manifestly unreasonable test in Massachusetts

2026"The manifestly unreasonable test . . . is essentially a search for rationality in counsel's strategic decisions." Kolenovic, supra at 674 .

2025See id. at 674-675 ("The manifestly unreasonable test . . . is essentially a search for rationality in counsel's strategic decisions, taking into account all the circumstances known or that should have been known to counsel in the exercise of his duty to provide effective representation to the client and not whether counsel could have made alternative choices").

2015Id. at 227-228 .

2015See Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 473 (2014) ("a decision not to pursue an insanity defense for tactical reasons, for instance because in the circumstances the defense would be factually weak, is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 228 (affirming denial of motion for new trial in part based on fact that defense counsel's trial strategy of pursuing one defense, as opposed to multiple defenses, was not manifestly unreasonable, "especially where the mental health defense would have 'severely weakened' the defense of self-defense").

2023See Commonwealth v. Montrond, 477 Mass. 127, 135 (2017).

2018See Commonwealth v. Johnson , 435 Mass. 113 , 133-134 (2001), quoting from Commonwealth v. Haley , 413 Mass. 770 , 777-778 (1992) ("Trial tactics which may appear questionable from the vantage point of hindsight do not amount to ineffective assistance unless 'manifestly unreasonable' when undertaken"). a.

2018See Commonwealth v. Johnson , 435 Mass. 113 , 133-134 (2001), quoting from Commonwealth v. Haley , 413 Mass. 770 , 777-778 (1992) ("Trial tactics which may appear questionable from the vantage point of hindsight do not amount to ineffective assistance unless 'manifestly unreasonable' when undertaken"). a.

2015In Commonwealth v. Federici, 427 Mass. 740, 743-744 (1998), the defendant, at trial, personally opposed the judge’s proposal to instruct the jury on lack of criminal responsibility, then argued on appeal that the judge erred in failing to give that instruction despite the defendant’s objection.

2015See Commonwealth v. Spray, 467 Mass. 456, 473 (2014) ("a decision not to pursue an insanity defense for tactical reasons, for instance because in the circumstances the defense would be factually weak, is not tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel"); Commonwealth v. Walker, 443 Mass. at 228 (affirming denial of motion for new trial in part based on fact that defense counsel's trial strategy of pursuing one defense, as opposed to multiple defenses, was not manifestly unreasonable, "especially where the mental health defense would have 'severely weakened' the defense of self-defense").

2015Notwithstanding the more limited deference to counsel when the defendant stands convicted of murder in the first degree, we may still rely on the manifestly unreasonable test in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), to evaluate the claimed inadequacy in counsel’s performance.

2015L. c. 278, § 33E, “we may still rely on the manifestly unreasonable test in Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974), to evaluate the claimed inadequacy in counsel’s performance.” Ante at note 17.