to provide a safe and stable environment, and the lack

2026Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(2); Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest finding when most of the best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination); see also In re G.M.D., Nos. 01-25-00609-CV, 01-25-00940-CV, 2026 WL 233139 , at *13 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (holding that evidence supported trial court’s best-interest finding because mother’s criminal activity caused her to be away from her children and subjected them to a life

2026See In re M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308 , at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2026See In re M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308 , at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2024In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.); see also In re S.V.H., No. 01-19- 01003-CV, 2020 WL 2988567 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 4, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2024In re Y.G., No. 01-22-00181-CV, 2022 WL 3362953 , at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.)).

2026“Parental drug abuse, which reflects poor judgment, is also a factor that may be considered when determining the child’s best interest[s].” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re M.C., 482 S.W.3d at 688 ) (citing In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 18 2007, no pet.))). “[W]e may consider evidence used to support the grounds for termination of parental rights in the best-interest analysis.” Id. (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 ).

2025“A mother’s use of illegal drugs during pregnancy endangers the physical wellbeing of her unborn child.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 17 595, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d at 893 (explaining that a mother’s drug use during pregnancy is a factor to consider in a best-interest analysis); see In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726 , 749 (Tex. 2022) (“Mother’s use of controlled substances while pregnant created a dangerous environment for J.W.”); see also In re K.N., No. 02-13-00062-CV, 2013 WL 3325104 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)

2024In conducting a best-interest analysis, “a court may consider not only direct evidence but also may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 269 .

2024In conducting a best-interest analysis, “a court may consider not only direct evidence but also may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

2018See, e.g., In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (recognizing that finding that parent failed to complete court-ordered services can be considered in support of best-interest finding); In re R.R.C., No. 04–17–00306–CV, 2017 WL 4413205 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 4, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A failure to complete service plans can be one of a number of the acts or omissions by a parent that are relevant to a best-interest analysis.”). 23 Mother also concedes that she did not complete her family service plan.

2014See In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685 , 707-08 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) (considering the parent’s uncorrected narcissistic and paranoid personality traits relevant to the best-interest analysis), abrogated on other grounds by In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2013).

2020In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).

2019In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). 17 Courts may consider these non-exclusive factors, known as the Holley factors, in the best-interest analysis: the desires of the child; the physical and emotional needs of the child now and in the future; the physical and emotional danger to the child now and in the future; the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; the stability of th

2024In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

2017In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Forth Worth 2001, no pet.); see In re A.L.D.H., 373 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied); The focus of a best-interest analysis is on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent.

2025Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).

2025Dupree, 907 S.W.2d at 86 .

2023“In Lenz, the [Texas] supreme court . . . identified a number of factors that may help give meaning to the best-interest standard in the context of relocation.” Id. (citing Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15–16, 19).

2023“In Lenz, the [Texas] supreme court . . . identified a number of factors that may help give meaning to the best-interest standard in the context of relocation.” Id. (citing Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15–16, 19).

2022Under the Family Code, 45 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-65 . 46 See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360 (subsections D and E both use the term endanger, which means “to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health[]”). 22 there is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest.47 Even so, it is also presumed “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest.”48 When determining whether terminating the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best int

2020S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 366 .

2024In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2024See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2026They remain enforceable in the face of a broad best-interest inquiry by the trial court, In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 455 , the lack of a pending suit, Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 776, and even the parties’ agreement to repudiate the MSA, In re Minix, 543 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, 6 orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).

2015Introduction The Supreme Court has recently held that Section 153.0071(e) prohibits a trial court from denying “a motion to enter judgment on [a mediated settlement agreement] based on a best interest determination.” Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 447 . 9 The trial court in Lee rejected the parties’ mediated settlement agreement under the general statutory best-interest standard of Section 153.002 of the Texas Family Code, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the specific provisions of Section 153.0071(e) of the Texas Family Code prevailed over the broad best-interest standard in Section 153.002.

2026“Parental drug abuse, which reflects poor judgment, is also a factor that may be considered when determining the child’s best interest[s].” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re M.C., 482 S.W.3d at 688 ) (citing In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 18 2007, no pet.))). “[W]e may consider evidence used to support the grounds for termination of parental rights in the best-interest analysis.” Id. (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 ).

2026“Parental drug abuse, which reflects poor judgment, is also a factor that may be considered when determining the child’s best interest[s].” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re M.C., 482 S.W.3d at 688 ) (citing In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 820 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 18 2007, no pet.))). “[W]e may consider evidence used to support the grounds for termination of parental rights in the best-interest analysis.” Id. (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 ).

2023See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (providing that evidence that establishes a predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) may be probative of the best-interest issue); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (considering mother’s admission to using methamphetamine around the time of child’s removal under the needs of and danger to the child factor in the best-interest analysis); In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“Evidence of domestic violence in the home is supportive of a trial court’s best-interest finding und

2020See In re J.D., No. 06-18- 00105-CV, 2019 WL 1302932 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[I]n conducting the best-interest analysis, a court may consider not only direct evidence but also may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence.” In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 114 (citation omitted).

2026In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).

2024Father argues that there is no clear and convincing evidence to support the finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interest, asserting that Bryant, Lacewell, and Rodriguez “did not relate any facts that formed the basis of their opinion as to why termination was in the best interest of the children.” He asserts that their testimony “amounted to little more than a recitation that the children were in foster care, that their needs were being met, that the children had bonded with [M.H.], and that [M.H.] wanted to adopt them.” Father argues that the best-intere

2023See In re K.F., 402 S.W.3d 497, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that parent’s failure to complete court-ordered services can be an omission by a parent that is relevant to a best-interest analysis); see also Tex. Fam.

2018See In re K.F., 402 S.W.3d 497, 506 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); In re A.B., 269 S.W.3d 120, 129 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.); see also In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (noting that parent’s failure to complete service plan supports finding that termination is in child’s best interest).

2020See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 116 (Tex. 2014) (legal sufficiency standard).

2019See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 112-13, 116 (legal sufficiency standard).

2019In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28 ).

2018In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28 ).

2026See id. at 734–35 (concluding a parent’s inability to provide for the children due to imprisonment favors termination under a best-interest analysis when the parent is unable to provide the Department with alternative placements for the children while the parent serves out the remainder of the prison sentence).

2024See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 ; In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); see also In re A.J.W., No. 04-19- 27 00346-CV, 2019 WL 6333468 , at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The [trial] court could have rationally concluded that [the mother] is unable to protect her children or to provide them a safe and stable environment because she minimizes her drug problem.”); In re A.E., No. 05-14-01340-CV, 2015 WL 1184179 , at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (The mother’s “choice to minimize her past d