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12 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Livelygreen2 sentences2013The sole exception is when a defense ‘negates’ an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (“If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 2013The sole exception is when a defense 'negates' an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) ("If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."). 9 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gor | 2 | 4 |
State v. Livelygreen2 sentences2013The sole exception is when a defense ‘negates’ an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (“If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 2013The sole exception is when a defense 'negates' an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) ("If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."). 9 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gor | 2 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. United States
green
2 sentences2021We did so in part because the United States Supreme Court had recently “clarified that the prosecution must always bear the burden of disproving a defense that necessarily negates an element of the charged offense.” Id. at 764 (citing Smith 9 State v. Knapp, No. 98067-5 v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 , 133 S. Ct. 714 , 184 L. 2021We did so in part because the United States Supreme Court had recently “clarified that the prosecution must always bear the burden of disproving a defense that necessarily negates an element of the charged offense.” Id. at 764 (citing Smith 9 State v. Knapp, No. 98067-5 v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 , 133 S. Ct. 714 , 184 L. | 3 | 2014–2021 |
State v. McCullum
green
2 sentences2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her 2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 3 | 2013–2020 |
State v. Deer
green
2 sentences2019Deer, 175 Wn.2d at 734 (citing State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 10-11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996)). 8 No. 50390-5-II Bail jumping requires the State to prove that the defendant knew that she was required to appear. 2013Where instead it "excus[es] conduct that would otherwise be punishable," but "does not controvert any of the elements of the offense itself," the Government has no constitutional duty to 7 See supra note 5, listing the jurisdictions that interpret Patterson and/or Martin to hold that prosecution has a constitutional duty to disprove any affirmative defense that negates an element of the crime charged. 8 See, e.g., State v. Deer, 175 Wn.2d 725 , 734 & n.5, 287 P.3d 539 (2012) ("It is generally recognized that the defendant bears the burden of proving an affinnative defense by a preponderance of | 2 | 2013–2019 |
Lewis v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences2013The sole exception is when a defense ‘negates’ an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (“If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 2013The sole exception is when a defense 'negates' an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) ("If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."). 9 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gor | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Patterson v. New York
green
2 sentences2013An affirmative answer to either question meant that the State bore the burden of disproving the defense: “There are two ways to determine if the absence of a defense is an ingredient of the offense: (1) the statute may reflect a legislative intent to treat absence of a defense as one ‘of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged,’ or (2) one or more elements of the defense may ‘negate’ one or more elements of the offense which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 490 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. 2013An affirmative answer to either question meant that the State bore the burden of disproving the defense: “There are two ways to determine if the absence of a defense is an ingredient of the offense: (1) the statute may reflect a legislative intent to treat absence of a defense as one ‘of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged,’ or (2) one or more elements of the defense may ‘negate’ one or more elements of the offense which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 490 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. | 2 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Riker
green
2 sentences1997"The State, in carrying the burden of proving each element of an offense, does not bear the burden of disproving a claim of duress.” State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 366 n.6, 869 P.2d 43 (1994). 1997"The State, in carrying the burden of proving each element of an offense, does not bear the burden of disproving a claim of duress.” State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 366 n.6, 869 P.2d 43 (1994). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Acosta
green
2 sentences2022Our Supreme Court has recognized that when the State bears the burden of disproving a defense, a specific instruction to this effect is preferable, “but failure to provide one is not reversible per se so long as the instructions, taken as a whole, make it clear that the State has the burden.” State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 621 , 683 P.2d 1069 (1984) (reversing conviction because “to convict” instruction did not tell jury that force used must be unlawful or without justification when self-defense raised). 2022Our Supreme Court has recognized that when the State bears the burden of disproving a defense, a specific instruction to this effect is preferable, “but failure to provide one is not reversible per se so long as the instructions, taken as a whole, make it clear that the State has the burden.” State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 621 , 683 P.2d 1069 (1984) (reversing conviction because “to convict” instruction did not tell jury that force used must be unlawful or without justification when self-defense raised). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Imokawa
neutral
1 sentence2022In State v. Imokawa, 194 Wn.2d 391 , 397, 450 P.3d 159 (2019), the -8- No. 81930-5-I/9 Supreme Court stated that, in general, a jury instruction explicitly providing that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory elements of the crime is sufficient when the defense at issue negates an element listed in the to- convict instruction. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Werner
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Riley
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Clausing
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Werner
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Willis
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Riley
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Clausing
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Willis
green
1 sentence2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Grott
green
2 sentences2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her 2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Dixon v. United States
green
2 sentences2013Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 , 126 S. Ct. 2437 , 165 L. 2013Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 , 126 S. Ct. 2437 , 165 L. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Camara
red
1 sentence2013An affirmative answer to either question meant that the State bore the burden of disproving the defense: "There are two ways to determine if the absence of a defense is an ingredient of the offense: (1) the statute may reflect a legislative intent to treat absence of a defense as one 'of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged'; or (2) one or more elements of the defense may 'negate' one or more elements of the offense which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Camara, 113 Wn.2d at 63 8 (quoting McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 490 (quoti | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Atkinson
green
1 sentence1978Ziegler next urges, however, that she has been denied constitutional due process under the rationale of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra. We do not agree because, as we recently said in State v. Atkinson, 19 Wn. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.