law of the case doctrine in West Virginia

2024What is more, in the event a defendant pursues his claim on direct appeal and it is rejected, our decision will be binding on the circuit court through the law of the case doctrine, “leaving [defendant] with the unenviable task of convincing the [circuit court] judge that he should disregard our previous ruling.” U.S. v. South, 28 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir.1994).

2022What is more, in the event a defendant pursues his claim on direct appeal and it is rejected, our decision will be binding on the circuit court through the law of the case doctrine, “leaving [defendant] with the unenviable task of convincing the [circuit court] judge that he should disregard our previous ruling.” U.S. v. South, 28 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 1994).

2017With respect to the law of the case doctrine, we have held as follows: The law of the case doctrine “generally prohibits reconsideration of issues which have been decided in a prior appeal in the same case, provided that there has been no material changes in the facts since the prior appeal, such issues may not be relitigated in the trial court or re-examined in a second appeal.” 5 Am.Jur.2d Appellate Review § 605 at 300 (1995) (footnotes omitted). “[T]he doctrine is a salutary rule of policy and practice, grounded in important considerations related to stability in the decision making process

2014Indeed, the law of the case doctrine is “ ‘grounded in important considerations related to stability in the decision making process, predictability of results, proper working relationships between trial and appellate courts, and judicial economy.’ United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir.1991).” Frazier & Oxley, 214 W.Va. at 808 , 591 S.E.2d at 734 .

2022See also United States v. Vigneau, 337 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2003) (“One aspect of the law of the case doctrine is the ‘mandate’ rule, which requires a district court to follow the decisions of a higher court.”). record of the case by including it in the circuit court’s order regarding class certification.

2022See also United States v. Vigneau, 337 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2003) (“One aspect of the law of the case doctrine is the ‘mandate’ rule, which requires a district court to follow the decisions of a higher court.”). record of the case by including it in the circuit court’s order regarding class certification.

2022Cir. 1997)] (“Although the district court cites much authority for the proposition that issues decided implicitly by courts of appeals may not be reexamined by the district court, the rule is actually applicable only to those issues decided by necessary implication.”); Simmons v. Culpepper, 937 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“The law of the case doctrine does not extend to mere dictum.”). 214 W.

2022Cir. 1997)] (“Although the district court cites much authority for the proposition that issues decided implicitly by courts of appeals may not be reexamined by the district court, the rule is actually applicable only to those issues decided by necessary implication.”); Simmons v. Culpepper, 937 S.W.2d 938, 942 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (“The law of the case doctrine does not extend to mere dictum.”). 214 W.

2022Va. 802 , 591 S.E.2d 728 (2003), “[f]or a thorough discussion of the law of the case doctrine.” TermNet, 217 W.

2022Va. at 808 , 812 n.14, 591 S.E.2d at 734 , 738 n.14 (noting an exception to the mandate rule, which is “a special aspect of the law of the case doctrine,” upon “a showing that a blatant error in the prior decision will result in a manifest injustice if uncorrected”).

2022Va. 802 , 591 S.E.2d 728 (2003), “[f]or a thorough discussion of the law of the case doctrine.” TermNet, 217 W.

2021Va. 696 , 702 n.14, 619 S.E.2d 209 , 215 n.14 (2005) (“The law of the case doctrine provides that a prior decision in a case is binding upon subsequent stages of litigation between the parties in order to promote finality.”) Here, inasmuch as the case at bar is separate and distinct from the 1984 action, it is readily apparent that the “law of the case” doctrine has no applicability.

2004While this percentage was that contained in the contingency fee agreement, Appellant voluntarily reduced that fee to $6,250, or 25% of the relevant med-pay recovery after consulting with the West Virginia State Bar. [5] Appellant represents that with interest included the refund would total over $14,000. [6] We recognized in footnote four of Phares v. Brooks, 214 W.Va. 442, 447 , 590 S.E.2d 370, 375 (2003), that there are narrowly configured exceptions to the law of the case doctrine which would allow a lower court to depart from one of our mandates.

2004While this percentage was that contained in the contingency fee agreement, Appellant voluntarily reduced that fee to $6,250, or 25% of the relevant med-pay recovery after consulting with the West Virginia State Bar. [5] Appellant represents that with interest included the refund would total over $14,000. [6] We recognized in footnote four of Phares v. Brooks, 214 W.Va. 442, 447 , 590 S.E.2d 370, 375 (2003), that there are narrowly configured exceptions to the law of the case doctrine which would allow a lower court to depart from one of our mandates.

2022This Court observed in Frazier & Oxley that the law of the case doctrine does not extend to dicta. “[D]icta . . . neither creates precedent, In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W.

2022This Court observed in Frazier & Oxley that the law of the case doctrine does not extend to dicta. “[D]icta . . . neither creates precedent, In re Kanawha Valley Bank, 144 W.

2024Third, collateral estoppel serves to “estop the relitigation by parties and their privies of any right, fact or legal matter which is put in issue and has been once determined by a valid and final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.” State v. Miller, 194 W.

2022While similar to the law of the case doctrine, collateral estoppel “serves to estop the relitigation by parties and their privies of any right, fact or legal matter which is put in issue and has been once determined by a valid and final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction.” State v. Miller, 194 W.

2023See Hatfield v. Painter, 222 W.

2022In In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Products Liability Litigation, the Sixth Circuit, too, stated that the law of the case doctrine “is not an inexorable command” and there rejected the argument that the law of the case doctrine prohibited a transferee court from modifying a prior ruling where the prior ruling was interlocutory and would, therefore, be subject to modification by 5 the transferor court. 664 F.2d 114, 120 (6th Cir. 1981) (citation omitted).

2022Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988) (citation omitted).

2015In Noland v. Virginia Insurance Reciprocal, 224 W.Va. 372, 378 , 686 S.E.2d 23, 29 (2009), we noted that the doctrine of law of the case “is equally applicable to issues that have been fully litigated in the [family] court,” but not raised on appeal. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2015In Noland v. Virginia Insurance Reciprocal, 224 W.Va. 372, 378 , 686 S.E.2d 23, 29 (2009), we noted that the doctrine of law of the case “is equally applicable to issues that have been fully litigated in the [family] court,” but not raised on appeal. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2014“This ‘mandate rule’ is the specific application of the law of the case doctrine.” Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir. 1985)); Hawkes v. IRS, 507 F.2d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 1974) (“In deciding whether the District Court properly followed our directions on remand, we consider whether it properly interpreted our mandate . . . .”).

2014“This ‘mandate rule’ is the specific application of the law of the case doctrine.” Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir.1992) (citing Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir.1985)); Hawkes v. IRS, 507 F.2d 481, 482 (6th Cir.1974) (“In deciding whether the District Court .properly-followed our directions on remand, we consider whether it properly interpreted our mandate — .

2014“This ‘mandate rule’ is the specific application of the law of the case doctrine.” Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir. 1985)); Hawkes v. IRS, 507 F.2d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 1974) (“In deciding whether the District Court properly followed our directions on remand, we consider whether it properly interpreted our mandate . . . .”).

2014“This ‘mandate rule’ is the specific application of the law of the case doctrine.” Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir.1992) (citing Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir.1985)); Hawkes v. IRS, 507 F.2d 481, 482 (6th Cir.1974) (“In deciding whether the District Court .properly-followed our directions on remand, we consider whether it properly interpreted our mandate — .

2014“This ‘mandate rule’ is the specific application of the law of the case doctrine.” Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir. 1985)); Hawkes v. IRS, 507 F.2d 481, 482 (6th Cir. 1974) (“In deciding whether the District Court properly followed our directions on remand, we consider whether it properly interpreted our mandate . . . .”).

2014“This ‘mandate rule’ is the specific application of the law of the case doctrine.” Jones v. Lewis, 957 F.2d 260, 262 (6th Cir.1992) (citing Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112, 1120 (11th Cir.1985)); Hawkes v. IRS, 507 F.2d 481, 482 (6th Cir.1974) (“In deciding whether the District Court .properly-followed our directions on remand, we consider whether it properly interpreted our mandate — .

2008Jur.2d Appellate Review § 605 at 300 (1995) (footnotes omitted). “[T]he doctrine is a salutary rule of policy and practice, grounded in important considerations related to stability in the decision making process, predictability of results, proper working relationships between trial and appellate courts, and judicial economy.” United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 981 F.2d 148, 151 (1st Cir.1991).

2004United States v. Howard Univ., 270 F.3d 969, 972 (D.C.Cir.2001)) extends "[n]ot only [to] all matters that were actually litigated, but also all others that the parties were bound, by the state of the pleadings, to assert, by way of defense to, or in support of, the demand or demands set up in a cause, are res judicata by the decision rendered therein." However, syllabus point 2 of Dent extends only to issues encompassed by the "state of the pleadings." Here, the pleadings in the case before St.

2004United States v. Howard Univ., 270 F.3d 969, 972 (D.C.Cir.2001)) extends "[n]ot only [to] all matters that were actually litigated, but also all others that the parties were bound, by the state of the pleadings, to assert, by way of defense to, or in support of, the demand or demands set up in a cause, are res judicata by the decision rendered therein.” However, syllabus point 2 of Dent extends only to issues encompassed by the "state of the pleadings.” Here, the pleadings in the case before St.

2004See United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2000) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine does not bind us with the same rigidity as it binds the district court."); LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 , 1393 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1996) ("[A]n even more powerful version of the doctrine—sometimes called the `mandate rule'—requires a lower court to honor the decisions of a superior court in the same judicial system."). [14] The other two exceptions to the mandate rule include a dramatic change in controlling legal authority or a showing that a blatant error in the prior decision will result in a manifest

2004See United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir.2000) ("[T]he law of the case doctrine does not bind us with the same rigidity as it binds the district court.”); LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 , 1393 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1996) (”[A]n even more powerful version of the doctrine — sometimes called the ‘mandate rule’ — requires a lower court to honor the decisions of a superior court in the same judicial system.”). .The other two exceptions to the mandate rule include a dramatic change in controlling legal authority or a showing that a blatant error in the prior decision will result in a manifest

2004See Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C.App. 390 , 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999) (holding that trial court on remand could in its sole discretion receive such further evidence and argument from parties as it deemed necessary and appropriate); Chattahoochee Bank, 418 S.E.2d at 75 (finding that failure of appellate court upon reversal of summary judgment to expressly direct taking of new evidence did not prohibit lower court from receiving additional evidence on *741 remand); Blue v. Campbell, 57 W.Va. 34 , 49 S.E. 909 (1905) (observing that even absent directions to permit amendment of pleadings, such amendment

2004See Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C.App. 390 , 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999) (holding that trial court on remand could in its sole discretion receive such further evidence and argument from parties as it deemed necessary and appropriate); Chattahoochee Bank, 418 S.E.2d at 75 (finding that failure of appellate court upon reversal of summary judgment to expressly direct taking of new evidence did not prohibit lower court from receiving additional evidence on remand); Blue v. Campbell, 57 W.Va. 34 , 49 S.E. 909 (1905) (observing that even absent directions-to permit amendment of pleadings, such amendment may o

2004See Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C.App. 390 , 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999) (holding that trial court on remand could in its sole discretion receive such further evidence and argument from parties as it deemed necessary and appropriate); Chattahoochee Bank, 418 S.E.2d at 75 (finding that failure of appellate court upon reversal of summary judgment to expressly direct taking of new evidence did not prohibit lower court from receiving additional evidence on *741 remand); Blue v. Campbell, 57 W.Va. 34 , 49 S.E. 909 (1905) (observing that even absent directions to permit amendment of pleadings, such amendment

2004See Cauble v. Cauble, 133 N.C.App. 390 , 515 S.E.2d 708 (1999) (holding that trial court on remand could in its sole discretion receive such further evidence and argument from parties as it deemed necessary and appropriate); Chattahoochee Bank, 418 S.E.2d at 75 (finding that failure of appellate court upon reversal of summary judgment to expressly direct taking of new evidence did not prohibit lower court from receiving additional evidence on *741 remand); Blue v. Campbell, 57 W.Va. 34 , 49 S.E. 909 (1905) (observing that even absent directions to permit amendment of pleadings, such amendment