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10 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1976–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Easton v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Under the identity exception, other-crimes evidence must create “a reasonable probability that the same person committed [the] crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts.” Gray v. United States, 147 A.3d 791, 799 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Easton v. United States, 533 A.2d 904, 907 (D.C. 1987)). 1990The standard for the admissibility of other crimes evidence under the identity exception is set forth in Easton v. United States, 533 A.2d 904 (D.C.1987). | 3 | 4 |
Bridges v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2013For other-crimes evidence to be admitted under the identity exception, it must “show[ ] that the defendant has committed crimes so nearly identical in method that it is likely that the present offense has been committed by him.” Bridges v. United States, 381 A.2d 1073, 1075 (D.C.1977). 1990In Bridges, supra, 381 A.2d at 1075 , this court held that the crimes must be “so nearly identical in method that it is likely that the present offense has been committed by [the same person].” As explained in Easton , this test does not require that a single characteristic itself be so unique as to lead to the conclusion that both were committed by the same person. | 2 | 3 |
Groves v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Under the identity exception to Drew, in order for evidence to be mutually admissible, there must be “enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the [robberies of Rowen, Manah, and Bangura] to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each.” Groves v. United States, 564 A.2d 372, 376 (D.C. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 551 A.2d 96, 100 (D.C. 1988)). 30 We compared all five robberies in subsection A but reiterate here that among the attacks that did not involve sexual assault, the robberies differed 1996In "signature" crime situations, the prosecution must establish that "there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each." Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52 , 56 n. 4 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015, 1020-22 (D.C.1978); Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App. | 2 | 2 |
Nathan L. Drew v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993Evidence of other criminal acts may be admitted under the identity exception when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that the same person committed both crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed.’ ” Cox, supra, 498 A.2d at 238 (quoting Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 16 , 331 F.2d at 90 ). 1993Evidence of other criminal acts may be admitted under the identity exception when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that the same person committed both crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed.’ ” Cox, supra, 498 A.2d at 238 (quoting Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 16 , 331 F.2d at 90 ). | 1 | 4 |
Byrd v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020Under the identity exception to Drew, in order for evidence to be mutually admissible, there must be “enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the [robberies of Rowen, Manah, and Bangura] to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each.” Groves v. United States, 564 A.2d 372, 376 (D.C. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Byrd v. United States, 551 A.2d 96, 100 (D.C. 1988)). 30 We compared all five robberies in subsection A but reiterate here that among the attacks that did not involve sexual assault, the robberies differed 1989Although the identity exception contemplated by Drew requires that “ ‘the device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature,’ ” 118 U.S. App.D.C. at 16 n. 11, 331 F.2d at 90 n. 11 (citing McCoRMICK, Evidence § 157), this court examines whether “there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each.” Byrd v. United States, 551 A.2d 96 (D.C.1988) (quoting Easton v. United States, 533 A.2d 904, 908 (D.C.1987)). | 1 | 2 |
ALAZAJUAN M. GRAY and CLIFTON SMITH v. UNITED STATES.green2 sentences2020Under the identity exception, other-crimes evidence must create “a reasonable probability that the same person committed [the] crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts.” Gray v. United States, 147 A.3d 791, 799 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Easton v. United States, 533 A.2d 904, 907 (D.C. 1987)). 2020Under the identity exception, other-crimes evidence must create “a reasonable probability that the same person committed [the] crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts.” Gray v. United States, 147 A.3d 791, 799 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Easton v. United States, 533 A.2d 904, 907 (D.C. 1987)). | 1 | 1 |
Willcher v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013“To be probative of intent ... the prior criminal conduct usually must involve an offense similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the charge at trial.” Willcher v. United States, 408 A.2d 67, 76 (D.C.1979). “[T]he fact that intent is in issue is not enough to let in evidence of similar acts, unless they are so connected with the offense charged in point of time and circumstances as to throw light upon the intent.” Boyer v. United States, 76 U.S.App. | 1 | 1 |
Cram v. Town of Northbridgegreen2 sentences1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl 1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Neves v. Pottergreen1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Chakov v. Outboard Marine Corp.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Brunswick Corp.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Hurt v. Leatherby Ins. Co.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996In "signature" crime situations, the prosecution must establish that "there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each." Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52 , 56 n. 4 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015, 1020-22 (D.C.1978); Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App. 1996In "signature” crime situations, the prosecution must establish that "there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each.” Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52 , 56 n. 4 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015, 1020-22 (D.C.1978); Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App. | 1 | 1 |
Irvin v. Griffin Corp.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Esterbrook v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl 1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Sellon v. General Motors Corp.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Manos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Missouri Pacific Railroadgreen2 sentences1996See, e.g., Moore v. Missouri Pacific R.R., supra, 299 Ark. at 240 , 773 S.W.2d at 78 ; Bjork v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 4, 702 P.2d at 162-163. 1996See, e.g., Moore v. Missouri Pacific R.R., supra, 299 Ark. at 240 , 773 S.W.2d at 78 ; Bjork v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 4, 702 P.2d at 162-163. | 1 | 1 |
Karen Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. Roper Corporationgreen1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Sims v. Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences1996Courts rejecting the specific identity rule assert that it reads statutory language (e.g., “unless the release so provides”) “more expansively than the legislature intended.” Sims v. Honda Motor Co., supra, 225 Conn, at 411, 623 A.2d at 1000 . 1996Courts rejecting the specific identity rule assert that it reads statutory language (e.g., “unless the release so provides”) “more expansively than the legislature intended.” Sims v. Honda Motor Co., supra, 225 Conn, at 411, 623 A.2d at 1000 . | 1 | 1 |
Ernest Menendez and Theresa Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., and Edgar Newton Crowe, Jr.green1 sentence1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1 |
Warren v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1989See also Gates, supra note 4, 481 A.2d at 123; Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 833 (D.C.1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. United States
green
2 sentences2005“The key to admissibility under the motive exception ... is the fact that the defendant’s prior criminal conduct was directed toward the same victim.” Id. 2005The government argues that the evidence was properly admitted under the motive exception to Drew . “[T]he motive exception is somewhat broader [than the identity exception], allowing evidence of past hostility between the defendant and the victim to be admitted as proof of a motive to commit the particular hostile act against the same victim for which the defendant is on trial.” (Arnold) Hill, supra, 600 A.2d at 62 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Russ v. General Motors Corp.
green
2 sentences1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl 1996Accord, e.g., Lemke v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 253, 255 (4th Cir.1988) (applying Virginia law); Irvin v. Griffin Corp., 808 F.2d 802, 804-805 (11th Cir.1987) (applying Alabama law); Menendez v. Perishable Distributors, Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1377-1378 (11th Cir.1985) (applying Florida law, and Georgia law prior to Posey v. Medical Center-West, Inc., supra note 1); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854 F.Supp. 1574, 1577 (N.D.Ga.1993); McInnis v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 625 F.Supp. 943, 947 (D.R.I.1986); Sel-lon v. General Motors Corp., 521 F.Supp. 978, 984-986 (D.Del.1981); Manos v. Trans Worl | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Artis v. United States
green
2 sentences1996In "signature" crime situations, the prosecution must establish that "there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each." Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52 , 56 n. 4 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015, 1020-22 (D.C.1978); Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App. 1996In "signature" crime situations, the prosecution must establish that "there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each." Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52 , 56 n. 4 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015, 1020-22 (D.C.1978); Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Artis v. United States
green
2 sentences1996In "signature" crime situations, the prosecution must establish that "there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each." Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52 , 56 n. 4 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015, 1020-22 (D.C.1978); Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App. 1996In "signature” crime situations, the prosecution must establish that "there are enough points of similarity in the combination of circumstances surrounding the two crimes to create a reasonable probability that the same person committed each.” Groves, supra, 564 A.2d at 376 (internal quotation marks omitted); Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52 , 56 n. 4 (D.C.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964 , 107 S.Ct. 464 , 93 L.Ed.2d 409 (1986); see Evans v. United States, 392 A.2d 1015, 1020-22 (D.C.1978); Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Cox v. United States
green
2 sentences1993Evidence of other criminal acts may be admitted under the identity exception when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that the same person committed both crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed.’ ” Cox, supra, 498 A.2d at 238 (quoting Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 16 , 331 F.2d at 90 ). 1993Evidence of other criminal acts may be admitted under the identity exception when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that the same person committed both crimes due to the concurrence of unusual and distinctive facts relating to the manner in which the crimes were committed.’ ” Cox, supra, 498 A.2d at 238 (quoting Drew, supra, 118 U.S.App.D.C. at 16 , 331 F.2d at 90 ). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Bridges v. United States
green
2 sentences1982This exception allows the introduction of prior wrongful conduct evidence “if the evidence shows that the defendant has committed crimes so nearly identical in method that it is likely the present offense has been committed by him.” Bridges v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 , 99 S.Ct. 135 , 58 L.Ed.2d 141 (1978). 1982This exception allows the introduction of prior wrongful conduct evidence “if the evidence shows that the defendant has committed crimes so nearly identical in method that it is likely the present offense has been committed by him.” Bridges v. United States, D.C.App., 381 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 842 , 99 S.Ct. 135 , 58 L.Ed.2d 141 (1978). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.