Supreme Court reaffirmed standard in Louisiana

5 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2013 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (1)

Case	Followed	Cited
Skannal v. Hespethgreen la · 1940 · cited in 1 Louisiana opinions naming this issue, 1941–1941 1 sentence 1941This was so held under similar provisions in the Constitutions of 1898 (article 233) and 1913 (article 233), and the ruling is equally applicable under the provision contained in the present Constitution.” Very recently again, in the case of Skannal v. Hes-peth, reported in 198 So. at page 661, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle by stating that “the prescription established by the Constitution [Section'll, Article X], however, does not run in favor of the tax purchaser as long as the tax debtor remains in physical possession of the property.” Page 663.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (7)

Case	Cited	Years
Steptore v. Masco Const. Co., Inc. green la · 1994 1 sentence 2013Arceneaux, 06-1592, p. 14, 969 So.2d at 767 (citing Steptore , 93-2064 at p. 4, 643 So.2d at 1216 ).	1	2013–2013
Foucha v. Louisiana green scotus · 1992 2 sentences 2011The Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard in Foucha v. Louisiana, noting that a State can “confine a mentally ill person if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous.” 504 U.S. 71, 80 , 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). 11 Further, although defendants argue the statute is silent on who carries the burden of proof at the hearing, a clear reading of the statute implies that the State carries the burden of \| ^showing a defendant meets 465 one or both of the classifications. 12 Moreover, the State has acknowledged that it has the burden of 2011The Supreme Court reaffirmed this standard in Foucha v. Louisiana, noting that a State can “confine a mentally ill person if it shows by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous.” 504 U.S. 71, 80 , 112 S.Ct. 1780 , 118 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992). 11 Further, although defendants argue the statute is silent on who carries the burden of proof at the hearing, a clear reading of the statute implies that the State carries the burden of \| ^showing a defendant meets 465 one or both of the classifications. 12 Moreover, the State has acknowledged that it has the burden of	1	2011–2011
Boyde v. California green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 1994In Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380-82 , 110 S.Ct. at 1198 , handed down before Cage , the Supreme Court discussed the standard: "This `reasonable likelihood' standard, we think, better accommodates the concerns of finality and accuracy than does a standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical `reasonable' juror could or might have interpreted the instruction." Very recently, in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. ___ , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard enunciated in Boyde/Estelle. 1994In Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380-82 , 110 S.Ct. at 1198 , handed down before Cage , the Supreme Court discussed the standard: "This `reasonable likelihood' standard, we think, better accommodates the concerns of finality and accuracy than does a standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical `reasonable' juror could or might have interpreted the instruction." Very recently, in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. ___ , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard enunciated in Boyde/Estelle.	1	1994–1994
Victor v. Nebraska green scotus · 1994 2 sentences 1994In Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380-82 , 110 S.Ct. at 1198 , handed down before Cage , the Supreme Court discussed the standard: "This `reasonable likelihood' standard, we think, better accommodates the concerns of finality and accuracy than does a standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical `reasonable' juror could or might have interpreted the instruction." Very recently, in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. ___ , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard enunciated in Boyde/Estelle. 1994In Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380-82 , 110 S.Ct. at 1198 , handed down before Cage , the Supreme Court discussed the standard: "This `reasonable likelihood' standard, we think, better accommodates the concerns of finality and accuracy than does a standard which makes the inquiry dependent on how a single hypothetical `reasonable' juror could or might have interpreted the instruction." Very recently, in Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. ___ , 114 S.Ct. 1239 , 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard enunciated in Boyde/Estelle.	1	1994–1994
Pierce v. Cushing neutral · 1881 1 sentence 1937In Pierce v. Cushing et al., 33 La.Ann. 809 , the contention of appellant was “that the failure to prosecute, or the abandonment of a first appeal, does not, ipso facto, preclude the right to a second appeal, and that, where the first appeal is dismissed, on motion of appellee, the appeal may be renewed at any time within the term prescribed by law.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule which it had followed several times, quoting what it had previously said in Redmond v. Mann et al., 24 La.Ann. 149 , as follows: “ ‘After the lapse .of the time at which the first devolutive appeal was made re	1	1937–1937
Sterling v. Heirs of Sterling neutral la · 1883 1 sentence 1937In Pierce v. Cushing et al., 33 La.Ann. 809 , the contention of appellant was “that the failure to prosecute, or the abandonment of a first appeal, does not, ipso facto, preclude the right to a second appeal, and that, where the first appeal is dismissed, on motion of appellee, the appeal may be renewed at any time within the term prescribed by law.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule which it had followed several times, quoting what it had previously said in Redmond v. Mann et al., 24 La.Ann. 149 , as follows: “ ‘After the lapse .of the time at which the first devolutive appeal was made re	1	1937–1937
Berhil v. Fisk neutral la · 1872 1 sentence 1937In Pierce v. Cushing et al., 33 La.Ann. 809 , the contention of appellant was “that the failure to prosecute, or the abandonment of a first appeal, does not, ipso facto, preclude the right to a second appeal, and that, where the first appeal is dismissed, on motion of appellee, the appeal may be renewed at any time within the term prescribed by law.” The Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule which it had followed several times, quoting what it had previously said in Redmond v. Mann et al., 24 La.Ann. 149 , as follows: “ ‘After the lapse .of the time at which the first devolutive appeal was made re	1	1937–1937

Where else courts name it

TX 26 (1956–2015) CA 25 (1933–2021) IL 22 (1978–2020) PA 19 (1952–2017) FL 17 (1961–2012) MI 12 (1976–2021) OH 11 (1952–2025) MO 10 (1912–2015) VA 6 (1997–2014) CO 6 (1973–2020) WA 5 (1931–2013) WI 5 (2003–2015) GA 5 (1913–2015) TN 5 (1988–2005) NJ 5 (1961–2015) LA 5 (1937–2013) KY 4 (1999–2026) CT 4 (1997–2006) NY 4 (1991–2023) AL 3 (1972–2003) MS 2 (2006–2011) OR 2 (1996–2006) AR 2 (1981–2024) DE 2 (1986–2017) MN 2 (2008–2008) SC 2 (1933–1996) VT 2 (2007–2007) NE 2 (1992–1995) MA 2 (1993–1993) NC 2 (2003–2011) ID 2 (2025–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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