burden of disproving defense in New York

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2019Where the jury is presented with a justification charge, the People bear the burden of disproving that defense ( see People v Steele , 26 NY2d 526, 528 [1970]; People v Walrad , 22 AD3d 883, 883 [2005]).

2011“Justification is a defense—as opposed to an affirmative defense—and the [P]eople have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526, 528 [1970] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]).

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Penal Law § 155.15 (1) provides that, “[i]n any prosecution for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement, it is an affirmative defense that the property was appropriated under a claim of right made in good faith.” As noted in People v Green ( 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]), however, the Court of Appeals in People v Chesler ( 50 NY2d 203, 209-210 [1980]) “held that section 155.15 was unconstitutional insofar as it made a good-faith claim of right an affirmative defense because to do so impermissibly shifted the burden onto the defendant to disprove the element of intent.” Rather, “a goo

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2015Here, however, the court instructed the jury that “defendant has the burden of proving that she took, withheld or obtained the property under a claim of right made in good faith by a preponderance of the evidence.” We conclude that the court committed a mode of proceedings error when it shifted the burden onto defendant to disprove the element of intent (see Green, 5 NY3d at 542 ), thereby requiring reversal of the judgment and a new trial even in the absence of preservation (see generally People v Becoats, 17 NY3d 643, 651 [2011], cert denied 566 US —, 132 S Ct 1970 [2012]; People v Patterson

2014Contrary to defendant’s further contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes of grand larceny in the second and third degrees as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 ).

2014Contrary to defendant’s further contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes of grand larceny in the second and third degrees as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 ).

2015A good faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, and the People have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Zona, 14 NY3d 488, 492-493 [2010]; People v Green, 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]). *1076 In analyzing the legal sufficiency of a conviction, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the People and “determine whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burde

2014Contrary to defendant’s further contention, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crimes of grand larceny in the second and third degrees as charged to the jury (see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence (see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495 ).

2020The defense of "[a] good faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, and the People have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Michaels , 132 AD3d 1073, 1075 [2015]).

2019Where the jury is presented with a justification charge, the People bear the burden of disproving that defense ( see People v Steele , 26 NY2d 526, 528 [1970]; People v Walrad , 22 AD3d 883, 883 [2005]).

2015A good faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, and the People have the burden of disproving such defense beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Zona, 14 NY3d 488, 492-493 [2010]; People v Green, 5 NY3d 538, 542 [2005]). *1076 In analyzing the legal sufficiency of a conviction, we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the People and “determine whether there is any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the jury on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burde

2011While deadly physical force cannot be used if the defendant could have safely retreated, retreat is not required prior to the use of ordinary physical force in self-defense (see Matter of Y.K., 87 NY2d 430 , 433 [1996]; People v Bradley, 297 AD2d 640, 641-642 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 556 [2002]; People v Young, 240 AD2d 974, 976 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 1015 [1997]; compare Penal Law § 35.15 [1], with Penal Law § 35.15 [2] [a]).

2011While deadly physical force cannot be used if the defendant could have safely retreated, retreat is not required prior to the use of ordinary physical force in self-defense (see Matter of Y.K., 87 NY2d 430 , 433 [1996]; People v Bradley, 297 AD2d 640, 641-642 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 556 [2002]; People v Young, 240 AD2d 974, 976 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 1015 [1997]; compare Penal Law § 35.15 [1], with Penal Law § 35.15 [2] [a]).

2010In determining whether to instruct a jury on a claimed defense, the court must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant (see People u Butts, 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]; People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526, 529 [1970]; see also Mathews v United States, 485 US 58, 63 [1988] [“a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor”]).

2010In determining whether to instruct a jury on a claimed defense, the court must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant (see People u Butts, 72 NY2d 746, 750 [1988]; People v Steele, 26 NY2d 526, 529 [1970]; see also Mathews v United States, 485 US 58, 63 [1988] [“a defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor”]).

2007While the court’s charge regarding the subjective element of the justification defense could be interpreted, in isolation, as placing the burden of proof on defendant, we find that the charge taken as a whole, which repeatedly instructed the jury that the People bore the burden of disproving the defense of justification, conveyed the correct standard (see People v Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]; People v Coleman, 70 NY2d 817 [1987]).