identity exception in New York

2017The identity exception applies where the defendant employs a unique, unusual, or distinct modus operandi in committing the uncharged crime ( see People v Mateo , 93 NY2d 327, 332 [1999]; People v Wright , 121 AD3d 924 , 926 [2014]).

2014The identity exception to the Molineux rule “is used in limited circumstances, when the defendant employs some unique, unusual, or distinctive modus operandi in an uncharged crime that is relevant to proving his identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged” (People v Mateo, 93 NY2d 327, 332 [1999]).

2013While the defendant accurately observes that there are some factual differences between the attack on M.S. and the charged crime in the instant case, the identity exception to the Molineux rule does not require that the crimes be committed in an identical manner, and we are satisfied that the common features in both incidents, when considered in their totality (see People v Beam, 57 NY2d at 253 ), adequately established a “distinctive repetitive pattern” (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d at 48; see People v Arafet, 13 NY3d at 466 ), making the evidence of the crime against M.S. highly probative of t

2013Of course, the identity exception to the Molineux rule “is used in limited circumstances, when the defendant employs some unique, unusual, or distinctive modus operandi in an uncharged crime that is relevant to proving his identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged” (People v Mateo, 93 NY2d 327, 332 [1999]). “[E]vidence of a similar crime may be admissible to identify the defendant where ‘the similarities [are] unusual enough to compel the inference that the defendant committed both’ ” (People v Agina, 18 NY3d at 603, quoting People v Beam, 57 NY2d 241, 251 [1982]).

2013On February 16, 2010, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and order of this Court, concluding that this Court erred in holding the defendant’s identity to be “conclusively established” for Molineux purposes, and remitted the matter to this Court to determine whether the identity exception is applicable to these facts, and to resolve any other open issues (People v Agina, 18 NY3d 600, 605 [2012]).

2013On February 16, 2010, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and order of this Court, concluding that this Court erred in holding the defendant’s identity to be “conclusively established” for Molineux purposes, and remitted the matter to this Court to determine whether the identity exception is applicable to these facts, and to resolve any other open issues (People v Agina, 18 NY3d 600, 605 [2012]).

2015The evidence was not admissible under the identity exception to the Molineux rule (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264 [1901]), which generally excludes such evidence.

2013Nevertheless, this Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial on the ground that the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial as a result of the Supreme Court’s improper admission of evidence of a prior crime pursuant to the identity exception to the Molineux rule (see People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 [1901]), concluding that identity was not an issue in the case (see People v Agina, 74 AD3d at 833-834 ).

2013While the defendant accurately observes that there are some factual differences between the attack on M.S. and the charged crime in the instant case, the identity exception to the Molineux rule does not require that the crimes be committed in an identical manner, and we are satisfied that the common features in both incidents, when considered in their totality (see People v Beam, 57 NY2d at 253 ), adequately established a “distinctive repetitive pattern” (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d at 48; see People v Arafet, 13 NY3d at 466 ), making the evidence of the crime against M.S. highly probative of t

2013While the defendant accurately observes that there are some factual differences between the attack on M.S. and the charged crime in the instant case, the identity exception to the Molineux rule does not require that the crimes be committed in an identical manner, and we are satisfied that the common features in both incidents, when considered in their totality (see People v Beam, 57 NY2d at 253 ), adequately established a “distinctive repetitive pattern” (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d at 48; see People v Arafet, 13 NY3d at 466 ), making the evidence of the crime against M.S. highly probative of t

2016Accordingly, the court’s conclusion that this evidence was admissible because it fell within the identity exception of Molineux and that its proba *1189 tive value outweighed its prejudicial effect was not an abuse of discretion (see People v Arafet, 54 AD3d 517, 521 [2008], affd 13 NY3d 460 [2009]; People v Brown, 13 AD3d 145, 146 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 828 [2005]).

2013While the defendant accurately observes that there are some factual differences between the attack on M.S. and the charged crime in the instant case, the identity exception to the Molineux rule does not require that the crimes be committed in an identical manner, and we are satisfied that the common features in both incidents, when considered in their totality (see People v Beam, 57 NY2d at 253 ), adequately established a “distinctive repetitive pattern” (People v Allweiss, 48 NY2d at 48; see People v Arafet, 13 NY3d at 466 ), making the evidence of the crime against M.S. highly probative of t

2013People v Brown, 266 AD2d 863, 863 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 860 [1999] [silver .380 caliber handgun]; People v Sheriff, 234 AD2d 894, 895 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 910 [1997] [chrome-plated handgun]) or possession on multiple occasions, or so close in time to the charged crime as to give rise to an inference that the same weapon was used (see e.g.

2013People v Brown, 266 AD2d 863, 863 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 860 [1999] [silver .380 caliber handgun]; People v Sheriff, 234 AD2d 894, 895 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 910 [1997] [chrome-plated handgun]) or possession on multiple occasions, or so close in time to the charged crime as to give rise to an inference that the same weapon was used (see e.g.

2013People v Brown, 266 AD2d 863, 863 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 860 [1999] [silver .380 caliber handgun]; People v Sheriff, 234 AD2d 894, 895 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 910 [1997] [chrome-plated handgun]) or possession on multiple occasions, or so close in time to the charged crime as to give rise to an inference that the same weapon was used (see e.g.

2013People v Brown, 266 AD2d 863, 863 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 860 [1999] [silver .380 caliber handgun]; People v Sheriff, 234 AD2d 894, 895 [1996], lv denied 90 NY2d 910 [1997] [chrome-plated handgun]) or possession on multiple occasions, or so close in time to the charged crime as to give rise to an inference that the same weapon was used (see e.g.

2000Normally the courts will permit the application of the identity exception in those cases in which the defendant’s identity is not conclusively established (see, People v Beam, 57 NY2d 241, 251 ; People v Condon, 26 NY2d 139, 142 ).

1999This Court has articulated the identity exception standard as “unique,” “unusual” (People v Condon, supra) and “distinctive” (People v Beam, supra).

2026Thus, although the witness's identity was not disclosed to defendant at the suppression hearing, his identity was " 'turned over early enough' to permit defendant to prepare for effective cross-examination of the witness[ ] at trial" ( People v Eaves , 152 AD3d 1226, 1227 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 949 [2017]), and we conclude, based on the relevant statutory factors, i.e., "witness safety, risk of witness intimidation, and risk of an adverse effect upon the legitimate needs of law enforcement" ( People v Griggs , 180 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2020]; see CPL 245.70 [4]), that the court ap

2026Thus, although the witness's identity was not disclosed to defendant at the suppression hearing, his identity was " 'turned over early enough' to permit defendant to prepare for effective cross-examination of the witness[ ] at trial" (<i>People v Eaves</i>, 152 AD3d 1226, 1227 [4th Dept 2017], <i>lv denied</i> 30 NY3d 949 [2017]), and we conclude, based on the relevant statutory factors, i.e., "witness safety, risk of witness intimidation, and risk of an adverse effect upon the legitimate needs of law enforcement" (<i>People v Griggs</i>, 180 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2020]; <i>see</i> CPL 245.70

2026"It is fundamental that a judgment in a prior action is binding not only on the parties to that action, but on those in privity with them" ( Green v Santa Fe Indus., Inc. , 70 NY2d 244, 253 [1st Dept 1987]; see also Fabiano v Philip Morris Inc. , 54 AD3d 146, 151 [1st Dept 2008]).

2026"It is fundamental that a judgment in a prior action is binding not only on the parties to that action, but on those in privity with them" ( Green v Santa Fe Indus., Inc. , 70 NY2d 244, 253 [1st Dept 1987]; see also Fabiano v Philip Morris Inc. , 54 AD3d 146, 151 [1st Dept 2008]).

2026To balance defendant's interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for the witness's safety and risk of intimidation, the court appropriately permitted disclosure of the witness's identity to defense counsel but not to defendant until one month before trial ( see People v Morales-Aguilar , 186 AD3d 786, 787-788 [2d Dept 2020]; People v [*2] Artis , 179 AD3d 1440, 1442-1443 [3d Dept 2020]).

2026The witness, who was in a vehicle with defendant and his codefendants before the shooting and told the police that he had observed defendant take part in the shooting, faced significant risk of harm or intimidation should his identity be revealed to defendant and his codefendants.</p> <p>To balance defendant's interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for the witness's safety and risk of intimidation, the court appropriately permitted disclosure of the witness's identity to defense counsel but not to defendant until one month before trial (<i>see People v Morales-

2026These similarities are relevant to the res judicata inquiry, but the court must also consider whether the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party to the previous action, or in privity with a party who was, and whether the claim was brought to a final conclusion in the prior matter ( Applied Card Sys. , 11 NY3d at 122; Rojas v Romanoff , 185 AD3d at 108 ["As the Court of Appeals has stressed, this identity requirement is a linchpin of res judicata, which applies only when a claim between the parties has been previously brought to a final conclusion"] [internal quotation marks omi

2026These similarities are relevant to the res judicata inquiry, but the court must also consider whether the party against whom the doctrine is invoked was a party to the previous action, or in privity with a party who was, and whether the claim was brought to a final conclusion in the prior matter ( Applied Card Sys. , 11 NY3d at 122 ; Rojas v Romanoff , 185 AD3d at 108 ["As the Court of Appeals has stressed, this identity requirement is a linchpin of res judicata, which applies only when a claim between the parties has been previously brought to a final conclusion"] [internal quotation marks om

2026"It is fundamental that a judgment in a prior action is binding not only on the parties to that action, but on those in privity with them" ( Green v Santa Fe Indus., Inc. , 70 NY2d 244, 253 [1st Dept 1987]; see also Fabiano v Philip Morris Inc. , 54 AD3d 146, 151 [1st Dept 2008]).

2026"It is fundamental that a judgment in a prior action is binding not only on the parties to that action, but on those in privity with them" ( Green v Santa Fe Indus., Inc. , 70 NY2d 244, 253 [1st Dept 1987]; see also Fabiano v Philip Morris Inc. , 54 AD3d 146, 151 [1st Dept 2008]).

2026To balance defendant's interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for the witness's safety and risk of intimidation, the court appropriately permitted disclosure of the witness's identity to defense counsel but not to defendant until one month before trial ( see People v Morales-Aguilar , 186 AD3d 786, 787-788 [2d Dept 2020]; People v [*2] Artis , 179 AD3d 1440, 1442-1443 [3d Dept 2020]).

2026The witness, who was in a vehicle with defendant and his codefendants before the shooting and told the police that he had observed defendant take part in the shooting, faced significant risk of harm or intimidation should his identity be revealed to defendant and his codefendants.</p> <p>To balance defendant's interest in obtaining information for defense purposes against concerns for the witness's safety and risk of intimidation, the court appropriately permitted disclosure of the witness's identity to defense counsel but not to defendant until one month before trial (<i>see People v Morales-

2026Thus, although the witness's identity was not disclosed to defendant at the suppression hearing, his identity was " 'turned over early enough' to permit defendant to prepare for effective cross-examination of the witness[ ] at trial" ( People v Eaves , 152 AD3d 1226, 1227 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 30 NY3d 949 [2017]), and we conclude, based on the relevant statutory factors, i.e., "witness safety, risk of witness intimidation, and risk of an adverse effect upon the legitimate needs of law enforcement" ( People v Griggs , 180 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2020]; see CPL 245.70 [4]), that the court ap

2026Thus, although the witness's identity was not disclosed to defendant at the suppression hearing, his identity was " 'turned over early enough' to permit defendant to prepare for effective cross-examination of the witness[ ] at trial" (<i>People v Eaves</i>, 152 AD3d 1226, 1227 [4th Dept 2017], <i>lv denied</i> 30 NY3d 949 [2017]), and we conclude, based on the relevant statutory factors, i.e., "witness safety, risk of witness intimidation, and risk of an adverse effect upon the legitimate needs of law enforcement" (<i>People v Griggs</i>, 180 AD3d 853, 855 [2d Dept 2020]; <i>see</i> CPL 245.70

2024The identity requirement is a "linchpin of res judicata," which applies "only when a claim between the parties has been previously 'brought to a final conclusion'" ( Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co. , 93 NY2d 343, 347 [1999]).

2024The identity requirement is a "linchpin of res judicata," which applies "only when a claim between the parties has been previously 'brought to a final conclusion'" ( Parker v Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co. , 93 NY2d 343, 347 [1999]).

2016Accordingly, the court’s conclusion that this evidence was admissible because it fell within the identity exception of Molineux and that its proba *1189 tive value outweighed its prejudicial effect was not an abuse of discretion (see People v Arafet, 54 AD3d 517, 521 [2008], affd 13 NY3d 460 [2009]; People v Brown, 13 AD3d 145, 146 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 828 [2005]).

2016Co., 75 NY2d 825, 826 [1990].) “Generally, for ‘a question to have been actually litigated’ so as to satisfy the identity requirement, it ‘must have been properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise placed in issue and actually determined in the prior proceeding.’ ” (D’Arata v New York Cent.

2016Accordingly, the court’s conclusion that this evidence was admissible because it fell within the identity exception of Molineux and that its proba *1189 tive value outweighed its prejudicial effect was not an abuse of discretion (see People v Arafet, 54 AD3d 517, 521 [2008], affd 13 NY3d 460 [2009]; People v Brown, 13 AD3d 145, 146 [2004], lv denied 4 NY3d 828 [2005]).

2015Additionally, the Supreme Court’s limiting instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the erroneous admission of this evidence (see People v Barbato, 82 AD3d 1112, 1113 [2011]; People v Wilkinson, 71 AD3d 249, 257 [2010]).

2015Additionally, the Supreme Court’s limiting instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudice caused by the erroneous admission of this evidence (see People v Barbato, 82 AD3d 1112, 1113 [2011]; People v Wilkinson, 71 AD3d 249, 257 [2010]).