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5 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1999–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hammons v. Stategreen1 sentence2020See, e.g., Hammons, 493 N.E.2d at 1255–56 (conducting an independent appellate sentence review—under the old manifestly unreasonable standard 4—after first reviewing the sentence’s lawfulness under an abuse of discretion standard). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Without addressing Kien v. State, this court applied the manifestly unreasonable standard set forth in the previous App. R. 17(B), holding that “Harlan’s sentence must be judged by the standards 4 that were in effect when he committed his crimes.” Harlan v. State, 971 N.E.2d at 171 n.3 (citing Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 700, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.). | 1 | 1 |
Neale v. Stategreen1 sentence2005Now, however, we "may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) at 185 (West 2005) (emphasis added); see also Neale v. State, 826 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ind., 2005) (discussing the difference between the old and new standard for revising sentences). | 1 | 1 |
Hackett v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See generally Hackett v. State, 716 N.E.2d 1273 , 1276 n. 1 (Ind.1999) (explaining the differences between errors in a sentencing statement and a claim of manifest unreasonableness). 4 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kien v. State
green
1 sentence2012In support of his argument that the inappropriateness test should apply, Clark directs our attention to Kien v. State, 782 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied, a case decided very shortly after the adoption of App. R. 7(B). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Bobby A. Harlan v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2012Without addressing Kien v. State, this court applied the manifestly unreasonable standard set forth in the previous App. R. 17(B), holding that “Harlan’s sentence must be judged by the standards 4 that were in effect when he committed his crimes.” Harlan v. State, 971 N.E.2d at 171 n.3 (citing Collins v. State, 911 N.E.2d 700, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Poling v. State
green
2 sentences1999However, the State argued that “[t]he nature and circumstances of Carter’s crime are very similar to those of the defendant’s in Poling v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.1987).” In Poling , the trial court found several aggravating circumstances including the “risk that Poling would commit another crime, Poling’s flight following his crime, his conduct prior to arrest, demonstrating a course of conduct indicative of continuing criminal intent, and the heinousness of this crime.” Id. at 1081 . 1999However, the State argued that “[t]he nature and circumstances of Carter’s crime are very similar to those of the defendant’s in Poling v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.1987).” In Poling , the trial court found several aggravating circumstances including the “risk that Poling would commit another crime, Poling’s flight following his crime, his conduct prior to arrest, demonstrating a course of conduct indicative of continuing criminal intent, and the heinousness of this crime.” Id. at 1081 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.