inventory search exception in Maryland

2025The United States Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), was and remains the “Fourth Amendment pole star” for law governing the inventory search doctrine.

2025“These rationales are distinct from the permissible reasons for conducting a routine inventory of the contents of an impounded vehicle, which are ‘to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.’” Id. (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 ); see also United States v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the inventory search doctrine “encompasses distinct police actions”); Brown, 417 P.3d at 871 (“[T]he decision to impound a vehicle and the ensuing

2017That evidence is essential to establishing the inventory search exception, regardless of whether the total circumstances seem more consistent with the search’s having been performed for a community caretaking purpose than for an investigatory purpose. 152 Md.App. at 23 , 828 A.2d 803 (emphasis supplied).

2017That evidence is essential to establishing the inventory search exception, regardless of whether the total circumstances seem more consistent with the search’s having been performed for a community caretaking purpose than for an investigatory purpose. 152 Md.App. at 23 , 828 A.2d 803 (emphasis supplied).

2025Defense counsel cited various United States Supreme Court cases, including Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), for the proposition that the seizure of a vehicle under the inventory search exception is justified only if authorized pursuant to standard criteria and based on something other than suspicion of criminal activity.

2025“These rationales are distinct from the permissible reasons for conducting a routine inventory of the contents of an impounded vehicle, which are ‘to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.’” Id. (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 ); see also United States v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the inventory search doctrine “encompasses distinct police actions”); Brown, 417 P.3d at 871 (“[T]he decision to impound a vehicle and the ensuing

2025“These rationales are distinct from the permissible reasons for conducting a routine inventory of the contents of an impounded vehicle, which are ‘to protect an owner’s property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger.’” Id. (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372 ); see also United States v. Arrocha, 713 F.3d 1159, 1162 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the inventory search doctrine “encompasses distinct police actions”); Brown, 417 P.3d at 871 (“[T]he decision to impound a vehicle and the ensuing

2025State v. Paynter, 234 Md.

2025In Paynter, we stated the two requirements of the inventory search exception; only the second requires a standardized police procedure: From the beginning, Maryland recognized that the two key requirements of that new doctrine are 1) that the vehicle be lawfully in police custody and 2) that the inventory be done “pursuant to standard police procedure.” 234 Md.

2010Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court found that the inventory search exception did not apply in that case because the officers “had no intention of impounding Gant’s car until after they searched the passenger compartment and found the contraband.” State v. Gant, 216 Ariz. 1 , 162 P.3d 640, 646 (2007) (citation omitted), aff'd, Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1720 .

2003The exception does not apply, however, when the inventory search is used by a police officer as “ ‘a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’ ” Id. at 811 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at 4 , 110 S.Ct. 1632 ).

2003The exception does not apply, however, when the inventory search is used by a police officer as “ ‘a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’ ” Id. at 811 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 (quoting Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at 4 , 110 S.Ct. 1632 ).

2003Finally, the Supreme Court touched upon the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), in which it held that, when a police officer has probable cause to seize a person for violating the traffic laws, the seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment just because it may be a pretext to accomplish some other law enforcement objective.

2003Finally, the Supreme Court touched upon the inventory search exception to the Fourth Amendment in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), in which it held that, when a police officer has probable cause to seize a person for violating the traffic laws, the seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment just because it may be a pretext to accomplish some other law enforcement objective.

2003In Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 , 103 S.Ct. 2605 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), the Court applied the inventory search exception outside the context of an automobile search.

2003In Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 , 103 S.Ct. 2605 , 77 L.Ed.2d 65 (1983), the Court applied the inventory search exception outside the context of an automobile search.

2003In New York v. Belton, supra, the Supreme Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of *24 that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 (footnotes omitted).

2003In New York v. Belton, supra, the Supreme Court held that “when a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of *24 that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” 453 U.S. at 460 , 101 S.Ct. 2860 (footnotes omitted).

1979Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Waine v. State, supra. The State urges that this search fell within the ambit of the inventory search exception as expressed by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 , 96 S. Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), wherein the Court found that an inventory search of an automobile in police custody usually *214 flows out of the necessity on the part of police to inventory the contents of an automobile in order to secure or protect the car and its contents.

1979Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 , 91 S. Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); Waine v. State, supra. The State urges that this search fell within the ambit of the inventory search exception as expressed by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364 , 96 S. Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), wherein the Court found that an inventory search of an automobile in police custody usually *214 flows out of the necessity on the part of police to inventory the contents of an automobile in order to secure or protect the car and its contents.