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25 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned up). [42] Here, the State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies was relevant under Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception. 9 As we have summarized: Evidence of other crimes admitted under the identity exception [is] generally evaluated based upon whether such crimes are “‘signature’ crimes with a common modus operandi.” Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997). 2019Here, the trial court admitted Hughes’s prior convictions as proof of identity and plan. [18] The identity exception was carved out primarily for crimes “so nearly identical that the modus operandi is virtually a ‘signature.’” Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 1999) (citing Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997)). | 14 | 14 |
Lockhart v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The rationale behind this exception “is that the crimes, or means used to commit them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them.” Id. (citing Lockhart v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. 1993)). 2019In considering whether identity evidence constitutes a signature crime, the focus is on whether “the crimes, or means used to commit them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them.” Thompson, 690 N.E.2d at 234 (citing Lockhart v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. 1993)). “[T]he repeated commission of similar crimes is not enough to qualify for the exception to the general rule. | 4 | 4 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Here, the trial court admitted Hughes’s prior convictions as proof of identity and plan. [18] The identity exception was carved out primarily for crimes “so nearly identical that the modus operandi is virtually a ‘signature.’” Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 1999) (citing Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997)). 2015See Allen, 720 N.E.2d at 712 (concluding that even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of another crime under the identity exception in Evidence Rule 404(b), the error was harmless in light of the DNA evidence linking Allen to the crime he was on trial for). | 2 | 4 |
Jeffrey Fairbanks v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2025Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned up). [42] Here, the State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies was relevant under Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception. 9 As we have summarized: Evidence of other crimes admitted under the identity exception [is] generally evaluated based upon whether such crimes are “‘signature’ crimes with a common modus operandi.” Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Harold Bishop v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2016Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Browning v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Browning v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (in a case for the attempted rape of Anderson University student A.B., this Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting other bad acts of the defendant— mostly masturbation and exposing himself — involving other Anderson University students because “[although there are certainly striking similarities among the ‘other’ incidents in question, the same cannot be said when comparing those incidents with the attack upon A.B. | 1 | 1 |
Hicks v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997) (“The identity 6 exception to the general prohibition on propensity evidence is crafted primarily for ‘signature’ crimes with a common modus operandi.”); Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ind. 1992) (noting that the “common scheme or plan exception” “permits proof of identity by showing the defendant committed other crimes with identical modus operandi.”). | 1 | 1 |
Wickizer v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Intent In Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ind.1993), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the intent exception in Evidence Rule 404(b) will be available when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged culpability and affirmatively presents a claim of particular contrary intent. | 1 | 1 |
Purvis v. Stategreen1 sentence2011See Purvis v. State, 829 N.E.2d 572, 587 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that evidence was admissible pursuant to the identity exception of Evidence Rule 404(b) and presuming that the court, as trier of fact, could limit this evidence to its permissible purpose), trans. denied, cert, denied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maldonado v. State
green
2 sentences1998These authorities, e.g. , Maldonado v. State , 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 (1976), however, stand for nothing more than what we have already concluded was permissible -- a showing, with reasonable factual context, of access to the murder weapon. 1998These authorities, e.g. , Maldonado v. State , 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 (1976), however, stand for nothing more than what we have already concluded was permissible -- a showing, with reasonable factual context, of access to the murder weapon. | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Cobbs v. State
neutral
2 sentences1986Evidence of the uncharged crime is also admissible under the identity exception when identity is an issue and the uncharged crime is "connected with the crime charged in such a way that proof of them naturally tends to identify the defendant as the one who committed the charged crime." Cobbs v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 60 , 338 N.E.2d 632, 634 . 1986Evidence of the uncharged crime is also admissible under the identity exception when identity is an issue and the uncharged crime is "connected with the crime charged in such a way that proof of them naturally tends to identify the defendant as the one who committed the charged crime." Cobbs v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 60 , 338 N.E.2d 632, 634 . | 2 | 1976–1986 |
Manuel v. State
green
1 sentence2019R. 404(b). [21] The Court further concluded that because such evidence was substantially probative as to the identity of the decedent’s attacker, such outweighed the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1007 | May 14, 2019 Page 11 of 20 danger of unfair prejudice. 5 Cf. Manuel v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that child victim’s testimony about prior uncharged molestations her father committed against her was not admissible to prove identity where victim’s testimony was extremely vague and only purpose was to establish defendant’s propensity to commit | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Berry v. State
green
1 sentence2019R. 404(b). [21] The Court further concluded that because such evidence was substantially probative as to the identity of the decedent’s attacker, such outweighed the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1007 | May 14, 2019 Page 11 of 20 danger of unfair prejudice. 5 Cf. Manuel v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that child victim’s testimony about prior uncharged molestations her father committed against her was not admissible to prove identity where victim’s testimony was extremely vague and only purpose was to establish defendant’s propensity to commit | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wilhelmus v. State
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 415 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2013Appellate counsel argued that the State failed to show a paramount interest in the nondisclosure of the CI’s identity, that the State failed to disclose the CI’s identity in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and that the State’s failure to disclose the CI’s identity violated various constitutional rights, including his right to confrontation. 2013Appellate counsel argued that the State failed to show a paramount interest in the nondisclosure of the CI’s identity, that the State failed to disclose the CI’s identity in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and that the State’s failure to disclose the CI’s identity violated various constitutional rights, including his right to confrontation. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Heyen v. State
green
1 sentence2013We rejected these arguments and reasoned, “based on their familiar interactions with each other, we conclude that Heyen has not shown that the CI’s identity was unknown to him and any refusal by the trial court to disclose his identity or not to allow him to call the CI as a witness was harmless error.” Heyen, 936 N.E.2d at 301 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Roviaro v. United States
green
1 sentence2005Id. at 59 , 77 S.Ct. 628 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Alfred Melvin Feldstein v. United States
green
1 sentence1973Feldstein v. U.S., 429 F. 2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1970). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1972Petitioner here asserts that this use of the single photograph violates due process in that it is impermissibly suggestive of the defendant’s identity under the rule of Simmons v. U.S. (1968), 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S. Ct. 967 , 19 L. 1972Petitioner here asserts that this use of the single photograph violates due process in that it is impermissibly suggestive of the defendant’s identity under the rule of Simmons v. U.S. (1968), 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S. Ct. 967 , 19 L. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.