prerevocation hearing in California

2017Prejudice "The denial of [a parolee's] right to a timely prerevocation hearing notwithstanding his timely effort to assert it does not necessarily mean that he is automatically entitled to relief therefrom." ( La Croix , supra , 12 Cal.3d at p. 154 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 .) Someone "whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the [final] revocation hearing." ( Ibid. ) The test of *660 prejudice is w

2017Prejudice "The denial of [a parolee's] right to a timely prerevocation hearing notwithstanding his timely effort to assert it does not necessarily mean that he is automatically entitled to relief therefrom." ( La Croix , supra , 12 Cal.3d at p. 154 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 .) Someone "whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the [final] revocation hearing." ( Ibid. ) The test of *660 prejudice is w

2007(Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 484.) Finally, the Board asserted that petitioner failed to show prejudice. 10 It has been held that “a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing.” (In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ].) “[M]inimum requirements of due process” [for parole revocation where a parolee has been physically deprived of his condi

2007(Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 484.) Finally, the Board asserted that petitioner failed to show prejudice. 10 It has been held that “a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing.” (In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ].) “[M]inimum requirements of due process” [for parole revocation where a parolee has been physically deprived of his condi

2016(In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 ["a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing"]; People v. Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1238 [defendant does not dispute that at the final revocation hearing he received the procedural due process rights to which he was entitled].) Coria does not establish that any alleged due process defect prejudiced him or affected the outcome

2016If he did not receive such a hearing, he is not entitled to relief because he has failed to show prejudice. "[I]n the absence of evidence that the [Parole] Authority is not making a good faith effort to comply with the mandates of Morrissey . . . a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing." (In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 ; see also People v. 3 Woodall (2013) 216 Cal.

1976Although summary revocation of probation is not proper in every case (see People v. Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d 451, 460-461 ), a prerevocation hearing is not ordinarily required where revocation is based upon the commission of a new offense, and the accused has a timely opportunity to contest the new charges.

1975(See People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451, 456-457, 461 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 305 , 503 P.2d 1313 ].) The Supreme Court noted in Gerstein , however, that the due process prerevocation hearings are to be distinguished from the Fourth Amendment probable cause hearings as a prerevocation hearing serves the further purpose of “gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final revocation hearing frequently is held at some distance from the place where the violation occurred.” (Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 121, fn. 22 [ 43 L.Ed.2d 54, 70 ].) The court found a further basis for distinctio

2013(In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ] [“a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing”]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 61 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249 ] [no relief for probationer who did not show prejudice from failure to hold immediate prerevocation hearing]; In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698-699 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 532 P

2013(In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ] [“a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing”]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 61 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249 ] [no relief for probationer who did not show prejudice from failure to hold immediate prerevocation hearing]; In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698-699 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 532 P

2016(In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 ["a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing"]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 61 , [no relief for probationer who did not show prejudice from failure to hold immediate prerevocation hearing].) Appellant argues that he suffered severe prejudice, because there would have been a very good chance of a different outcome if he had been

2013(In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ] [“a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing”]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 61 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249 ] [no relief for probationer who did not show prejudice from failure to hold immediate prerevocation hearing]; In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698-699 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 532 P

1974Furthermore, the probation revocation hearing in California, unlike a parole revocation hearing, is a judicial proceeding providing the probationer with the use of court processes, thus assuring him the presence of necessary witnesses. *981 It must be kept in mind that due process is flexible, and “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 494 ]; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 790 [ 36 L.Ed.2d at p. 666 ].) Thus, a prerevocation hearing is not mandated where the circumstanc

1974Furthermore, the probation revocation hearing in California, unlike a parole revocation hearing, is a judicial proceeding providing the probationer with the use of court processes, thus assuring him the presence of necessary witnesses. *981 It must be kept in mind that due process is flexible, and “calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 481 [ 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 494 ]; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 411 U.S. at p. 790 [ 36 L.Ed.2d at p. 666 ].) Thus, a prerevocation hearing is not mandated where the circumstanc

1976(See In re Valrie (1974) 12 Cal.3d 139 *70 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 340 , 524 P.2d 812 ].) Yet as we explained in In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 26-27 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ], a timely preliminary examination may afford a satisfactory substitute for the prerevocation hearing mandated by Morrissey, supra. Petitioner was afforded such a hearing as to the pending criminal charges a few weeks after he was arrested; moreover, as noted above, petitioner expressly waived the initiation of revocation proceedings pending the outcome of his trial.

1976(See In re Valrie (1974) 12 Cal.3d 139 *70 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 340 , 524 P.2d 812 ].) Yet as we explained in In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 26-27 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ], a timely preliminary examination may afford a satisfactory substitute for the prerevocation hearing mandated by Morrissey, supra. Petitioner was afforded such a hearing as to the pending criminal charges a few weeks after he was arrested; moreover, as noted above, petitioner expressly waived the initiation of revocation proceedings pending the outcome of his trial.

2011(See In re Carr (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 ] [even if decision not to hold annual parole discharge review violated due process, remedy would be to provide annual hearing, not nullification of parole revocation decision]; In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ] [failure to provide inmate with a confidential report before his parole revocation hearing violated due process; remedy was to provide the report and a new revocation hearing]; In re Castaneda (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ] [failure to hold prerevocation hearing violated

2011(See In re Carr (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 ] [even if decision not to hold annual parole discharge review violated due process, remedy would be to provide annual hearing, not nullification of parole revocation decision]; In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ] [failure to provide inmate with a confidential report before his parole revocation hearing violated due process; remedy was to provide the report and a new revocation hearing]; In re Castaneda (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ] [failure to hold prerevocation hearing violated

1976(See In re Valrie (1974) 12 Cal.3d 139 *70 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 340 , 524 P.2d 812 ].) Yet as we explained in In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 26-27 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ], a timely preliminary examination may afford a satisfactory substitute for the prerevocation hearing mandated by Morrissey, supra. Petitioner was afforded such a hearing as to the pending criminal charges a few weeks after he was arrested; moreover, as noted above, petitioner expressly waived the initiation of revocation proceedings pending the outcome of his trial.

1976(See In re Valrie (1974) 12 Cal.3d 139 *70 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 340 , 524 P.2d 812 ].) Yet as we explained in In re Law (1973) 10 Cal.3d 21, 26-27 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 573 , 513 P.2d 621 ], a timely preliminary examination may afford a satisfactory substitute for the prerevocation hearing mandated by Morrissey, supra. Petitioner was afforded such a hearing as to the pending criminal charges a few weeks after he was arrested; moreover, as noted above, petitioner expressly waived the initiation of revocation proceedings pending the outcome of his trial.

1974(See In re Love, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 185 [fn. 4 and accompanying text]; In re Castaneda, 34 Cal.App.3d 825, 832-833 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ].) The order of the trial court is modified to read as follows: “The Department of Corrections is directed to vacate its order revoking petitioner’s parole and to conduct further hearings in petitioner’s case in conformity with the guidelines explicated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; In re Prewitt, 8 Cal.3d 470 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 503 P.2d 1326 ], and In re Love, 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ].

1974(See In re Love, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 185 [fn. 4 and accompanying text]; In re Castaneda, 34 Cal.App.3d 825, 832-833 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ].) The order of the trial court is modified to read as follows: “The Department of Corrections is directed to vacate its order revoking petitioner’s parole and to conduct further hearings in petitioner’s case in conformity with the guidelines explicated in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ]; In re Prewitt, 8 Cal.3d 470 [ 105 Cal.Rptr. 318 , 503 P.2d 1326 ], and In re Love, 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ].

2017Prejudice "The denial of [a parolee's] right to a timely prerevocation hearing notwithstanding his timely effort to assert it does not necessarily mean that he is automatically entitled to relief therefrom." ( La Croix , supra , 12 Cal.3d at p. 154 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 .) Someone "whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the [final] revocation hearing." ( Ibid. ) The test of *660 prejudice is w

2017Prejudice "The denial of [a parolee's] right to a timely prerevocation hearing notwithstanding his timely effort to assert it does not necessarily mean that he is automatically entitled to relief therefrom." ( La Croix , supra , 12 Cal.3d at p. 154 , 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 .) Someone "whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the [final] revocation hearing." ( Ibid. ) The test of *660 prejudice is w

2013(In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ] [“a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing”]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 61 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249 ] [no relief for probationer who did not show prejudice from failure to hold immediate prerevocation hearing]; In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698-699 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 532 P

2013(In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ] [“a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing”]; In re Coughlin (1976) 16 Cal.3d 52, 61 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 337 , 545 P.2d 249 ] [no relief for probationer who did not show prejudice from failure to hold immediate prerevocation hearing]; In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698-699 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 532 P

2011(See In re Carr (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 ] [even if decision not to hold annual parole discharge review violated due process, remedy would be to provide annual hearing, not nullification of parole revocation decision]; In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ] [failure to provide inmate with a confidential report before his parole revocation hearing violated due process; remedy was to provide the report and a new revocation hearing]; In re Castaneda (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ] [failure to hold prerevocation hearing violated

2011(See In re Carr (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 ] [even if decision not to hold annual parole discharge review violated due process, remedy would be to provide annual hearing, not nullification of parole revocation decision]; In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ] [failure to provide inmate with a confidential report before his parole revocation hearing violated due process; remedy was to provide the report and a new revocation hearing]; In re Castaneda (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ] [failure to hold prerevocation hearing violated

2016(See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 399 [defendant submitted on PRCS revocation petition without contesting probable cause determination].) Accordingly, any error that took place during the pre-revocation proceedings was harmless. “[T]here is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.” (Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 18 .) 3 DISPOSITION The order revoking PRCS and confining appellant in county jail for 120 days is affirmed.

2013There is no presumption in favor of such procedures; the “judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.” (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 348 ; see Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 392 [“[Procedural due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every instance.”].) To the contrary, “[i]n general, ‘something less’ than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, s

2013There is no presumption in favor of such procedures; the “judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.” (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 348 ; see Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 392 [“[Procedural due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every instance.”].) To the contrary, “[i]n general, ‘something less’ than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, s

2013There is no presumption in favor of such procedures; the “judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.” (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 348 ; see Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 392 [“[Procedural due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every instance.”].) To the contrary, “[i]n general, ‘something less’ than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, s

2013There is no presumption in favor of such procedures; the “judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances.” (Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 348 ; see Oberholzer v. Commission on Judicial Performance, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 392 [“[Procedural due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every instance.”].) To the contrary, “[i]n general, ‘something less’ than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action.” (Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, s

2011(See In re Carr (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 ] [even if decision not to hold annual parole discharge review violated due process, remedy would be to provide annual hearing, not nullification of parole revocation decision]; In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ] [failure to provide inmate with a confidential report before his parole revocation hearing violated due process; remedy was to provide the report and a new revocation hearing]; In re Castaneda (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ] [failure to hold prerevocation hearing violated

2011(See In re Carr (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 209, 218 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 34 ] [even if decision not to hold annual parole discharge review violated due process, remedy would be to provide annual hearing, not nullification of parole revocation decision]; In re Love (1974) 11 Cal.3d 179 [ 113 Cal.Rptr. 89 , 520 P.2d 713 ] [failure to provide inmate with a confidential report before his parole revocation hearing violated due process; remedy was to provide the report and a new revocation hearing]; In re Castaneda (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 825 [ 110 Cal.Rptr. 385 ] [failure to hold prerevocation hearing violated

2007(Duvall, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 484.) Finally, the Board asserted that petitioner failed to show prejudice. 10 It has been held that “a parolee whose parole has been revoked after a properly conducted revocation hearing is not entitled to have the revocation set aside unless it appears that the failure to accord him a prerevocation hearing resulted in prejudice to him at the revocation hearing.” (In re La Croix (1974) 12 Cal.3d 146, 154 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 344 , 524 P.2d 816 ].) “[M]inimum requirements of due process” [for parole revocation where a parolee has been physically deprived of his condi

1980He presents nothing which even suggests that all factual issues to be presented at the summary prerevocation hearing to which he was entitled would not necessarily have been resolved against him... .He thus fails completely to demonstrate prejudice [citation], and we can declare without reservation that the denial in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (Italics added.) ( 12 Cal.3d at p. 155 .) (See also In re Shapiro (1975) 14 Cal.3d 711, 717-718 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 768 , 537 P.2d 888 ].) It is equally “manifest” in the instant case that Caudillo can demonstrate no preju

1980He presents nothing which even suggests that all factual issues to be presented at the summary prerevocation hearing to which he was entitled would not necessarily have been resolved against him... .He thus fails completely to demonstrate prejudice [citation], and we can declare without reservation that the denial in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (Italics added.) ( 12 Cal.3d at p. 155 .) (See also In re Shapiro (1975) 14 Cal.3d 711, 717-718 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 768 , 537 P.2d 888 ].) It is equally “manifest” in the instant case that Caudillo can demonstrate no preju

1977In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 287 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 ], the high court “pointedly did not require that the hearing on termination of [welfare] benefits be conducted by a judicial oEcer or even before the traditional ‘neutral and detached’ officer; it required only that the hearing be conducted by some person other than one initially dealing with the case.” (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. 471, 486 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 497 ].) Accordingly, the court held in Morrissey that in the parole revocation context due process would be satisfied if the prerevocation hearing were hel

1977In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254 [ 25 L.Ed.2d 287 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 ], the high court “pointedly did not require that the hearing on termination of [welfare] benefits be conducted by a judicial oEcer or even before the traditional ‘neutral and detached’ officer; it required only that the hearing be conducted by some person other than one initially dealing with the case.” (Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, 408 U.S. 471, 486 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 497 ].) Accordingly, the court held in Morrissey that in the parole revocation context due process would be satisfied if the prerevocation hearing were hel

1975(In re Winn, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 697-698.) Having determined that petitioner was properly detained fora formal revocation hearing on either count 1 or 4, the court concluded “that the failure to conduct a prerevocation hearing on count 2, the count as to which criminal charges were dismissed, does not compel reconsideration of petitioner’s parole revocation.” ( 13 Cal.3d at p. 698 ; see also, In re Melendez (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 967, 974-975 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 755 ].) The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for the writ is denied.

1975(In re Winn, supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 697-698.) Having determined that petitioner was properly detained fora formal revocation hearing on either count 1 or 4, the court concluded “that the failure to conduct a prerevocation hearing on count 2, the count as to which criminal charges were dismissed, does not compel reconsideration of petitioner’s parole revocation.” ( 13 Cal.3d at p. 698 ; see also, In re Melendez (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 967, 974-975 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 755 ].) The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for the writ is denied.