best-interest analysis in Texas

2026Best Interest under Section 161.001(b)(2) In Father’s fourth issue, he contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in Ann’s best interest under Section 161.001(b)(2) of the Texas Family Code. 15 Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 .

2026Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 .

2026Best Interest under Section 161.001(b)(2) In Father’s fourth issue, he contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in Ann’s best interest under Section 161.001(b)(2) of the Texas Family Code. 15 Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 .

2026Although we generally presume that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006), the best-interest analysis is child-centered, focusing on the child’s well-being, safety, and development, A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 .

2026“A best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

2026“A best-interest analysis may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence.” See In re E.D., 419 S.W.3d 615, 620 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied).

2025Finally, regarding the uncertainty of the children’s placement, the supreme court has explained that “the lack of evidence about definitive plans for permanent placement and adoption cannot be the dispositive factor” in a best-interest inquiry; “otherwise, determinations regarding best interest would regularly be subject to reversal on the sole ground that an adoptive family has yet to be located.” C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 .

2025See M.C. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 300 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (“Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be sufficient to support a finding that termination is in the best interest of a child.”) (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27 ); In re A.P., 184 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.). 51 In a best-interest analysis, the focus is on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent.

2024See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. 10 Most importantly, given the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry, we may not discount or minimize that Z.B. is “thriving” and “happy” in his current placement.

2024See Standards for Appellate Conduct, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court ¶ 4, Texas Rules of Court (State) 324–25 (West 2023) (“Counsel will advise the Court of controlling legal authorities, including those adverse to their position, and should not cite authority that has been reversed, overruled, or restricted 16 544 S.W.2d 367 , 371–72 (Tex. 1976). 12 without informing the court of those limitations.”) (available at http://www.txcourts.gov/media/1437423/standards-for-appellate-conduct.pdf). 17 Because the scenario presented here is not a close call, we will not request rebriefing or further delay

2026A separate consideration of alternatives to termination is not required.”), disapproved on other grounds by In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002); cf. In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 91 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that “severance of the parent-child relationship will survive constitutional scrutiny only if . . . it is impossible to achieve the goal through any less restrictive means”).

2026A separate consideration of alternatives to termination is not required.”), disapproved on other grounds by J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 256 ; cf. In re S.H.A., 728 S.W.2d 73, 91 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that “severance of the parent–child relationship will survive constitutional scrutiny only if . . . it is impossible to achieve the goal through any less restrictive means”). 17 Because the best-interest analysis and clear-and-convincing-evidence standard “guarantee[ ] the constitutionality of termination proceedings,” Edwards, 946 S.W.2d at 139 , we decline to apply a separa

2026Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(2); Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest finding when most of the best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination); see also In re G.M.D., Nos. 01-25-00609-CV, 01-25-00940-CV, 2026 WL 233139 , at *13 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (holding that evidence supported trial court’s best-interest finding because mother’s criminal activity caused her to be away from her children and subjected them to a life

2026Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(2); Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 733 (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest finding when most of the best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination); see also In re A.V., No. 11-23-00144-CV, 2023 WL 8631492 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding based on, among other things, mother’s lack of parental abilities, history of domestic violence and drug abuse, her inability to provide a safe and stable environment, and the lack

2024In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.).

2024In re Y.G., No. 01-22-00181-CV, 2022 WL 3362953 , at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re B.R., 456 S.W.3d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.)).

2026See In re M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308 , at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2026See In re M.A.A., No. 01-20-00709-CV, 2021 WL 1134308 , at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 25, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2024In conducting a best-interest analysis, “a court may consider not only direct evidence but also may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).

2024In conducting a best-interest analysis, “a court may consider not only direct evidence but also may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence.” In re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d at 269 .

2025“A mother’s use of illegal drugs during pregnancy endangers the physical wellbeing of her unborn child.” In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 17 595, 608 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied); In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d at 893 (explaining that a mother’s drug use during pregnancy is a factor to consider in a best-interest analysis); see In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726 , 749 (Tex. 2022) (“Mother’s use of controlled substances while pregnant created a dangerous environment for J.W.”); see also In re K.N., No. 02-13-00062-CV, 2013 WL 3325104 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)

2019Id. (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 ).

2018See, e.g., In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (recognizing that finding that parent failed to complete court-ordered services can be considered in support of best-interest finding); In re R.R.C., No. 04–17–00306–CV, 2017 WL 4413205 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 4, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“A failure to complete service plans can be one of a number of the acts or omissions by a parent that are relevant to a best-interest analysis.”). 23 Mother also concedes that she did not complete her family service plan.

2014See In re S.A.P., 169 S.W.3d 685 , 707-08 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) (considering the parent’s uncorrected narcissistic and paranoid personality traits relevant to the best-interest analysis), abrogated on other grounds by In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239 (Tex. 2013).

2020In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).

2019In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 287 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). 17 Courts may consider these non-exclusive factors, known as the Holley factors, in the best-interest analysis: the desires of the child; the physical and emotional needs of the child now and in the future; the physical and emotional danger to the child now and in the future; the parental abilities of the persons seeking custody; the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; the plans for the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; the stability of th

2024In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

2017In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 814 (Tex. App.—Forth Worth 2001, no pet.); see In re A.L.D.H., 373 S.W.3d 187, 194 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, pet. denied); The focus of a best-interest analysis is on the best interest of the child, not the best interest of the parent.

2025Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ).

2025Dupree, 907 S.W.2d at 86 .

2023“In Lenz, the [Texas] supreme court . . . identified a number of factors that may help give meaning to the best-interest standard in the context of relocation.” Id. (citing Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15–16, 19).

2023“In Lenz, the [Texas] supreme court . . . identified a number of factors that may help give meaning to the best-interest standard in the context of relocation.” Id. (citing Lenz, 79 S.W.3d at 15–16, 19).

2022Under the Family Code, 45 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-65 . 46 See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360 (subsections D and E both use the term endanger, which means “to expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical health[]”). 22 there is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest.47 Even so, it is also presumed “the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is . . . in the child’s best interest.”48 When determining whether terminating the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best int

2020S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 366 .

2026They remain enforceable in the face of a broad best-interest inquiry by the trial court, In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 455 , the lack of a pending suit, Highsmith, 587 S.W.3d at 776, and even the parties’ agreement to repudiate the MSA, In re Minix, 543 S.W.3d 446, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, 6 orig. proceeding [mand. denied]).

2015Introduction The Supreme Court has recently held that Section 153.0071(e) prohibits a trial court from denying “a motion to enter judgment on [a mediated settlement agreement] based on a best interest determination.” Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 447 . 9 The trial court in Lee rejected the parties’ mediated settlement agreement under the general statutory best-interest standard of Section 153.002 of the Texas Family Code, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the specific provisions of Section 153.0071(e) of the Texas Family Code prevailed over the broad best-interest standard in Section 153.002.

2024In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2024See In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 677 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.).

2023See C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28 (providing that evidence that establishes a predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) may be probative of the best-interest issue); In re E.R.W., 528 S.W.3d 251, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (considering mother’s admission to using methamphetamine around the time of child’s removal under the needs of and danger to the child factor in the best-interest analysis); In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d 97, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“Evidence of domestic violence in the home is supportive of a trial court’s best-interest finding und

2020See In re J.D., No. 06-18- 00105-CV, 2019 WL 1302932 , at *8 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 22, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[I]n conducting the best-interest analysis, a court may consider not only direct evidence but also may consider circumstantial evidence, subjective factors, and the totality of the evidence.” In re R.J., 579 S.W.3d at 114 (citation omitted).

2022See In re L.J., 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 4271 at *17 (explaining that the impact of a parent’s mental illness and failure to take prescribed medication are relevant factors in a best- interest analysis); In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to provide a stable home, and failure to 23 comply with a family service plan support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”).

2020Code Ann. § 161.001 (b)(2); Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 733 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (holding evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the trial 26 court’s best-interest finding when most of the best-interest factors weighed in favor of termination); In re D.R.T., No. 02-11-00213-CV, 2012 WL 1868535 , at *1–14, *18 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 24, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding evidence sufficient to support best-interest finding when record reflected that the mother not only failed to recognize how she had endangered her children through the domesti

2026In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.).

2024Father argues that there is no clear and convincing evidence to support the finding that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best interest, asserting that Bryant, Lacewell, and Rodriguez “did not relate any facts that formed the basis of their opinion as to why termination was in the best interest of the children.” He asserts that their testimony “amounted to little more than a recitation that the children were in foster care, that their needs were being met, that the children had bonded with [M.H.], and that [M.H.] wanted to adopt them.” Father argues that the best-intere

2023See In re K.F., 402 S.W.3d 497, 507 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (holding that parent’s failure to complete court-ordered services can be an omission by a parent that is relevant to a best-interest analysis); see also Tex. Fam.

2018See In re K.F., 402 S.W.3d 497, 506 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied); In re A.B., 269 S.W.3d 120, 129 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.); see also In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (noting that parent’s failure to complete service plan supports finding that termination is in child’s best interest).

2020See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 116 (Tex. 2014) (legal sufficiency standard).

2019See In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d at 112-13, 116 (legal sufficiency standard).

2019In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28 ).

2018In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 581 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27-28 ).

2024The trial court noted on the record that the foster parents’ home was “the only home this child has ever known.” See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595 , 611 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (“As the best-interest inquiry is child-centered, we cannot discount or minimize the level of permanence the child has with his foster parents.”).

2024See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595 , 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (“As the best-interest inquiry is child-centered, we cannot discount or minimize the level of permanence the child has with his foster parents.”).