Supreme Court reaffirmed principle in Colorado

2020Powell,” Frye, 898 P.2d at 571 .3 ¶16 But the Court in Powell cautioned that it was not resolving a situation where a defendant is convicted of two crimes and a guilty verdict on one count excludes 3This line of cases renders inconsequential any inconsistency between the guilty verdicts on the first two counts and the acquittal of the charged offense on the third count.

2000In Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments, 980 P.2d 973 (Colo.1999), the supreme court reaffirmed the principle that a party should not be denied his or her day in court because of an inflexible application of the rules of procedure.

1996Similarly, in People v. Colorado Springs Board of Realtors, 692 P.2d 1055 (Colo.1984), the supreme court reaffirmed the principle that federal judicial interpretations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts are entitled to careful scrutiny in determining whether a particular business arrangement is a per se antitrust violation under the Colorado Antitrust Act.

1985The supreme court reaffirmed this analysis in Board of County Commissioners of the County of Arapahoe v. Intermountain Rural Electric Association , 655 P.2d 831 , 834 (Colo. 1982).

1983Using that approach, the court held a statement which is ostensibly an opinion is actionable “only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis of the opinion.” Comment c of Restatement § 566 elaborates on this point, stating: “If the defendant bases his expression of a derogatory opinion on the existence of ‘facts’ that he does not state but that are assumed to be true by both parties to the communication, and if the communication does not give rise to the reasonable inference that it is also based on other facts that are defamatory, he is not subject to liability

1983Citing Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp., 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1980), the court enumerated factors to be examined when the speech at issue might be considered protected opinion: whether the statement is prefaced by the phrase “in my opinion” or language of similar import; the entire context of the statement; and the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the medium through which it is communicated and the audience to which it is directed.

1973In Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 , 92 S.Ct. 1503 , 31 L.Ed.2d 787 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle first annunciated in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 , 85 S.Ct. 546 , 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965), that due process was denied where a material witness also acted as bailiff and had continual association with the jury.

1973In Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 , 92 S.Ct. 1503 , 31 L.Ed.2d 787 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle first annunciated in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 , 85 S.Ct. 546 , 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965), that due process was denied where a material witness also acted as bailiff and had continual association with the jury.

1973In Gonzales, however, it was recognized that “association with the jury by a witness whose testimony was ‘confined to some uncontroverted or merely formal aspect of the case for the prosecution’ would hardly present a constitutional problem. * * * And it indicated a mere ‘brief encounter’, by chance, with the jury would not generally contravene due process principles. 405 U.S. at 1054 , 92 S.Ct. at 1505 , 31 L.Ed.2d at 788, quoting Turner v. Louisiana, supra.” We believe the exceptions in Turner , coupled with the waiver of objection by defense counsel, are controlling here.

1973In Gonzales v. Beto, 405 U.S. 1052 , 92 S.Ct. 1503 , 31 L.Ed.2d 787 (1972), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle first annunciated in Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 , 85 S.Ct. 546 , 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965), that due process was denied where a material witness also acted as bailiff and had continual association with the jury.