inventory search exception (California) · Go Syfert
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inventory search exception in California

6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
People v. Williamsgreen
cal · 1999 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2025
2 sentences

2025(Dominguez, at p. 353 [relying upon a “reasonable” “inference” in applying inevitable discovery doctrine].) Third, defendant argues that the inventory search doctrine only applies to automobiles and that the People must introduce evidence of the standardized procedures followed for such auto searches (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 138 [discussing absence of a “policy supporting an inventory search” of an automobile specifying which parts of the vehicle would be searched]).

2002(Ibid.) Citing Colorado v. Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. 367 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 , Williams stated that police have a legitimate interest in taking an inventory of the contents, including closed containers, in vehicles they legally tow and impound, and therefore inventory searches constitute an exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. ( Williams, supra, at p. 126 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 973 P.2d 52 .) However, for the inventory search exception to apply, police must follow established standardized procedures.

23
People v. Torresgreen
calctapp · 2010 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2019–2024
2 sentences

2024(People v. Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867; Blakes v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 914-915.) “Unlike the probable cause determination, which rests solely on an objective standard, the inventory search exception evaluates both the objective reasonableness of the impound decision and the subjective intent of the impounding officer to determine whether the decision to impound was ‘motivated by an improper investigatory purpose.’ [Citation.] Such purpose renders a decision to impound and the subsequent inventory search unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.” (People v. Lee, supr

2024(People v. Lee, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 867; Blakes v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 914-915.) “Unlike the probable cause determination, which rests solely on an objective standard, the inventory search exception evaluates both the objective reasonableness of the impound decision and the subjective intent of the impounding officer to determine whether the decision to impound was ‘motivated by an improper investigatory purpose.’ [Citation.] Such purpose renders a decision to impound and the subsequent inventory search unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.” (People v. Lee, supr

13
Florida v. Wellsgreen
scotus · 1990 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2002–2021
2 sentences

2021“Because of the risk that an inventory search will be ‘a ruse for a general rummaging,’ . . . a valid inventory search must adhere to a preexisting policy or practice.” (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 138 (Williams).) Thus, for instance, “standardized criteria . . . or established routine, . . . must regulate the opening of containers found during inventory searches,” and the “individual police officer must not be allowed so much 11 latitude that inventory searches are turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of discovering evidence of crime.’ ” (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S.

2019(Torres, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 788 .) Officers may not use an inventory search as "a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence." (Florida v. Wells (1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4 .) Unlike the probable cause determination, which rests solely on an objective standard, the inventory search exception evaluates both the objective reasonableness of the impound decision and the subjective intent of the impounding officer to determine whether the decision to impound was "motivated by an improper investigatory purpose." (Torres, at p. 791.) Such purpose renders a decision to

13
United States v. Mark Johnsongreen
ca9 · 2018 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024The relevant question is whether the impounding was subjectively motivated by an improper investigatory purpose”]; and see United States v. Anderson (2024) 101 F.4th 586, 593 [impoundments and inventory searches are “the rare context where the Fourth Amendment analysis is not purely objective—subjective motivations are material”]; and United States v. Johnson (2018) 889 F.3d 1120, 1125 [“ ‘actual motivations do matter’ ” in “administrative searches conducted without individualized suspicion—such as drunk-driving checkpoints or vehicular inventory searches”].) Thus, “courts will explore police

11
United States v. Jonathan Andersongreen
ca9 · 2024 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024The relevant question is whether the impounding was subjectively motivated by an improper investigatory purpose”]; and see United States v. Anderson (2024) 101 F.4th 586, 593 [impoundments and inventory searches are “the rare context where the Fourth Amendment analysis is not purely objective—subjective motivations are material”]; and United States v. Johnson (2018) 889 F.3d 1120, 1125 [“ ‘actual motivations do matter’ ” in “administrative searches conducted without individualized suspicion—such as drunk-driving checkpoints or vehicular inventory searches”].) Thus, “courts will explore police

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (4)

CaseCitedYears
Colorado v. Bertine green
scotus · 1987
2 sentences

2002(Ibid.) Citing Colorado v. Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. 367 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 , Williams stated that police have a legitimate interest in taking an inventory of the contents, including closed containers, in vehicles they legally tow and impound, and therefore inventory searches constitute an exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. ( Williams, supra, at p. 126 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 973 P.2d 52 .) However, for the inventory search exception to apply, police must follow established standardized procedures.

2002(Ibid.) Citing Colorado v. Bertine, supra, 479 U.S. 367 , 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 , Williams stated that police have a legitimate interest in taking an inventory of the contents, including closed containers, in vehicles they legally tow and impound, and therefore inventory searches constitute an exception to the search warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. ( Williams, supra, at p. 126 , 83 Cal.Rptr.2d 275 , 973 P.2d 52 .) However, for the inventory search exception to apply, police must follow established standardized procedures.

21994–2002
Illinois v. Lafayette green
scotus · 1983
1 sentence

2025Defendant is wrong: Inventory searches also include a defendant’s belongings upon booking (see Lafayette, supra, 462 U.S. at pp. 646-648), and we may reasonably infer that the police 10 would have opened and looked inside the backpack in defendant’s possession where, as here, there was no one else present to whom the backpack could be entrusted when defendant was arrested.

12025–2025
People v. Aguilar green
calctapp · 1991
1 sentence

2019(Aguilar, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 1053 .) Officer Robles's search of the Cadillac is similar to the search in Torres.

12019–2019
South Dakota v. Opperman green
scotus · 1976
2 sentences

1994What the department does not expressly argue, but what we imply from its argument, is that, were Ms. Taylor's entry into Susan T.'s home pursuant to the department's authority under section 5156, that entry would fall within the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment under the authority of Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 739 , 107 S.Ct. 738 ] and South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 ].

1994What the department does not expressly argue, but what we imply from its argument, is that, were Ms. Taylor's entry into Susan T.'s home pursuant to the department's authority under section 5156, that entry would fall within the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment under the authority of Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 739 , 107 S.Ct. 738 ] and South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 [ 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 , 96 S.Ct. 3092 ].

11994–1994

Where else courts name it

PA 51 (2007–2026) OH 27 (1990–2024) MI 16 (1981–2026) IN 16 (1988–2020) TX 10 (1984–2026) NM 10 (1993–2023) LA 9 (1978–2008) FL 7 (1979–2025) VA 7 (1980–2025) IL 6 (1978–2025) CO 6 (1984–2019) MO 6 (1979–2016) NE 6 (2017–2023) CA 6 (1994–2025) MD 5 (1979–2025) ND 5 (1990–2023) TN 5 (1992–2015) MN 5 (2004–2016) NY 5 (1989–2021) NJ 4 (1993–2026) ID 4 (1983–2023) WA 4 (2015–2019) MA 4 (2002–2019) NH 3 (1985–2011) NC 3 (1981–2014) AL 3 (1982–1988) KS 3 (2007–2024) MT 2 (2009–2015) MS 2 (1981–2023) WI 2 (1990–2003) SC 2 (2014–2018) HI 2 (1984–1988) AR 2 (1997–2005) NV 2 (2000–2024) AK 2 (1979–1996)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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