Supreme Court reaffirmed principle (Georgia) · Go Syfert
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Supreme Court reaffirmed principle in Georgia

5 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1913–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (4)

CaseFollowedCited
American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Browngreen
ga · 2009 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015
2 sentences

2015Twelve years later, in a case involving a “Wet Floor” sign that caused a movie theater patron to trip, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “[a]n invitee like [Seago] is not bound to avoid hazards not usually present on the premises and which the invitee, exercising ordinary care, did not observe.” 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 447 (3) ( 679 SE2d 25 ) (2009).

2015Twelve years later, in a case involving a “Wet Floor” sign that caused a movie theater patron to trip, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “[a]n invitee like [Seago] is not bound to avoid hazards not usually present on the premises and which the invitee, exercising ordinary care, did not observe.” 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v. Brown, 285 Ga. 442, 447 (3) ( 679 SE2d 25 ) (2009).

11
Edwards v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1981 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
1 sentence

1995In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484 (II) (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States held that an accused who has invoked his right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” In Minnick, supra at 150 , it subsequently was held that the “protection of Edwards is not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel.” In so holding, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “Edwards d

11
Minnick v. Mississippigreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995
2 sentences

1995In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484 (II) (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States held that an accused who has invoked his right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” In Minnick, supra at 150 , it subsequently was held that the “protection of Edwards is not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel.” In so holding, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “Edwards d

1995In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U. S. 477, 484 (II) (101 SC 1880, 68 LE2d 378) (1981), the Supreme Court of the United States held that an accused who has invoked his right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him, “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” In Minnick, supra at 150 , it subsequently was held that the “protection of Edwards is not terminated or suspended by consultation with counsel.” In so holding, however, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “Edwards d

11
Cotton States Insurance v. Studdardgreen
gactapp · 1972 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1981–1981
2 sentences

1981Co. v. Studdard, 126 Ga. App. 217, 220-221 ( 190 SE2d 549 ) (1972), that an employer and insurance carrier qre estopped from pleading the statute of limitation as a defense to a workers’ compensation claim where they have induced the claimant, through misleading or deceptive conduct, whether intentional or unintentional, to postpone filing the claim until the limitation period has expired.

1981Co. v. Studdard, 126 Ga. App. 217, 220-221 ( 190 SE2d 549 ) (1972), that an employer and insurance carrier qre estopped from pleading the statute of limitation as a defense to a workers’ compensation claim where they have induced the claimant, through misleading or deceptive conduct, whether intentional or unintentional, to postpone filing the claim until the limitation period has expired.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (3)

CaseCitedYears
Motel Properties, Inc. v. Miller green
ga · 1993
2 sentences

2015In Motel Properties, 263 Ga. at 486 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that imposition of the duty under OCGA § 51-3-1 on a premises owner to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe for invitees is predicated on the owner’s right to control that property.

2015In Motel Properties, 263 Ga. at 486 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that imposition of the duty under OCGA § 51-3-1 on a premises owner to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe for invitees is predicated on the owner’s right to control that property.

12015–2015
BROWN TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. James green
ga · 1979
2 sentences

1981You and I have had no agreement as concerns any waiver; and, in fact, we have had no discussion concerning the statute of limitations.” Held: In Brown Transport Corp. v. James, 243 Ga. 701 ( 257 SE2d 242 ) (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule set forth in Cotton States Ins.

1981You and I have had no agreement as concerns any waiver; and, in fact, we have had no discussion concerning the statute of limitations.” Held: In Brown Transport Corp. v. James, 243 Ga. 701 ( 257 SE2d 242 ) (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule set forth in Cotton States Ins.

11981–1981
Harris v. State green
ga · 1904
1 sentence

1913In Harris v. State, 120 Ga. 170 ( 47 S. E. 520 ), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule which had its source in the decision in Patterson v. State, supra, and, in discussing the same error in the charge, said: “It is also to be noted that in a later portion of his charge the court, at the request of counsel for the accused, gave to the jury the correct rule of law, and to that extent the error in the earlier charge will be considered as cured.” In the present case, after instructing the jury that “had the assault eventuated in the death of Doe Ken drick, and that death had been murder, or the

11913–1913

Where else courts name it

TX 26 (1956–2015) CA 25 (1933–2021) IL 22 (1978–2020) PA 19 (1952–2017) FL 17 (1961–2012) MI 12 (1976–2021) OH 11 (1952–2025) MO 10 (1912–2015) VA 6 (1997–2014) CO 6 (1973–2020) WA 5 (1931–2013) WI 5 (2003–2015) GA 5 (1913–2015) TN 5 (1988–2005) NJ 5 (1961–2015) LA 5 (1937–2013) KY 4 (1999–2026) CT 4 (1997–2006) NY 4 (1991–2023) AL 3 (1972–2003) MS 2 (2006–2011) OR 2 (1996–2006) AR 2 (1981–2024) DE 2 (1986–2017) MN 2 (2008–2008) SC 2 (1933–1996) VT 2 (2007–2007) NE 2 (1992–1995) MA 2 (1993–1993) NC 2 (2003–2011) ID 2 (2025–2025)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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