burden of disproving defense (Washington) · Go Syfert
← Washington issues

burden of disproving defense in Washington

12 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2022 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (2)

CaseFollowedCited
State v. Livelygreen
wash · 1996 · cited in 4 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2019
2 sentences

2013The sole exception is when a defense ‘negates’ an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (“If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

2013The sole exception is when a defense 'negates' an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) ("If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."). 9 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gor

24
State v. Livelygreen
wash · 1996 · cited in 4 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2012–2019
2 sentences

2013The sole exception is when a defense ‘negates’ an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (“If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

2013The sole exception is when a defense 'negates' an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) ("If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."). 9 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gor

24

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (20)

CaseCitedYears
Smith v. United States green
scotus · 2013
2 sentences

2021We did so in part because the United States Supreme Court had recently “clarified that the prosecution must always bear the burden of disproving a defense that necessarily negates an element of the charged offense.” Id. at 764 (citing Smith 9 State v. Knapp, No. 98067-5 v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 , 133 S. Ct. 714 , 184 L.

2021We did so in part because the United States Supreme Court had recently “clarified that the prosecution must always bear the burden of disproving a defense that necessarily negates an element of the charged offense.” Id. at 764 (citing Smith 9 State v. Knapp, No. 98067-5 v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 , 133 S. Ct. 714 , 184 L.

32014–2021
State v. McCullum green
wash · 1983
2 sentences

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

32013–2020
State v. Deer green
wash · 2012
2 sentences

2019Deer, 175 Wn.2d at 734 (citing State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 10-11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996)). 8 No. 50390-5-II Bail jumping requires the State to prove that the defendant knew that she was required to appear.

2013Where instead it "excus[es] conduct that would otherwise be punishable," but "does not controvert any of the elements of the offense itself," the Government has no constitutional duty to 7 See supra note 5, listing the jurisdictions that interpret Patterson and/or Martin to hold that prosecution has a constitutional duty to disprove any affirmative defense that negates an element of the crime charged. 8 See, e.g., State v. Deer, 175 Wn.2d 725 , 734 & n.5, 287 P.3d 539 (2012) ("It is generally recognized that the defendant bears the burden of proving an affinnative defense by a preponderance of

22013–2019
Lewis v. District of Columbia green
scotus · 2013
2 sentences

2013The sole exception is when a defense ‘negates’ an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense.” (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (“If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

2013The sole exception is when a defense 'negates' an element of the charged offense, in which case due process requires the State to bear the burden of disproving the defense." (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 991 (2013); State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 11 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) ("If a statute indicates an intent to include absence of a defense as an element of the offense, or the defense negates one or more elements of the offense, the State has a constitutional burden to prove the absence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt."). 9 State v. Lynch (Jeffrey Thomas), No. 87882-0 (Gor

22013–2013
Patterson v. New York green
scotus · 1977
2 sentences

2013An affirmative answer to either question meant that the State bore the burden of disproving the defense: “There are two ways to determine if the absence of a defense is an ingredient of the offense: (1) the statute may reflect a legislative intent to treat absence of a defense as one ‘of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged,’ or (2) one or more elements of the defense may ‘negate’ one or more elements of the offense which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 490 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S.

2013An affirmative answer to either question meant that the State bore the burden of disproving the defense: “There are two ways to determine if the absence of a defense is an ingredient of the offense: (1) the statute may reflect a legislative intent to treat absence of a defense as one ‘of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged,’ or (2) one or more elements of the defense may ‘negate’ one or more elements of the offense which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 490 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S.

22013–2013
State v. Riker green
wash · 1994
2 sentences

1997"The State, in carrying the burden of proving each element of an offense, does not bear the burden of disproving a claim of duress.” State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 366 n.6, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).

1997"The State, in carrying the burden of proving each element of an offense, does not bear the burden of disproving a claim of duress.” State v. Riker, 123 Wn.2d 351, 366 n.6, 869 P.2d 43 (1994).

21997–1997
State v. Acosta green
wash · 1984
2 sentences

2022Our Supreme Court has recognized that when the State bears the burden of disproving a defense, a specific instruction to this effect is preferable, “but failure to provide one is not reversible per se so long as the instructions, taken as a whole, make it clear that the State has the burden.” State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 621 , 683 P.2d 1069 (1984) (reversing conviction because “to convict” instruction did not tell jury that force used must be unlawful or without justification when self-defense raised).

2022Our Supreme Court has recognized that when the State bears the burden of disproving a defense, a specific instruction to this effect is preferable, “but failure to provide one is not reversible per se so long as the instructions, taken as a whole, make it clear that the State has the burden.” State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 621 , 683 P.2d 1069 (1984) (reversing conviction because “to convict” instruction did not tell jury that force used must be unlawful or without justification when self-defense raised).

12022–2022
State v. Imokawa neutral
wash · 2019
1 sentence

2022In State v. Imokawa, 194 Wn.2d 391 , 397, 450 P.3d 159 (2019), the -8- No. 81930-5-I/9 Supreme Court stated that, in general, a jury instruction explicitly providing that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory elements of the crime is sufficient when the defense at issue negates an element listed in the to- convict instruction.

12022–2022
State v. Werner green
wash · 2010
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Riley green
wash · 1999
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Clausing green
wash · 2002
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Werner green
wash · 2010
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Willis green
wash · 2005
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Riley green
wash · 1999
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Clausing green
wash · 2002
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Willis green
wash · 2005
1 sentence

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
State v. Grott green
wash · 2020
2 sentences

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

2020We review jury instructions de novo.13 Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theory of the case, do not mislead the jury, and correctly inform the jury of the applicable law, including the State’s burden of proof.14 A defendant may claim he or she acted in self-defense where the defendant has a subjective, reasonable belief of imminent harm from the victim.15 The amount of force used must be “not more than is necessary.”16 A defendant is entitled to a self-defense instruction when he or she meets the “‘initial burden of producing some evidence that his or her

12020–2020
Dixon v. United States green
scotus · 2006
2 sentences

2013Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 , 126 S. Ct. 2437 , 165 L.

2013Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1, 6 , 126 S. Ct. 2437 , 165 L.

12013–2013
State v. Camara red
wash · 1989
1 sentence

2013An affirmative answer to either question meant that the State bore the burden of disproving the defense: "There are two ways to determine if the absence of a defense is an ingredient of the offense: (1) the statute may reflect a legislative intent to treat absence of a defense as one 'of the elements included in the definition of the offense of which the defendant is charged'; or (2) one or more elements of the defense may 'negate' one or more elements of the offense which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Camara, 113 Wn.2d at 63 8 (quoting McCullum, 98 Wn.2d at 490 (quoti

12013–2013
State v. Atkinson green
washctapp · 1978
1 sentence

1978Ziegler next urges, however, that she has been denied constitutional due process under the rationale of Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra. We do not agree because, as we recently said in State v. Atkinson, 19 Wn.

11978–1978

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.040 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.050 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.060 (5) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.010 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.030 (4) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.100 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

GA 55 (1991–2026) NY 42 (1908–2020) PA 29 (1987–2026) CT 26 (1982–2021) OR 21 (1973–2026) IN 19 (1983–2017) TX 14 (1982–2017) MI 12 (1958–2020) IL 12 (1977–2022) WA 12 (1978–2022) ND 12 (1971–1994) HI 9 (1995–2020) NJ 8 (1977–2021) MA 7 (1978–2025) AL 7 (2013–2023) MN 4 (1978–2002) FL 3 (1992–2012) IA 3 (1910–2021) KS 2 (2018–2019) LA 2 (1984–1999) WY 2 (2011–2024) MD 2 (2019–2019) CA 2 (2006–2025) ME 2 (2020–2020)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

← Caselaw search · G Cite Topics · Brief Check