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11 Massachusetts opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hankerson v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences2006Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 475 (1998), discussing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (“States could ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ ”). 2002See Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366 (2002) (no consideration of merits of defendant’s sixth postdirect appeal motion); Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30 (2000) (no consideration on merits on appeal from denial of defendant’s fifth motion for new trial); Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 475 (1998), discussing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (“States could ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ ”). | 4 | 11 |
Commonwealth v. Burnettgreen2 sentences2006Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 475 (1998), discussing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (“States could ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ ”). 2002See Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366 (2002) (no consideration of merits of defendant’s sixth postdirect appeal motion); Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30 (2000) (no consideration on merits on appeal from denial of defendant’s fifth motion for new trial); Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 475 (1998), discussing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (“States could ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ ”). | 3 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Repozagreen2 sentences2000See Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 475 (1998), discussing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (“States could ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ ”); Commonwealth v. Repoza, 400 Mass. 516, 520 , cert, denied, 484 U.S. 516 (1987) (same). 1997Commonwealth v. Repoza, 400 Mass. 516, 520 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987), quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (noting “the normal and valid rule that failure to object ... is a waiver of any claim of error”). | 1 | 3 |
Rodwell v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2006See Rodwell v. Commonwealth, 432 Mass. 1016, 1018 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Vallieregreen1 sentence2002See Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366 (2002) (no consideration of merits of defendant’s sixth postdirect appeal motion); Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30 (2000) (no consideration on merits on appeal from denial of defendant’s fifth motion for new trial); Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 475 (1998), discussing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (“States could ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ ”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Olanogreen1 sentence2000See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465 (1997), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (recognizing “the ‘familiar’ principle that a right ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it’ ”). rhere is no merit to the Commonwealth’s argument that the moral certainty language argument was available to the defendant at the time of his direct appeal in 1978. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2000See also Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 465 (1997), quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (recognizing “the ‘familiar’ principle that a right ‘may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it’ ”). rhere is no merit to the Commonwealth’s argument that the moral certainty language argument was available to the defendant at the time of his direct appeal in 1978. | 1 | 1 |
Robert Dietz v. Herman Solem, Wardengreen2 sentences1987See Dietz, supra at 132 . 1987See Dietz, supra at 132 . | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Franksgreen1 sentence1978For two reasons, we decline to apply Massachusetts law in this manner. *589 First, it is true that under Massachusetts law “an assignment of error . . . not based on an exception brings nothing to this court for review . . ..” Commonwealth v. Franks, 365 Mass. 74, 76 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Lynaugh, Director, Texas Department of Corrections
green
2 sentences1997Commonwealth v. Repoza, 400 Mass. 516, 520 , cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987), quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (noting “the normal and valid rule that failure to object ... is a waiver of any claim of error”). 1990Even in cases where the retroactive application of a new criminal rule is required, the Supreme Court has ruled that “States may ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error.’ ” Commonwealth v. Repoza, 400 Mass. 516, 520 (1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987), quoting Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 (1987). | 2 | 1990–1997 |
Mains v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2002See Commonwealth v. Valliere, 437 Mass. 366 (2002) (no consideration of merits of defendant’s sixth postdirect appeal motion); Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30 (2000) (no consideration on merits on appeal from denial of defendant’s fifth motion for new trial); Commonwealth v. Burnett, 428 Mass. 469, 475 (1998), discussing Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977) (“States could ‘insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waiver of any claim of error’ ”). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Commonwealth v. Sama
green
1 sentence2002The defendant asserts that the law underpinning his challenge to the intoxication instruction given at trial was not firmly established until our decision in Commonwealth v. Sama, 411 Mass. 293 (1991). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Commonwealth v. Stokes
green
2 sentences1980In Stokes, supra at 590 , we concluded that “with respect to trials occurring before Mullaney , a specific objection to the judge’s instructions on burden of proof need not be shown in order to secure appellate review.” In reaching this conclusion the court explicitly rejected the suggestion in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977), which it now seems to embrace, namely, that with respect to pre-Mullaney cases, “[t]he States, if they wish, may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waive 1980In Stokes, supra at 590 , we concluded that “with respect to trials occurring before Mullaney , a specific objection to the judge’s instructions on burden of proof need not be shown in order to secure appellate review.” In reaching this conclusion the court explicitly rejected the suggestion in Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233 , 244 n.8 (1977), which it now seems to embrace, namely, that with respect to pre-Mullaney cases, “[t]he States, if they wish, may be able to insulate past convictions by enforcing the normal and valid rule that failure to object to a jury instruction is a waive | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.