identity exception (Indiana) · Go Syfert
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identity exception in Indiana

25 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (10)

CaseFollowedCited
Thompson v. Stategreen
ind · 1997 · cited in 14 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 1999–2025
2 sentences

2025Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned up). [42] Here, the State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies was relevant under Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception. 9 As we have summarized: Evidence of other crimes admitted under the identity exception [is] generally evaluated based upon whether such crimes are “‘signature’ crimes with a common modus operandi.” Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997).

2019Here, the trial court admitted Hughes’s prior convictions as proof of identity and plan. [18] The identity exception was carved out primarily for crimes “so nearly identical that the modus operandi is virtually a ‘signature.’” Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 1999) (citing Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997)).

1414
Lockhart v. Stategreen
ind · 1993 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2025
2 sentences

2025The rationale behind this exception “is that the crimes, or means used to commit them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them.” Id. (citing Lockhart v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. 1993)).

2019In considering whether identity evidence constitutes a signature crime, the focus is on whether “the crimes, or means used to commit them, were so similar and unique that it is highly probable that the same person committed all of them.” Thompson, 690 N.E.2d at 234 (citing Lockhart v. State, 609 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (Ind. 1993)). “[T]he repeated commission of similar crimes is not enough to qualify for the exception to the general rule.

44
Allen v. Stategreen
ind · 1999 · cited in 4 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2002–2019
2 sentences

2019Here, the trial court admitted Hughes’s prior convictions as proof of identity and plan. [18] The identity exception was carved out primarily for crimes “so nearly identical that the modus operandi is virtually a ‘signature.’” Allen v. State, 720 N.E.2d 707, 711 (Ind. 1999) (citing Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997)).

2015See Allen, 720 N.E.2d at 712 (concluding that even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of another crime under the identity exception in Evidence Rule 404(b), the error was harmless in light of the DNA evidence linking Allen to the crime he was on trial for).

24
Jeffrey Fairbanks v. State of Indianagreen
ind · 2019 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned up). [42] Here, the State argued, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence relating to the Kentucky robberies was relevant under Rule 404(b)(2)’s identity exception. 9 As we have summarized: Evidence of other crimes admitted under the identity exception [is] generally evaluated based upon whether such crimes are “‘signature’ crimes with a common modus operandi.” Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997).

11
Harold Bishop v. State of Indianagreen
indctapp · 2015 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
1 sentence

2016Bishop v. State, 40 N.E.3d 935, 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

11
Browning v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2002 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
1 sentence

2015See Browning v. State, 775 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (in a case for the attempted rape of Anderson University student A.B., this Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting other bad acts of the defendant— mostly masturbation and exposing himself — involving other Anderson University students because “[although there are certainly striking similarities among the ‘other’ incidents in question, the same cannot be said when comparing those incidents with the attack upon A.B.

11
Hicks v. Stategreen
ind · 1997 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 221 (Ind. 1997).

11
Davis v. Stategreen
ind · 1992 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013See Thompson v. State, 690 N.E.2d 224, 234 (Ind. 1997) (“The identity 6 exception to the general prohibition on propensity evidence is crafted primarily for ‘signature’ crimes with a common modus operandi.”); Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 1041, 1048 (Ind. 1992) (noting that the “common scheme or plan exception” “permits proof of identity by showing the defendant committed other crimes with identical modus operandi.”).

11
Wickizer v. Stategreen
ind · 1993 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
1 sentence

2013Intent In Wickizer v. State, 626 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ind.1993), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the intent exception in Evidence Rule 404(b) will be available when a defendant goes beyond merely denying the charged culpability and affirmatively presents a claim of particular contrary intent.

11
Purvis v. Stategreen
indctapp · 2005 · cited in 1 Indiana opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011
1 sentence

2011See Purvis v. State, 829 N.E.2d 572, 587 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (holding that evidence was admissible pursuant to the identity exception of Evidence Rule 404(b) and presuming that the court, as trier of fact, could limit this evidence to its permissible purpose), trans. denied, cert, denied.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
Maldonado v. State green
ind · 1976
2 sentences

1998These authorities, e.g. , Maldonado v. State , 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 (1976), however, stand for nothing more than what we have already concluded was permissible -- a showing, with reasonable factual context, of access to the murder weapon.

1998These authorities, e.g. , Maldonado v. State , 265 Ind. 492 , 355 N.E.2d 843 (1976), however, stand for nothing more than what we have already concluded was permissible -- a showing, with reasonable factual context, of access to the murder weapon.

21997–1998
Cobbs v. State neutral
ind · 1975
2 sentences

1986Evidence of the uncharged crime is also admissible under the identity exception when identity is an issue and the uncharged crime is "connected with the crime charged in such a way that proof of them naturally tends to identify the defendant as the one who committed the charged crime." Cobbs v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 60 , 338 N.E.2d 632, 634 .

1986Evidence of the uncharged crime is also admissible under the identity exception when identity is an issue and the uncharged crime is "connected with the crime charged in such a way that proof of them naturally tends to identify the defendant as the one who committed the charged crime." Cobbs v. State (1975), 264 Ind. 60 , 338 N.E.2d 632, 634 .

21976–1986
Manuel v. State green
indctapp · 2003
1 sentence

2019R. 404(b). [21] The Court further concluded that because such evidence was substantially probative as to the identity of the decedent’s attacker, such outweighed the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1007 | May 14, 2019 Page 11 of 20 danger of unfair prejudice. 5 Cf. Manuel v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that child victim’s testimony about prior uncharged molestations her father committed against her was not admissible to prove identity where victim’s testimony was extremely vague and only purpose was to establish defendant’s propensity to commit

12019–2019
Berry v. State green
ind · 1999
1 sentence

2019R. 404(b). [21] The Court further concluded that because such evidence was substantially probative as to the identity of the decedent’s attacker, such outweighed the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1007 | May 14, 2019 Page 11 of 20 danger of unfair prejudice. 5 Cf. Manuel v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that child victim’s testimony about prior uncharged molestations her father committed against her was not admissible to prove identity where victim’s testimony was extremely vague and only purpose was to establish defendant’s propensity to commit

12019–2019
Wilhelmus v. State green
indctapp · 2005
1 sentence

2014Id. at 415 .

12014–2014
Brady v. Maryland green
scotus · 1963
2 sentences

2013Appellate counsel argued that the State failed to show a paramount interest in the nondisclosure of the CI’s identity, that the State failed to disclose the CI’s identity in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and that the State’s failure to disclose the CI’s identity violated various constitutional rights, including his right to confrontation.

2013Appellate counsel argued that the State failed to show a paramount interest in the nondisclosure of the CI’s identity, that the State failed to disclose the CI’s identity in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963), and that the State’s failure to disclose the CI’s identity violated various constitutional rights, including his right to confrontation.

12013–2013
Heyen v. State green
indctapp · 2010
1 sentence

2013We rejected these arguments and reasoned, “based on their familiar interactions with each other, we conclude that Heyen has not shown that the CI’s identity was unknown to him and any refusal by the trial court to disclose his identity or not to allow him to call the CI as a witness was harmless error.” Heyen, 936 N.E.2d at 301 .

12013–2013
Roviaro v. United States green
scotus · 1957
1 sentence

2005Id. at 59 , 77 S.Ct. 628 .

12005–2005
Alfred Melvin Feldstein v. United States green
ca9 · 1970
1 sentence

1973Feldstein v. U.S., 429 F. 2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1970).

11973–1973
Simmons v. United States green
scotus · 1968
2 sentences

1972Petitioner here asserts that this use of the single photograph violates due process in that it is impermissibly suggestive of the defendant’s identity under the rule of Simmons v. U.S. (1968), 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S. Ct. 967 , 19 L.

1972Petitioner here asserts that this use of the single photograph violates due process in that it is impermissibly suggestive of the defendant’s identity under the rule of Simmons v. U.S. (1968), 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S. Ct. 967 , 19 L.

11972–1972

Where else courts name it

AL 66 (1906–2015) CT 65 (1982–2026) NY 42 (1852–2026) TX 38 (1932–2025) IL 25 (1976–2022) PA 25 (1979–2026) IN 25 (1972–2025) CA 20 (1887–2025) MO 18 (1976–2019) MD 17 (1941–2025) AZ 15 (1967–2020) IA 12 (1914–2017) NM 12 (1977–2024) GA 11 (1980–2025) FL 11 (1980–2021) DC 10 (1976–2020) NC 9 (1982–2014) OH 8 (1933–2022) TN 8 (1997–2015) WA 7 (1976–2024) OR 6 (1976–2006) NV 6 (1978–2020) MN 6 (1972–2016) OK 5 (1980–2020) VA 4 (1969–2000) KS 4 (1991–2026) MT 3 (2010–2020) CO 3 (1988–2021) MA 3 (1990–2015) SD 2 (1979–1992) ID 2 (1977–2013) WI 2 (1999–2005) SC 2 (2020–2025) WV 2 (1983–2013) MS 2 (2005–2007) HI 2 (1978–2013)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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