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12 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Massey v. Secretary of Stategreen2 sentences2004But in Massey, supra at 417 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that the ordinary elector, not being a constitutional lawyer, would be confused rather than helped by a publication of all the other constitutional provisions which were or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, affected by the proposed amendment. [Quoting Pontiac School Dist, supra at 344 (emphasis added).] Thus, under the holdings of Massey, supra, and Pontiac School Dist, supra, even if the interpretation of the antidiscrimination clause is directly affected by the proposed amendment, the langua 2004But in Massey, supra at 417 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that the ordinary elector, not being a constitutional lawyer, would be confused rather than helped by a publication of all the other constitutional provisions which were or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, affected by the proposed amendment. [Quoting Pontiac School Dist, supra at 344 (emphasis added).] Thus, under the holdings of Massey, supra, and Pontiac School Dist, supra, even if the interpretation of the antidiscrimination clause is directly affected by the proposed amendment, the langua | 2 | 2 |
School District v. City of Pontiacgreen2 sentences2004But in Massey, supra at 417 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that the ordinary elector, not being a constitutional lawyer, would be confused rather than helped by a publication of all the other constitutional provisions which were or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, affected by the proposed amendment. [Quoting Pontiac School Dist, supra at 344 (emphasis added).] Thus, under the holdings of Massey, supra, and Pontiac School Dist, supra, even if the interpretation of the antidiscrimination clause is directly affected by the proposed amendment, the langua 2004But in Massey, supra at 417 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that the ordinary elector, not being a constitutional lawyer, would be confused rather than helped by a publication of all the other constitutional provisions which were or might be directly or only remotely, and possibly only contingently, affected by the proposed amendment. [Quoting Pontiac School Dist, supra at 344 (emphasis added).] Thus, under the holdings of Massey, supra, and Pontiac School Dist, supra, even if the interpretation of the antidiscrimination clause is directly affected by the proposed amendment, the langua | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ferency v. Secretary of State
green
2 sentences2004In the absence of such a change, publication is not required because Article 1, § 2 "will remain `operative, though possibly [it] ... may need thereafter to be construed in conjunction with the amending provision[s].'" Ferency, supra at 597 , 297 N.W.2d 544 , quoting Pontiac School Dist., supra at 344, 247 N.W. 474 ; see also Massey, supra at 417 , 579 N.W.2d 862 . 2004In the absence of such a change, publication is not required because Article 1, § 2 “will remain ‘operative, though possibly [it] ... may need thereafter to be construed in conjunction with the amending provi sion[s].’ ” Ferency, supra at 597 , quoting Pontiac School Dist, supra at 344; see also Massey, supra at 417 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
In Re Guilty Plea Cases
green
2 sentences1981In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 118 ; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of strict compliance with respect to this requirement: " 'The rule reflects the extent to which this Court is willing to impose on the judge the obligation of informing the defendant of such consequences. 1981In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 118 ; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of strict compliance with respect to this requirement: " 'The rule reflects the extent to which this Court is willing to impose on the judge the obligation of informing the defendant of such consequences. | 2 | 1976–1981 |
Florida v. Riley
green
2 sentences2021In Florida v Riley, 488 US 445 ; 109 S Ct 693 ; 102 L Ed 2d 835 (1989), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle when it again noted, “[a]s a general proposition, the police may see what may be seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’ ” Riley, 488 US at 449 , quoting Ciraolo, 476 US at 214 . 2021In Florida v Riley, 488 US 445 ; 109 S Ct 693 ; 102 L Ed 2d 835 (1989), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle when it again noted, “[a]s a general proposition, the police may see what may be seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’ ” Riley, 488 US at 449 , quoting Ciraolo, 476 US at 214 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
California v. Ciraolo
green
1 sentence2021In Florida v Riley, 488 US 445 ; 109 S Ct 693 ; 102 L Ed 2d 835 (1989), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle when it again noted, “[a]s a general proposition, the police may see what may be seen ‘from a public vantage point where [they have] a right to be.’ ” Riley, 488 US at 449 , quoting Ciraolo, 476 US at 214 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Doggett v. United States
green
1 sentence2019Once triggered by arrest, indictment, or other official accusation, however, the speedy trial enquiry must weigh the effect of delay on the accused's defense just as it has to weigh any other form of prejudice that Barker recognized.” Id. at 655 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States
green
2 sentences2019In Bravo-Fernandez v United States, ___ US ___; 137 S Ct 352 ; 196 L Ed 2d 242 (2016), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of issue preclusion in criminal cases but held that it did not apply in that case. 2019In Bravo-Fernandez v United States, ___ US ___; 137 S Ct 352 ; 196 L Ed 2d 242 (2016), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of issue preclusion in criminal cases but held that it did not apply in that case. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Duke v. Miller
green
2 sentences2018Almost 100 years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle: “[W]hen a contract is silent as to time of performance or payment, absent any expression of a contrary intent, the law will presume a reasonable time.” Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540, 543 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959). 2018Almost 100 years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle: “[W]hen a contract is silent as to time of performance or payment, absent any expression of a contrary intent, the law will presume a reasonable time.” Duke v Miller, 355 Mich 540, 543 ; 94 NW2d 819 (1959). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. Powell
green
2 sentences2014The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Powell, 469 US 57 , rejecting the defendant’s argument that the principles of collateral estoppel should require a different result. 2014The Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in Powell, 469 US 57 , rejecting the defendant’s argument that the principles of collateral estoppel should require a different result. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller v. Mercy Memorial Hospital
green
2 sentences2003In Miller, supra at 202 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated by this Court in Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1, 6 ; 568 NW2d 131 (1997), overruled on other grounds in Miller, supra, that “ ‘[t]he period of limitation in a wrongful *490 death action is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim.’ ” There is no dispute that the underlying claim in this case is one of malpractice, and, accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is MCL 600.5805(5). 2003In Miller, supra at 202 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated by this Court in Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1, 6 ; 568 NW2d 131 (1997), overruled on other grounds in Miller, supra, that “ ‘[t]he period of limitation in a wrongful *490 death action is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim.’ ” There is no dispute that the underlying claim in this case is one of malpractice, and, accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is MCL 600.5805(5). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Poffenbarger v. Kaplan
neutral
2 sentences2003In Miller, supra at 202 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated by this Court in Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1, 6 ; 568 NW2d 131 (1997), overruled on other grounds in Miller, supra, that “ ‘[t]he period of limitation in a wrongful *490 death action is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim.’ ” There is no dispute that the underlying claim in this case is one of malpractice, and, accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is MCL 600.5805(5). 2003In Miller, supra at 202 , the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle enunciated by this Court in Poffenbarger v Kaplan, 224 Mich App 1, 6 ; 568 NW2d 131 (1997), overruled on other grounds in Miller, supra, that “ ‘[t]he period of limitation in a wrongful *490 death action is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to the underlying claim.’ ” There is no dispute that the underlying claim in this case is one of malpractice, and, accordingly, the applicable statute of limitations is MCL 600.5805(5). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Marrs v. Board of Medicine
green
2 sentences1986In Marrs v Bd of Medicine, 422 Mich 688, 694 ; 375 NW2d 321 (1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard for reviewing a claim of abuse of discretion in a civil matter that was set forth in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959): "The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. 1986In Marrs v Bd of Medicine, 422 Mich 688, 694 ; 375 NW2d 321 (1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard for reviewing a claim of abuse of discretion in a civil matter that was set forth in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959): "The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Spalding v. Spalding
green
2 sentences1986In Marrs v Bd of Medicine, 422 Mich 688, 694 ; 375 NW2d 321 (1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard for reviewing a claim of abuse of discretion in a civil matter that was set forth in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959): "The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. 1986In Marrs v Bd of Medicine, 422 Mich 688, 694 ; 375 NW2d 321 (1985), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the standard for reviewing a claim of abuse of discretion in a civil matter that was set forth in Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385 ; 94 NW2d 810 (1959): "The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Quern v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1985In Quern v Jordan, 440 US 332 ; 99 S Ct 1139 ; 59 L Ed 2d 358 (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 440 US 337 . 1985In Quern v Jordan, 440 US 332 ; 99 S Ct 1139 ; 59 L Ed 2d 358 (1979), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 440 US 337 . | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.