inventory search exception in Pennsylvania

2025“Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception …, the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2025Exceptions to the warrant requirement include [inter alia] the inventory search exception[.] Commonwealth v. Simonson, 148 A.3d 792, 797 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations and internal brackets omitted).

2026Particularly relevant to the case sub judice, when specifically addressing the viability of the inventory search exception post- Alexander, this Court has recognized that “the limited automobile exception is doctrinally distinct from the inventory search exception[,]” and determined that Alexander “does not eliminate the inventory search exception.” Commonwealth v. Thompson, 289 A.3d 1104, 1110 (Pa. Super. 2023) (explaining that “[a]n inventory search falls under ‘community caretaking’ and thus does not involve probable cause.”).

2025See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 , 207 (Pa. 2020); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 289 A.3d 1104, 1110 (Pa.Super. 2023) (concluding Alexander “does not eliminate the inventory search exception”), appeal granted, 303 A.3d 111 (Pa. 2023), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 315 A.3d 1277 (Pa. 2024).

2023These exceptions include “the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception, ... the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

2023These exceptions include “the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception, ... the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 285 A.3d 328, 332 (Pa.Super. 2022) (citation omitted).

2026This Court has explained that “[s]uch exceptions include the consent exception, the plain view exception, the inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances exception, the automobile exception[,] the stop and frisk exception, and the search incident to arrest exception.” Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1072 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

2024The "well well delineated exceptions" to exceptions" to the the warrant requirement include warrant requirement include `the the consent consent exception, exception, the the plain view exception, plain view exception, the the inventory search exception, inventory search exception, the exigent circumstances the exigent circumstances exception, exception, the automobile exception the automobile exception ... ... the stop and the stop and frisk exception, and frisk exception, and the search incident the search to arrest incident to arrest exception."" exception."' Commonwealth y v. McMahon, 280

2024None of the safeguards that attend the warrant procedure are relevant, the inventory search doctrine holds, because, before conducting the search, the police officer removes his or her proverbial “criminal investigator” hat and dons a “community caretaker” hat, whereupon the officer’s role suddenly is “totally divorced” from any interest 7 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). [J-6-2024, 85 MAP 2023] - 4 in investigating crime. 8 When the officer then rummages through the car, ostensibly for non-investigatory reasons, and comes across evidence of a crime (by sheer happenstance, o

2023Id. at 447 . -5- J-A24006-22 In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976), the United States Supreme Court announced the inventory search exception relied upon by the Commonwealth in this case and cited Cady’s rationale.

2025Here, we agree with Carthon that the record is silent as to the second prong of the inventory search exception, i.e., whether the search was conducted pursuant to “reasonable standard police procedures and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of investigation.” Henley, 909 A.2d at 359 .

2011As such, we conclude the first prong of the inventory search test ( i.e., whether the police lawfully took custody of a vehicle) is met. [FN6] See Henley, 909 A.2d at 359 .

2026Nor does he take ____________________________________________ 3 Our Supreme Court has explained that for purposes of Section 6309.2(a)(1), there is “no distinction between a vehicle that has been impounded and one that has been towed and stored.” Lagenella, 83 A.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). - 11 - J-A30021-25 issue with the fact that he was operating a motor vehicle on a highway or trafficway in the Commonwealth.

2019See id. at 102 . - 13 - J-A02016-18 We also observe that the police did not abide by standard policies.

2023See id. at 392 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (arguing that, at minimum, an inventory search cannot take place if the car owner declines; “It is at least clear that any owner might prohibit the police from executing a protective search of his impounded car, since by hypothesis the inventory is conducted for the owner’s benefit.”); see also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 , 385 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that in Opperman the vehicle’s owner was not present when the vehicle was towed; “In this case, however, the owner was present to make other arrangements for the safekeeping of his

2023We recognize that, in Thompson, supra, this Court acknowledged that aspects of the Alexander decision may support some limitations on the inventory search exception under our charter, but we ultimately declined to address such arguments: … Alexander may well support some limitations on the inventory search exception, as expressed by the dissenting Justices in Opperman[, 428 U.S.] at 392 … (Marshall, J. dissenting) (arguing that, at minimum, an inventory search cannot take place if the car owner declines; “It is at least clear that any owner might prohibit the police from executing a protective

2018The “administration of a blood test . . . performed by an agent of, or at the direction of the government” constitutes a search under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. -3- J-S18009-18 Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152 , 615 A.2d 308, 315 (1992); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

2018The “administration of a blood test . . . performed by an agent of, or at the direction of the government” constitutes a search under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. -3- J-S18009-18 Commonwealth v. Kohl, 532 Pa. 152 , 615 A.2d 308, 315 (1992); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966).

2016White, 543 Pa. at 58 , 669 A.2d at 903 , When the court finds that the search constituted a criminal investigation the inventory search exception is inapplicable.

2016White, 543 Pa. at 58 , 669 A.2d at 903 , When the court finds that the search constituted a criminal investigation the inventory search exception is inapplicable.

2013Id. at 623 .

2011Additionally, the procedures set forth for the release of the vehicle upon immobilization have no bearing on the issue whether the police can conduct an inventory search of the vehicle. [FN7] Commonwealth v. Thompson, 999 A.2d 616, 619-623 (Pa.Super.2010) (emphasis added).

2025Hennigan, 753 A.2d at 255 (internal citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Thompson, 289 A.3d 1104, 1107-10 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“[T]he limited automobile exception is doctrinally distinct from the inventory search exception. [. . .] An inventory search falls under community caretaking and thus does not involve probable cause.”) (quotation marks omitted).

2024Commonwealth v. Thompson, 289 A.3d 1104, 1111 (Pa. Super. 2023) (“The Alexander Court’s rejection of the United States Supreme Court’s views on the privacy interests involved in an automobile may well support some limitations on the inventory search doctrine.”). 25 See DePaul v. Commonwealth, 969 A.2d 536, 547 (Pa. 2009) (noting that, “[g]iven this Court’s extensive consideration of Article I, Section 7 under the Edmunds factors” in an earlier decision, “there is no reason to engage in a full-blown Edmunds analysis here”). [J-6-2024, 85 MAP 2023] - 10 our continued adherence to the rule that i

2024See Commonwealth v. Toanone, 553 A.2d 998, 1001 (Pa. Super. 1989). -8- J-A01028-24 credited the testimony of the sergeant and found that the search was conducted pursuant to a standard police procedure.9 Therefore, the second requirement is met, and we conclude that the trial court properly found that a valid inventory search was conducted.10 Next, we must address one other claim raised by Dollard: that the inventory search exception is no longer applicable after Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020).

2024Smith, 285 A.3d at 332 . -6- J-S44028-23 “The plain view doctrine provides that evidence in plain view of the police can be seized without a warrant.” Commonwealth v. Luczki, 212 A.3d 530, 546 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

2023See Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069 , 1073 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“[The a]ppellant points to nothing in Alexander which modified the plain view exception, and we decline to apply Alexander.”); Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571 , 576 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Alexander did not impact its ruling because its decision did not rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view and search incident to arrest exceptions to the warrant requirement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation to trial court opinion o

2023See Commonwealth v. McMahon, 280 A.3d 1069, 1073 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“[The a]ppellant points to nothing in Alexander which modified the plain view exception, and we decline to apply Alexander.”); Commonwealth v. Lutz, 270 A.3d 571, 576 (Pa. Super. 2022) (“Alexander did not impact its ruling because its decision did not rest upon the analytical underpinnings of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, but rather upon an application of the plain view and search incident to arrest exceptions to the warrant requirement.”) (internal quotation marks and citation to trial court opinion omi

2023See Henley, supra. See also Williams, supra. Accordingly, we affirm.

2019The public servant exception, the inventory search exception, and the emergency aid exception all fall under the same umbrella: the “community caretaking doctrine.” See id. at 626-627 ; see also, e.g., In Interest of M.W., supra, 194 A.3d at 1100-1101 (“As long as the search is pursuant to the caretaking functions of the police department, the conduct of the police - 19 - J-A02016-18 will not be viewed as unreasonable under the Constitution.”) (emphasis added).

2018Here, Appellant relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Daniels, 593 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 533 (Pa. 1991), for the proposition that, “[t]he plain view exception cannot be used as a pretext when police officers know in advance the location of an item and intend to seize it.” Daniels, supra at 898 ; (see also Appellant’s Brief, at 15).

2018Here, Appellant relies on this Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Daniels, 593 A.2d 895, 898 (Pa. Super. 1991), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 533 (Pa. 1991), for the proposition that, “[t]he plain view exception cannot be used as a pretext when police officers know in advance the location of an item and intend to seize it.” Daniels, supra at 898 ; (see also Appellant’s Brief, at 15).

2017See Germann, 621 A.2d at 594 .