10 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Oppermangreen2 sentences2026See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5) (explaining the inventory-search exception focuses on “the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions[ ]”); see also State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. Crim. 2017See id. at 371-72 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5) (explaining that the inventory-search exception centers “upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions[]”); see also State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 3 |
Cruz, Adelfo Ramirezgreen2 sentences2026See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5) (explaining the inventory-search exception focuses on “the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions[ ]”); see also State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. Crim. 2017See id. at 371-72 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5) (explaining that the inventory-search exception centers “upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions[]”); see also State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Colorado v. Bertinegreen2 sentences2026See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5) (explaining the inventory-search exception focuses on “the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions[ ]”); see also State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. Crim. 2017See id. at 371-72 (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 370 n.5) (explaining that the inventory-search exception centers “upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking functions[]”); see also State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 542 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Moskey v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Moskey, 333 S.W.3d at 700 (citing Bertine, 479 U.S. at 374 ). 2014See Moskey, 333 S.W.3d at 702 . | 1 | 2 |
Andreas Marcopoulos v. Stategreen1 sentence2017App. 2002). 54 Marcopoulos , 492 S.W.3d at 777 ("Appellant's four issues challenge ... whether the search of his truck fit within the inventory-search exception to obtaining a search warrant."). 1 "We'd seen him at the location before, we couldn't get him to stop quick enough and get him out of there due to traffic or we couldn't enter in there. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1984The sounder approach was epitomized by the case of United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1980), wherein the 8th Circuit said that a legitimate seizure of an automobile does not automatically justify an unlimited inventory search of the automobile, nor entry via key into a locked automobile trunk: "Although an individual may not reasonably expect the same degree of privacy in a car trunk as in a home or office, an individual may justifiably have a greater expectation of privacy in the locked trunk than in the interior of his car. * * * * * * "We hold, therefore, that the needs of the 1984The sounder approach was epitomized by the case of United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1980), wherein the 8th Circuit said that a legitimate seizure of an automobile does not automatically justify an unlimited inventory search of the automobile, nor entry via key into a locked automobile trunk: “Although an individual may not reasonably expect the same degree of privacy in a car trunk as in a home or office, an individual may justifiably have a greater expectation of privacy in the locked trunk than in the interi- or of his car. ****** “We hold, therefore, that the needs of the gov | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cornelius Jackson v. State
green
2 sentences2017App. 2015) (noting that the inventory search exception is based on administrative concerns) (citing to Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 ); Jackson, 468 S.W.3d at 195 . 2017App. 2015) (noting that the inventory search exception is based on administrative concerns) (citing to Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371 ); Jackson, 468 S.W.3d at 195 . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Lalande v. State
green
1 sentence2020Accordingly, the search of Appellant’s suitcase might have been valid as a legal 1 676 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
McGee v. State
green
1 sentence2018Error Appellant's four issues challenge (1) whether the search of his truck fit within the inventory-search exception to obtaining a search warrant, (2) whether the search could properly be characterized as an inventory-search, (3) whether the Houston Police Department's inventory search requirements were constitutional, and (4) whether the search exceeded the scope of his arrest. *703 "Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search of either a person or property is considered per se unreasonable subject to a few specifically defined and well established exceptions." McGee v. State , 1 | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Mercado
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 76 . 1998Id. at 76 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. Loren Robie Wilson
green
2 sentences1984The sounder approach was epitomized by the case of United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1980), wherein the 8th Circuit said that a legitimate seizure of an automobile does not automatically justify an unlimited inventory search of the automobile, nor entry via key into a locked automobile trunk: "Although an individual may not reasonably expect the same degree of privacy in a car trunk as in a home or office, an individual may justifiably have a greater expectation of privacy in the locked trunk than in the interior of his car. * * * * * * "We hold, therefore, that the needs of the 1984The sounder approach was epitomized by the case of United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1980), wherein the 8th Circuit said that a legitimate seizure of an automobile does not automatically justify an unlimited inventory search of the automobile, nor entry via key into a locked automobile trunk: "Although an individual may not reasonably expect the same degree of privacy in a car trunk as in a home or office, an individual may justifiably have a greater expectation of privacy in the locked trunk than in the interior of his car. * * * * * * "We hold, therefore, that the needs of the | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Gill v. State
green
2 sentences1984In Gill the majority characterized the State's argument as nothing more than "advocating that a routine lawful arrest of a suspect in an automobile authorizes a search of every nook and cranny of that automobile." Gill, supra at 320 . 1984In Gill the majority characterized the State’s argument as nothing more than “advocating that a routine lawful arrest of a suspect in an automobile authorizes a search of every nook and cranny of that automobile.” Gill, supra at 320 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Stephen v. State
green
1 sentence1984NOTES [1] See also Stephen v. State, 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex.Cr.App. delivered this day). [2] Black's Law Dictionary, 1261 (5th ed. 1979). [3] Notwithstanding the apparent emphasis on forced entry in the Gill majority's second, additional reason, where a key is used by police to enter a locked car trunk there can be made a strong argument against use of the inventory search doctrine to justify this police conduct. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Kelley v. State
green
2 sentences1984As pointed out in my dissent in Kelley, supra, the United States Supreme Court has never sanctioned keyed entry into a locked glove compartment under the guise of the inventory search doctrine. 1984As pointed out in my dissent in Kelley, supra, the United States Supreme Court has never sanctioned keyed entry into a locked glove compartment under the guise of the inventory search doctrine. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.