waiver of any claim in California

2021(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101 .) Once that prima facie showing has been made, “‘it is presumed the communication is privileged and the burden shifts to the opponent to establish waiver, an exception, or that the privilege does not for some other reason apply.’” (Ibid., quoting DP Pham, LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653 , 659–600 (DP Pham).) The determination whether a communication is privileged, and whether there has been a waiver of any such privilege, requires consideration of fact and law.

2021(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101 .) Once that prima facie showing has been made, “‘it is presumed the communication is privileged and the burden shifts to the opponent to establish waiver, an exception, or that the privilege does not for some other reason apply.’” (Ibid., quoting DP Pham, LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653 , 659–600 (DP Pham).) The determination whether a communication is privileged, and whether there has been a waiver of any such privilege, requires consideration of fact and law.

2021(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101 .) Once that prima facie showing has been made, “‘it is presumed the communication is privileged and the burden shifts to the opponent to establish waiver, an exception, or that the privilege does not for some other reason apply.’” (Ibid., quoting DP Pham, LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653 , 659–600 (DP Pham).) The determination whether a communication is privileged, and whether there has been a waiver of any such privilege, requires consideration of fact and law.

2021(McDermott, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1101 .) Once that prima facie showing has been made, “‘it is presumed the communication is privileged and the burden shifts to the opponent to establish waiver, an exception, or that the privilege does not for some other reason apply.’” (Ibid., quoting DP Pham, LLC v. Cheadle (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 653 , 659–600 (DP Pham).) The determination whether a communication is privileged, and whether there has been a waiver of any such privilege, requires consideration of fact and law.

2016Where, as here, the substantial evidence test applies, “[a]n appellant . . . who cites and discusses only evidence in her favor fails to demonstrate any error and waives the contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 , italics added.) Plaintiff’s decision to rely exclusively on her own declaration and the “me too” declarations of her coworkers in her opening brief operates as a waiver of any challenge based on claimed insufficiency of the evidence.

2015Where, as here, the substantial evidence test applies, “[a]n appellant … who cites and discusses only evidence in [his] favor fails to demonstrate any error and waives the contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the judgment.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408 , italics added.) 3 In an attempt to submit unauthorized supplemental briefing, plaintiff filed a document entitled “Appellant’s Motion for New Trial.” Whatever is stated in that document is plainly too little, too late, and in any event it presents nothing to alter our opinion that the appeal is fundamen

2005Conversely, where a requirement is designed to protect an individual and the failure to comply might harm the individual, the requirement is generally mandatory." ( Ibid. ) Turning to the question of waiver, People v. Williams relied on People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pages 146-148, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 , among other cases, and "[found] no meaningful basis to distinguish an alleged violation [of the date requirements for an extension trial] from a violation of section 1382." ( People v. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 460 , 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 .) The Court of Appeal conclud

2005Conversely, where a requirement is designed to protect an individual and the failure to comply might harm the individual, the requirement is generally mandatory." ( Ibid. ) Turning to the question of waiver, People v. Williams relied on People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pages 146-148, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 , among other cases, and "[found] no meaningful basis to distinguish an alleged violation [of the date requirements for an extension trial] from a violation of section 1382." ( People v. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 460 , 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 .) The Court of Appeal conclud

1961This was not a case in which counsel's conduct led the court to believe that he was consenting to a mistrial, as in *277 People v. Kelly, 132 Cal.App. 118 [ 22 P.2d 526 ], relied upon by the People. [7] The record is clear that counsel was not consenting and the case thus must be treated as one in which the mistrial was granted on the prosecutor's motion over the petitioner's objection, a situation which clearly supports the plea of once in jeopardy.

1961This was not a case in which counsel's conduct led the court to believe that he was consenting to a mistrial, as in *277 People v. Kelly, 132 Cal.App. 118 [ 22 P.2d 526 ], relied upon by the People. [7] The record is clear that counsel was not consenting and the case thus must be treated as one in which the mistrial was granted on the prosecutor's motion over the petitioner's objection, a situation which clearly supports the plea of once in jeopardy.

2025(Roberts, supra, 109 Cal.App.3d at p. 631 .) “[W]e find that counsel’s refusal to properly modify [the instruction] is tantamount to a waiver of any error on the part of the court in its failure to give the former 8 instruction.” (Id. at p. 634.) The court further noted, “‘There is no reason nor justification for compelling a trial judge to act as a sort of advisory or “backup” counsel . . . .’” (Id. at p. 635, quoting Gagosian v. Burdick’s Television & Appliances (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 .) The same reasoning applies here.

2025(Roberts, supra, 109 Cal.App.3d at p. 631 .) “[W]e find that counsel’s refusal to properly modify [the instruction] is tantamount to a waiver of any error on the part of the court in its failure to give the former 8 instruction.” (Id. at p. 634.) The court further noted, “‘There is no reason nor justification for compelling a trial judge to act as a sort of advisory or “backup” counsel . . . .’” (Id. at p. 635, quoting Gagosian v. Burdick’s Television & Appliances (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 316, 318 .) The same reasoning applies here.

2023To put it another way, review is limited to issues which have been adequately raised and briefed.” (Lewis v. County of Sacramento (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 107, 116 ; see Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 [recognizing the principle that an “appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error”]; Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1111, 1115 [rejecting appellant’s challenge to the grant of summary judgment because, although appellant alleged a “ ‘plethora of admissible evidence’ indicate[d] a triable issue of fact existed”

2014The majority in that case held that the waiver is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment under Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 420 .

2014The majority in that case held that the waiver is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment under Murphy, supra, 465 U.S. at p. 420 .

2013(Hambrose Reserve, Ltd. v. Faitz (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 129, 133 [failure to address a point on appeal was a waiver of any challenge to the lower court’s ruling on that basis], overruled on other grounds in Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 292 .) Even if C. had not waived the issue, we conclude we would be compelled to follow Davis here.

2013(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) Therefore, C.’s argument lacks merit as well.4 II.

2005Analysis Returning to Osman's argument that this case is controlled by the rationale of the San Mateo Appellate Division's decision in Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 , 111 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 , we disagree.

2005Conversely, where a requirement is designed to protect an individual and the failure to comply might harm the individual, the requirement is generally mandatory." ( Ibid. ) Turning to the question of waiver, People v. Williams relied on People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pages 146-148, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 , among other cases, and "[found] no meaningful basis to distinguish an alleged violation [of the date requirements for an extension trial] from a violation of section 1382." ( People v. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 460 , 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 .) The Court of Appeal conclud

2005Conversely, where a requirement is designed to protect an individual and the failure to comply might harm the individual, the requirement is generally mandatory." ( Ibid. ) Turning to the question of waiver, People v. Williams relied on People v. Wilson, supra, 60 Cal.2d at pages 146-148, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44 , 383 P.2d 452 , among other cases, and "[found] no meaningful basis to distinguish an alleged violation [of the date requirements for an extension trial] from a violation of section 1382." ( People v. Williams, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 460 , 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 .) The Court of Appeal conclud

2005Analysis Returning to Osman's argument that this case is controlled by the rationale of the San Mateo Appellate Division's decision in Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 4 Cal.Rptr.3d 62 , 111 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 , we disagree.

1993After consideration, we find the subdivision does not aid defendant's position. [29] Powell v. Texas (1989) 492 U.S. 680 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 551 , 109 S.Ct. 3146 ] is distinguishable.

1993After consideration, we find the subdivision does not aid defendant's position. [29] Powell v. Texas (1989) 492 U.S. 680 [ 106 L.Ed.2d 551 , 109 S.Ct. 3146 ] is distinguishable.

1993Section 994 (physician-patient privilege), ... a waiver of the right of a particular joint holder of the privilege to claim the privilege does not affect the right of another joint holder to claim the privilege. . . . [f] (c) A disclosure that is itself privileged is not a waiver of any privilege. [1] (d) A disclosure in confidence of a communication that is protected by a privilege provided by . . . 994 (physician-patient privilege), ... is not a waiver of the privilege.” A confidential communication between a patient and a physician is “information, including information obtained by an exami

1989Had the prosecutor drawn a clear distinction between the statutory factors of moral justification, duress, etc., which could only be mitigating, and circumstances shown by the evidence, which could be “aggravating” in the sense of rebutting other evidence tending to prove the factor, the prosecutor might possibly have avoided Davenport error (People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]). 16 Defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument on these grounds would normally be deemed a waiver of any error.

1989Had the prosecutor drawn a clear distinction between the statutory factors of moral justification, duress, etc., which could only be mitigating, and circumstances shown by the evidence, which could be “aggravating” in the sense of rebutting other evidence tending to prove the factor, the prosecutor might possibly have avoided Davenport error (People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]). 16 Defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s argument on these grounds would normally be deemed a waiver of any error.